



Department of Homeland Security
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL



SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS

April 1, 2017 – September 30, 2017

Inspector General's Message

Secretary
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary:

I am pleased to present our semiannual report, which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the second half of fiscal year 2017.


Our work has made the Department better and more effective. The audits, inspections and investigations we conducted during this reporting period will improve effectiveness in TSA's checkpoint screening operations; increase effectiveness in managing the deportation of aliens who are no longer detained; make progress toward meeting enterprise-wide data goals; improve oversight of housing challenges in response to Hurricane Harvey; ensure FEMA funds are put to better use; and improve management and oversight of programs and operations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

I am also pleased to report that our Special Review Group is now operational. This is a small group of auditors, investigators and attorneys who examine issues that do not lend themselves to a traditional audit, inspection, or investigation. This group then reports the results of their inquiry in a very short timeframe – in a matter of weeks, not months. We will continue to innovate how we conduct oversight to ensure we are as effective as we can be in our crucial mission.

The Department and its components have worked with us to correct hundreds of issues and improve the economy and efficiency of programs and operations. Based on the Department's actions this period, we closed 174 recommendations issued in this and prior periods. This would not happen without the commitment of the men and woman throughout DHS who are committed to improving how DHS meets its mission.

Moving forward, we will continue to be agents of positive change and concentrate on the areas of greatest risk to the Department. We look forward to reporting in the future on the Department's actions to address its many challenges.

Sincerely,



John Roth
Inspector General

Table of Contents

Inspector General’s Message	1
Highlights of Office of Inspector General Activities and Accomplishments	3
Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles	9
Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activity	10
Preventing Terrorism and Other Threats	11
Enhancing Border and Transportation Security and Immigration Enforcement	12
Securing Cyberspace and Information Technology Assets	13
Promoting Disaster Resilience and Disaster Grant Management	14
Improving Management Stewardship and Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse	15
Investigations of Senior Government Employees.....	16
Congressional Testimony and Briefings.....	17
OIG In The News	18
Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other Office of Inspector General Activities	19
APPENDIXES	
Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings	20
Appendix 2 Compliance—Resolution of Reports and Recommendations	22
Appendix 3 Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months Old	23
Appendix 4 Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old	24
Appendix 5 Reports Issued	35
Appendix 6 Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated ..	46
Appendix 7 Contract Audit Reports	48
Appendix 8 Peer Review Results	49
Appendix 9 Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public	50
Appendix 10 Acronyms and Abbreviations	53
Appendix 11 OIG Contacts and Locations	54
Appendix 12 Index to Reporting Requirements.....	55

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments


April 1, 2017 through September 30, 2017

During this reporting period, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed significant audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department’s programs and operations.

Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 72 reports, including management alerts, and reports on Disaster Relief Fund spending (appendix 5), as well as 367 investigative reports, while continuing to strengthen our transparency and internal oversight.

Our reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of the issues the Department faces. They also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS’ programs.



Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$2,040,440,766 of which \$117,091 did not have supporting documentation. The Department recovered or deobligated from audits \$15,862,127 (appendix 6). We issued 8 reports identifying \$54,320,598 in funds put to better use. Additionally, we reported \$30,861,038 in recoveries, fines, and restitution from investigations.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$2,040,440,766
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$54,320,598
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$15,862,127
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$15,862,127
Recoveries from Investigations Not from Fines and Restitution	\$1,456,473
Funds Recovered from Audits and Investigations	\$17,318,600
Fines from Investigations	\$17,503
Restitution from Investigations	\$29,387,062

Funds Recovered

\$17,318,600

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)


Investigations

We initiated 461 and closed 401 investigations. Our investigations resulted in 55 arrests, 57 indictments, 63 convictions, and 9 personnel actions. We have included, in accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, information regarding number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations, 4/1/2017	1,054
Investigations Initiated	461
Investigations Closed	401
Open Investigations, 9/30/2017	1,114
Investigative Reports Issued	367
Investigations Administratively Closed	34
Investigations Referred for Prosecution	165
Investigations Accepted for Prosecution	64
Investigations Declined for Prosecution	97
Investigations Pending Acceptance/Declination for Prosecution	4
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	35
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	13

*All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigation's case management system. The open investigations balance, 4/1/2017 was adjusted by 6 investigations from the balance on 3/31/2017.

Investigations resulted in



Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, abuse, or fraud affecting the programs and operations of the Department. In addition, whistleblower disclosures play a crucial role in keeping the Department efficient and accountable.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	11,358
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	10,964
Complaints Closed	10,898*

*Complaints closed included complaints received in prior periods.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

DHS OIG investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees and applicants for employment; uniformed United States Coast Guard members; and DHS contractors, subcontractors, and grantees. DHS OIG conducts investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*, Presidential Policy Directive 19; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Investigation by DHS OIG is mandatory under these statutes when a *prima facie* case of retaliation is determined. Additionally, in certain instances, DHS OIG conducts investigations pursuant to the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302.

Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints	Number
Total Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints Received	104
Complaints Closed Because Legal Standard for Retaliation not Met	18
Complaints Closed for no Response from Claimant	7
Complaints Closed in Deferral to Other Agency Investigations	23
Complaints Withdrawn	2
Complaints Referred for Discretionary Investigations	24
Complaints Pending Further Whistleblower Protection Unit Review	23
Merged into Existing Investigation	1
Investigations Opened During Semiannual Report (SAR) Period	6

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Program consists of two components. The first is the Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU), which includes a supervisory investigator, two investigative counsel, and two whistleblower investigators. The WPU is responsible for complaint intake and assessment, whistleblower retaliation policy formulation and legal research, and full investigation of whistleblower retaliation complaints. The second component is the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman (WPO). The WPO has the department-level responsibility to educate and advise DHS employees about whistleblower protection rights and remedies.

Activity during Current SAR Period

During this SAR period, WPU received 104 complaints that, on their face, alleged retaliation for protected whistleblower activity. Of those 104, 18 were declined because WPU determined the complaint did not meet the legal threshold for whistleblower retaliation. In 23 instances, the complaint was already the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another agency (such as the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, or the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)), or falling within the EEO process. Per DHS OIG policy, WPU deferred to the already initiated inquiries and did not open an additional investigation. In 24 instances, the retaliation alleged did not fall within one of three types of investigations DHS OIG is mandated by statute to conduct. Full investigation of these complaints is discretionary, and in all 24 instances, both WPU and the Office of Investigations declined to open an investigation based on resource or other constraints. WPU closed 7 complaints due to a lack of response from the complainant and closed 2 other complaints where the complainant withdrew from the process. One complaint was merged into an existing investigation, and 23 complaints are currently pending WPU review. WPU also opened 6 new investigations during the SAR period.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Number
Investigations Opened During SAR Period	6
Current Total Active Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	31
Investigations Closed	9
Reports Issued	4

Comparison with Previous SAR Period

Both the number of complaints and investigations increased over the last SAR period. This SAR period, WPU handled 104 complaints compared to 74 last period, and opened 6 new investigations compared to 4 last period.

At the end of the last SAR period, WPU had 34 open whistleblower retaliation investigations. During this period, WPU closed 5 investigations administratively

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

without reports. WPU closed 4 investigations with reports, including 2 that substantiated whistleblower retaliation allegations. Including the 6 new investigations opened, WPU currently has 31 total open whistleblower retaliation investigations.

Substantiated Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations

Case 1

OIG investigated, and substantiated for the first time in DHS, whistleblower retaliation related to security clearance actions under Presidential Policy Directive 19 (PPD-19). OIG determined that the United States Secret Service suspended and revoked the complainant's security clearance in retaliation for disclosing alleged violations of Federal anti-discrimination laws and for separately reporting abuse of authority on the part of his former Special Agent in Charge and other officials. Based on the two instances of retaliation, OIG recommended that the Secret Service reinstate the complainant's security clearance and return him to a paid duty status. OIG also recommended that the Secret Service provide back pay and attorney fees to the complainant. The full report of investigation with appropriate redactions can be found on the DHS OIG website:

https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/WRRI-I15-USSS-SID-01777-092217_0.pdf

Case 2

OIG investigated, and substantiated, an allegation that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) retaliated against a CBP Officer by denying him a training opportunity for contacting CBP's Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) to disclose that CBP was conducting racial profiling and illegal searches of "turn-around" vehicles at a northern land border. OIG made two recommendations for corrective action: (1) that CBP be directed to make a similar training opportunity available to the complainant at its earliest possible convenience; and (2) that CBP provide guidance to the port, and CBP-wide, for all employees regarding protections applicable to whistleblower disclosures, and establish training and procedures for OCC attorneys and staff who receive such disclosures. The full report of investigation with appropriate redactions can be found on the DHS OIG website:

<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2017/WRRI-I16-CBP-DET-17715-092917.pdf>

Training and Outreach

During this reporting period, WPO provided Whistleblower Training to 13 DHS New Employee Orientation Classes and trained approximately 350 new DHS headquarters employees, conducted 3 DHS OIG New Employee Orientation classes, and provided supervisory Whistleblower training to approximately 50 DHS

Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

OIG managers. The WPU also provided training to all DHS OIG desk officers and hotline call center personnel. Additionally, during this reporting period, with the passage of the new *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractor and Sub contractors* (41 U.S.C. § 4712), WPO collaborated with the DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer in ensuring that DHS contractors and their subcontractors, as applicable, properly notify their employees in writing of their whistleblower rights and protections under the law and in planning for training to be provided to all DHS contracting officers.



Improved Analytics Capacity

OIG has produced considerable results from its efforts to replace in-house the analytic capabilities previously provided by the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board. Concurrent with intense hiring and continued implementation of state-of-the-art technology, assigned staff have worked to analyze voluminous data and provide the summary products needed to support audits and investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse of disaster relief resources. Accomplishments in fiscal year 2017 include:

- Reporting potentially derogatory information related to more than a dozen FEMA contractors involved in Hurricane Sandy recovery efforts. This work supported an OIG recommendation that the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) recover \$3.4 million in funding to build a school, due to lack of documentation and potentially improper activities on the part of the developer.
- Coding Structured Query Language to extract data from FEMA's web-based Integrated Financial Management Information System on disaster relief funding and to warehouse this financial data to help select potential audits and address ad hoc queries.
- Creating an audit risk visualization tool that, using data from OMB Circular A-133 single audits of state, local, and non-profit entities, can help identify control weaknesses in FEMA's disaster relief spending. A pilot of this tool is expected to be delivered during the first quarter of FY 2018.
- Training new analysts and collaborating with investigators to meet increased requirements for contractor vetting as FEMA provides disaster relief after the 2017 hurricane season.

In addition to this disaster relief-related work, data analytic staff reported on DHS' Enterprise Data Strategy (OIG-17-101) and provided data analytic assistance to various OIG program units on more than a dozen issues, including U.S. Customs and Immigration Services' (USCIS) H-1B Visa Program abuse, CBP's Global Entry Program vetting, USCIS' medical screening, information technology (IT) security controls for targeting and examining incoming international mail, and investigations related to the National Flood Insurance Program.

Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act* ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS' programs and operations.


OIG Offices	DHS Component and Offices
Executive Office Office of Audits (OA) Office of Counsel Office of Emergency Management Oversight (EMO) Office of Enterprise Risk Identification and Management Office of External Affairs Office of Information Technology Audits (ITA) Office of Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO) Office of Investigations (INV) Office of Management	Directorate for Management (MGMT) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office of Inspector General (OIG) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Operations Coordination Office of Partnership and Engagement Office of Public Affairs Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Privacy Office Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activity

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. We issued more than 10,096 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of September 30, 2017, the Department took action to address all but 506 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 148 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 72 new reports and 141 unique recommendations to the Department; we closed 174 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, because of the Department's actions. Congress also recognized our work by calling on us to testify three times about our efforts to improve the Department.

OIG Activity April 1, 2017 – September 30, 2017



We have highlighted a number of audits and inspections that we conducted during the reporting period in the following five mission areas:

- Preventing Terrorism and Other Threats
- Enhancing Border and Transportation Security and Immigration Enforcement
- Securing Cyberspace and Information Technology Assets
- Promoting Disaster Resilience and Disaster Grant Management
- Improving Management Stewardship and Combating Fraud, Waste, and Abuse

PREVENTING TERRORISM AND OTHER THREATS

Our reports on the Department's efforts to prevent terrorism and other threats focused on covert testing of TSA's screening checkpoint effectiveness, an investigation based on anonymous complaints related to the actions of TSA management during and after an active shooter event, and security and safety concerns at Border Patrol stations in the Tucson Sector.



What We Found

1

Covert Testing of TSA's Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness (CLASSIFIED)

We conducted covert tests to determine the effectiveness of TSA's checkpoint screening equipment and screener performance in identifying and resolving potential security threats at airport security checkpoints. We identified vulnerabilities with TSA's screener performance, screening equipment, and associated procedures. Details related to our testing results presented in the report are classified or designated Sensitive Security Information.

2

Response to January 6, 2017, Shooting Transportation Security Administration, Fort Lauderdale, FL

We initiated an investigation based on anonymous complaints of actions of TSA management officials during an active shooter event. Specifically, based on anonymous complaints it was alleged onsite TSA managers:

- did not properly communicate with or account for employees during the shooting, and
- provided false information related to the shooting to TSA headquarters.

Although we did not substantiate the allegations, we did identify certain issues and conditions that TSA may want to address.

3

Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in Tucson Sector

During spot inspections of Border Patrol stations in the Tucson Sector, we observed, and Border Patrol agents corroborated, multiple physical security issues that raise concerns about agent safety at two locations. Both facilities have vulnerable outdoor storage containers secured with padlocks that could be easily opened with common bolt cutters. We also observed security issues related to cameras and access at three additional stations.



Moving Forward

In response to our classified report, TSA concurred with the eight recommendations we made that when implemented should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness. TSA's management should consider taking corrective action to include reviewing and revising the TSA Active Shooter Tactical Response Plan; conducting regular testing of the Alert and Warning System, and conducting training exercises. CBP reported it concurred with our recommendations and will take actions to address the physical security issues, ensure cameras are operable and facility access is secure.

DHS Response

The DHS response is classified. We made eight recommendations that when implemented, should improve TSA's screening checkpoint operational effectiveness.

We recommended that TSA management consider taking action to address the issues we identified. We did not seek comments from DHS as part of this investigation.

CBP officials reported they have a Policy and Compliance Team in place that identifies potential physical security vulnerabilities, conducts physical security assessments, and takes prompt action to bring any physical security vulnerabilities into compliance. CBP officials reported they will conduct a review to ensure detention area cameras are operational and feeds are visible. CBP noted it has a pending work order to install seven cameras, but this project is on hold due to funding.

ENHANCING BORDER AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

ICE does not effectively manage the deportation of aliens who are no longer detained. ICE also faces challenges in complying with oversight requirements for segregation of detainees with mental health conditions. CBP needs to learn lessons described in the DHS OIG, Government Accountability Office, and DHS reports on CBP's Secure Border Initiative (SBI) and other acquisitions related to securing our southern border.

What We Found

1 ICE Deportation Operations
ICE does not effectively manage the deportation of aliens who are no longer detained, but are under its supervision. ICE does not collect and analyze data about employee workloads to allocate staff judiciously and determine achievable caseloads. We found ICE has not:

- clearly and widely communicated Department priorities for deportation to deportation officers;
- issued up-to-date, comprehensive, accessible procedures for supervising aliens; and
- provided sufficient training.

2 ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions
ICE field offices did not record and promptly report all instances of segregation to ICE headquarters, nor did their system properly reflect all required reviews of ongoing segregation cases. ICE does not regularly compare segregation data in the electronic management system with information at detention facilities to assess the accuracy and reliability of data in the system.

3 Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing Our Border
CBP currently faces an aggressive schedule to satisfy its requirements under the President's Executive Order. CBP is working on an acquisition plan while preparing a solicitation for the design and build of a southern border wall. Prior reports on CBP's SBI and acquisitions found CBP did not have:

- defined and validated operational requirements,
- a proper acquisition workforce, and
- robust business processes and information systems.

DHS Response

ICE officials reported they currently work with DHS' Office of Policy and others to examine current ICE policies and guidance to ensure they align with the President's recent Executive Orders and the Secretary of Homeland Security's vision and plans for implementing those orders. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) reported it examines staffing structure to determine the future operational footprint for ERO's 24 field offices. ICE reported actions to improve the training curriculum.

ICE reported it currently has some internal controls in place including periodic inspections. ICE noted that its January 6, 2017 guidance provided additional, specific guidance and timeframes for field offices to adhere to when managing segregation placements. ICE officials also reported that they changed the methodology use to calculate the length of segregation placements in the Segregation Review Management System.

We made no recommendations in this special report but DHS responded that it is committed to ensuring that investments are effective, transparent, and compliant with Federal law and DHS policy.

Moving Forward

A more organized and complete approach to management would help ICE deport aliens expeditiously and keep up with the growing numbers of aliens who should be deported. Ensuring that field offices follow procedures for segregation will strengthen ICE's oversight and accountability and mitigate the risk of potential harm to facility staff and detainees. CBP must be mindful of lessons learned related to an aggressive acquisition schedule to protect taxpayer dollars associated with the construction of a southern border wall.

SECURING CYBERSPACE AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSETS

The myriad of DHS information systems and databases did not effectively track visas to identify nonimmigrant overstays. Some of these systems and databases did not electronically share information, resulting in numerous inefficiencies. CBP faces challenges in its IT systems and infrastructure supporting border security operations. The Department has not taken steps to finalize activities, assign responsibilities, and establish timelines for 19 objectives of its *Enterprise Data Strategy*.

What We Found

1 DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology

DHS' IT systems did not effectively support ICE visa tracking operations. ICE personnel pieced together information from dozens of systems and databases, some of which were not integrated and did not electronically share information. ICE did not ensure that its field personnel received the training and guidance needed to properly use the systems. Also, the Department lacked a comprehensive biometric exit system at U.S. ports of departure.

2 CBP'S IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations

CBP's IT systems and infrastructure did not fully support its border security objective of preventing the entry of inadmissible aliens to the country. Further, frequent system outages hampered incoming passenger screening at U.S. international airports. IT systems and infrastructure also did not fully support Border Patrol and Air and Marine Operations (AMO) border security activities between ports of entry. Poor systems performance and network instability hampered these CBP operations nationwide.

3 Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals

DHS was in the process of implementing only 4 of 23 strategic objectives of its *Enterprise Data Strategy*. It had not taken steps to finalize activities, assign responsibilities, define outcomes, and establish timelines for addressing the remaining 19 objectives. DHS delayed finalizing its plans for implementing many of the strategic objectives in the data strategy until late FY 2017 to avoid duplication with planning for related information sharing efforts.

Moving Forward

Because of IT systems and management limitations, DHS could not accurately account for all visa overstays it annually reported to Congress. Until CBP fully completes needed upgrades, Border Patrol and AMO agents will continue to struggle with systems availability and performance challenges that impede accomplishment of their critical border security mission operations. Providing additional assistance needed to coordinate data investments may spur Department progress toward meeting its enterprise-wide data goals.

DHS Response

DHS reported progress in addressing potential security risks created by visitors who remain in the United States after their period of admission has expired. DHS reported recent efforts to draft the FY 2016 overstay report, which will include more than 97 percent of all nonimmigrants admitted by air and sea to the United States. DHS also reported on progress made toward implementing a biometric solution and highlighted its recent facial recognition pilot effort.

DHS reported CBP's commitment to providing excellent IT support for border security operations. CBP's Office of Information Technology (OIT) will develop a holistic plan to ensure primary traveler system availability. OIT will work to increase monitoring of system response times. DHS also reported they will deploy and upgrade backup systems to provide more up-to date information when network connectivity is unavailable.

DHS reported it plans to complete the *FY 2018 2022 Information Sharing and Safeguarding (IS&S) Strategy* by September 30, 2017. DHS reported the 2018 Implementation Plan for the IS&S Strategy will include milestones necessary for achieving the 19 remaining strategic objectives and is expected to be completed by March 31, 2018.

PROMOTING DISASTER RESILIENCE AND DISASTER GRANT MANAGEMENT

FEMA needs to address the potential housing challenges and risks during Hurricane Harvey's recovery efforts in Texas. We determined that FEMA should not have awarded the New Orleans and the Sewerage and Water (S&W) Board the \$2.04 billion to complete pre-existing infrastructure repairs not directly caused by the storms. FEMA also did not implement our prior report recommendations and suspended improvements on existing IT systems.

What We Found

1 Management Alert – Observations and Concerns with FEMA's Housing Assistance Program Efforts for Hurricane Harvey in Texas

FEMA is currently responding to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, some of the most catastrophic disasters in recent United States history. The State of Texas General Land Office entered into an agreement to provide assistance to FEMA in the delivery of Direct Housing Assistance to Hurricane Harvey survivors on a temporary basis. The agreement does not include required approval authorities, physical inspections, separation of duties, and independent certifications. We are concerned that without adequate controls in place the Federal funds may be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

2 FEMA Should Disallow \$2.04 Billion Approved for New Orleans Infrastructure Repairs

FEMA should not have awarded the City and the S&W Board the initial \$785 million, or the additional \$1.25 billion to complete the repairs to damaged infrastructure, because the damages were not eligible for Federal disaster assistance funding. Even though FEMA attributed the damages to the water distribution system directly to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, we concluded that FEMA did not have sufficient documentation to support its decision.

3 Verification Review: FEMA's Lack of Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements Places Billions of Tax Dollars at Risk

We learned FEMA did not implement our prior report recommendations (OIG-12-18, *FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistant Insurance Requirements*) and suspended improvements on existing IT systems. Without a reliable system to track insurance information, FEMA risks providing duplicate assistance in violation of the *Stafford Act*. As a result, billions of dollars of taxpayer funds have been and will continue to be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Moving Forward

If FEMA and Texas do not provide timely and adequate oversight of the Housing Assistance Program in response to Hurricane Harvey, significant amounts of Federal funding could be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA should deobligate the \$2.04 billion it awarded to the applicants to complete the pre-existing repairs not directly caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Without a reliable system to track insurance information, FEMA risks providing duplicate assistance in violation of the *Stafford Act*.

DHS Response

Management alerts are used by the OIG to inform senior DHS managers of conditions which pose an immediate threat of waste, fraud and abuse in agency programs. We discussed this alert with FEMA senior management at the Joint Field Office and Headquarters. We made no recommendations in this report and did not seek written comments from DHS.

FEMA reported that it documented in its project worksheets and additional funding requests that repairs were required as a direct result of the declared disaster. FEMA did not agree with our report conclusions and recommendations.

We made no recommendations in this verification review. However, FEMA reported that it had implemented corrective action and will continue to take steps to update the quality of the data maintained in its databases as issues with data fields are identified during future disasters.

IMPROVING MANAGEMENT STEWARDSHIP AND COMBATING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE

Our reports on improving management stewardship and combating fraud, waste, and abuse focused on ICE and CBP's unclear executive protection policies; DHS' Performance and Learning Management System (PALMS) that does not address the Department's critical needs of an integrated learning and management system; and FEMA's need to improve the management of its Flood Mapping Programs.



What We Found

1

Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns

ICE and CBP created their own internal authorizations for executive protection details, staffed them, and funded them without clear legal authority. These security details incur substantial monetary and personnel costs and provide transportation and logistical services not necessarily tied to any demonstrated security concern. These details give the appearance to some observers of being more related to executive convenience and status than protection. They operate without departmental guidance or written approval, are subject to the appearance of impropriety, and have significant cost implications.

2

PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs

DHS PALMS does not address the Department's critical need for an integrated, department-wide learning and performance management system. PALMS has not met DHS operational requirements for effective administration of employee learning and performance management activities. The PALMS program office did not effectively implement its acquisition methodology and did not monitor contractor performance. DHS PALMS does not achieve the intended benefits or address the Department's needs.

3

FEMA Needs to Improve Management of Its Flood Mapping Programs

FEMA did not meet its flood mapping goals and did not ensure that completed flood maps complied with FEMA standards. Specifically, FEMA:

- needs to improve its financial management of flood map projects;
- has not updated its RISK MAP lifecycle cost estimate;
- lacks uniform, centralized policies, procedures; and
- is not performing adequate oversight to ensure mapping partner quality reviews comply with requirements.

DHS Response

DHS reported that while the DHS Office of General Counsel will review further the security details, they believe a reasonable basis exists to maintain the status quo during the review of these security details. DHS reported the Chief Security Officer will lead efforts to develop a directive outlining an approval process for senior leadership executive details and Headquarters oversight.

DHS reported it agrees that PALMS did not deliver an integrated capability, resulting in three Components remaining on their current systems and not migrating to the enterprise solution. DHS reported that it remains committed to ensuring efficient and effective delivery of capability to meet the enterprise wide performance and learning needs.

FEMA reported it has developed and implemented several flood-related policy and program changes that include: (1) developing and finalization of a Risk Mapping Assessment and Planning Program Lifecycle Cost Estimate, (2) development and implementation of the Risk Management Directorate Budget Matrix Tool, and (3) updating the Risk MAP Quality Assurance Management Plan.

➔ Moving Forward

Every government employee has the duty to protect and conserve government resources and only use them for authorized purposes. The ICE and CBP executive protection is based on questionable legal authority and invites abuse. Without accurate floodplain identification and mapping processes, management, and oversight, FEMA cannot provide the public with a reliable rendering of flood vulnerability. The Department cannot address its capability needs or achieve its intended training and performance management goals without a system that meets DHS' operational requirements.

Investigations of Senior Government Employees

This section reports on each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct of a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This report is being provided in accordance with the requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and not disclosed to the public.

We Investigated...

A CBP manager (GS-15) for allegedly affording special favors to two subordinates and coordinating with another employee (GS-12) to sexually exploit female travelers who applied to enter the United States and being sexually involved with multiple female subordinates. We found no evidence that the GS-15 afforded special favors to specific subordinates or sexually exploited travelers, but the GS-15 acknowledged having a brief, sexual relationship with a subordinate employee. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A CBP information technology manager (Senior Executive Service, (SES)) for allegedly conducting official government business via personal email and a personal server not approved for government business. We found that the CBP manager used a personal email account to conduct official business; instructed contract staff to send daily updates and other official government information to a non-government email account; and used a server not accredited or approved by CBP to process government information. However, we found no evidence that the CBP manager transmitted sensitive information on a non-government email account. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A Federal Protective Service official (GS-15) for allegedly accepting bribe payments in exchange for attempting to award DHS contracts to two inter-connected Federal contracting companies. Our joint investigation with four other OIG's determined that the official, who resigned while under investigation, conspired with company officials to use his Federal position to help one of the companies secure Federal contracts in exchange for being paid \$12,500 pursuant to a 1-year consulting agreement totaling \$50,000. The official pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery and was sentenced to 15 months confinement. The official was also debarred for 5 years.

A DHS official (SES) for allegedly being involved in the diversion of controlled substances by seeing several different medical professionals to obtain prescription pain medications. We closed this matter after the official resigned from DHS; however, the U.S. Attorney's Office is pursuing this matter with another Federal agency.

An ICE official (SES) for allegedly signing a contract modification memorandum pertaining to a corporation with whom the official was in employment negotiations after having previously signed a recusal letter. We found that the official reportedly did not thoroughly read the memorandum when it was provided for signature and therefore did not realize that signing it would involve a potential ethics violation or conflict of interest. A recusal letter remains on file and the official is no longer seeking employment with this corporation. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

A Secret Service official (SES) for allegedly improperly approving the use of Treasury asset forfeiture program funds to purchase furnishings for their manager's office. We found that the approving official approved the expenditure in violation of program guidelines. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.


Congressional Testimony and Briefings



The Office of Inspector General testified before Congress three times during this period. Testimony prepared for these hearings may be accessed on our website at www.oig.dhs.gov.

U.S. House of Representatives

U.S. Senate



We briefed congressional members and their staffs frequently throughout the reporting period. Our office conducted more than 25 briefings for congressional members and staff on the results of our work, including on the following OIG reports: *Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information* (OIG-17-49); *FEMA Should Disallow \$2.04 Billion Approved for New Orleans Infrastructure Repairs* (OIG-17-97-D); *DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology* (OIG-17-56); and *Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals* (OIG-17-101). We also met with staff to discuss Member requests for reviews of DHS programs and operations and to provide input on draft legislation.

OIG In The News



NBC News, Homeland Security Today, and CNN — among other news outlets — took notice of our audit work from April 2017 to September 2017.

ICE Deportation Officers Overburdened, Undertrained: Inspector General

NBC News
April 20, 2017

DHS's Tracking of Visa Overstays Hindered by Insufficient Technology, IG Reports

Homeland Security Today
May 9, 2017

DHS IG: CBP must avoid poor choices that walled in past border security initiatives

Federal Times
June 19, 2017

How Homeland Security Wasted Millions on Software That Doesn't Work

Fiscal Times
July 10, 2017

Inspector General: CBP spent \$5M on polygraphs for unsuitable job applicants

CNN
August 11, 2017

Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other Office of Inspector General Activities

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REVIEWS




The *Inspector General Act* directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations. During this semiannual reporting period, we discussed several pieces of legislation with congressional stakeholders. We reviewed and provided comments on the following bills:

- *Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2017* (H.R. 2825)
- *Fixing Internal Response to Misconduct Act* (H.R. 2131)
- *NIST Cybersecurity Framework, Assessment, and Auditing Act of 2017* (H.R. 1224)
- *CBP Hire Act* (S. 1305)
- *Reducing DHS Acquisition Cost Growth Act* (S. 906)

OVERSIGHT OF SINGLE AUDIT ACT, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 104-156

During this reporting period, we completed 32 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by independent public accountant organizations. Additionally, we completed 2 quality control reviews. Our ongoing work includes 7 onsite quality control reviews and 23 Single Audit desk reviews.



Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings



Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs, Unsupported Costs

Carryover from last period

8 reports with 26 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$69,681,288
- Unsupported Costs \$37,206


Issued this period

6 reports with 12 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$2,040,440,766
- Unsupported Costs \$117,091




**14 Reports with
38 Recommendations**



**2,110,122,054 Questioned Costs
154,297 Unsupported Costs**

Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs (QC) and Unsupported Costs (UC)



Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings (continued)



Reports and Recommendations with Funds to be Put to Better Use (FPTBU)

Carryover from last period

5 reports with 24 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$31,257,569

Issued this period


8 reports with 10 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$54,320,598


**13 Reports with
34 Recommendations**



**FPTBU
85,578,167**

Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with FPTBU




- The management decision for 2 recommendations was changed from Open-Resolved to Open-Unresolved for OIG-15-131-D recommendation 1 and OIG-16-143-D recommendation 2 during the reporting period.

Appendix 2 Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations



ACTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS



Note: This appendix excludes most investigative reports.

Appendix 3

Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec. Numbers	DHS Comp.	No. of Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months
1	12/16/2011	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	3, 4	FEMA	2
2	8/28/2013	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	9	MGMT	1
3	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
4	8/21/2015	OIG-15-131-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$21.7 Million of \$376 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Biloxi, Mississippi, for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	1	FEMA	1
5	5/10/2016	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	5	TSA	1
6	9/30/2016	OIG-16-143-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$25.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Louisville, Mississippi, for an April 2014 Disaster</i>	2	FEMA	1
7	3/30/2017	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	1, 2	SEC, DSEC, COS	2
Total						9

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-10-11	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2009 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
2	OIG-11-16	<i>Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
3	OIG-11-86	<i>U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program – Offshore Vessel Inspections</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
4	OIG-11-92	<i>Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection's Bonding Process</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
5	OIG-12-07	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2011 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	\$0	\$0	USCG
6	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
7	OIG-12-26	<i>(U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
8	OIG-12-64	<i>Operations of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Secure Communities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
9	OIG-12-79	<i>Opportunities to Improve FEMA's Public Assistance Preliminary Damage Assessment Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
10	OIG-12-132	<i>CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
11	DD-13-11	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$46.2 Million of Improper Contracting Costs from Federal Funds Awarded to the Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	1	\$35,003,493	\$0	FEMA
12	OIG-13-19	<i>Identification, Reutilization, and Disposal of Excess Personal Property by the United States Coast Guard</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
13	OIG-13-20	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements and Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	16	\$0	\$0	USCG
14	OIG-13-80	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Enforcement and Removal Operations' Contract Funding and Payment Processes</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
15	OIG-13-92	<i>Marine Accident Reporting, Investigations, and Enforcement in the United States Coast Guard</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
16	OIG-13-104	<i>Technical Security Evaluation of DHS Activities at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
17	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs To Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
18	OIG-13-113	<i>DHS Needs to Manage Its Radio Communication Program Better</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
19	OIG-13-114	<i>CBP Use of Force Training and Actions To Address Use of Force Incidents (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
20	OIG-13-115	<i>DHS Uses Social Media To Enhance Information Sharing and Mission Operations, But Additional Oversight and Guidance Are Needed</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PLCY
21	OIG-13-119	<i>CBP's and USCG's Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
22	OIG-14-02	<i>DHS' Efforts To Coordinate the Activities of Federal Cyber Operations Centers</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
23	OIG-14-14	<i>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	3	\$727,742	\$1,528,259	FEMA
24	OIG-14-18	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2013 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	10	\$0	\$0	MGMT

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
25	OIG-14-32	<i>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
26	OIG-14-47	<i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Advanced Training Center Acquisition</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
27	OIG-14-105	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
28	OIG-14-112	<i>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
29	OIG-14-116	<i>ICE's Release of Immigration Detainees</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
30	OIG-14-118-D	<i>FEMA Should Take Steps to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Disaster Assistance Helpline for Disaster Survivors That Do Not Speak English or Spanish</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
31	OIG-14-132	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport</i>	8	\$0	\$0	ICE
32	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
33	OIG-14-150-D	<i>FEMA and the State of Louisiana Need to Accelerate the Funding of \$812 Million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funds and Develop a Plan to Close Approved Projects</i>	1	\$0	\$812,238,776	FEMA
34	OIG-14-151	<i>FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System May Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
35	OIG-14-153	<i>Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
36	OIG-15-01-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$13 Million of Grant Funds Awarded to The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	5	\$12,988,064	\$0	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
37	OIG-15-02-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3 Million of Ineligible Costs and \$4.3 Million of Unneeded Funds from the Columbus Regional Hospital</i>	2	\$1,720,315	\$0	FEMA
38	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
39	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	1	\$3,559,067	\$0	FEMA
40	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	\$0	\$0	USCG
41	OIG-15-16	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2014</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
42	OIG-15-18	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	6	\$0	\$0	CBP
43	OIG-15-19-D	<i>FEMA Insurance Reviews of Applicants Receiving Public Assistance Grant Funds for 2004 and 2005 Florida Hurricanes Were Not Adequate</i>	2	\$177,178,950	\$0	FEMA
44	OIG-15-22	<i>U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement's Alternatives to Detention (Revised)</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
45	OIG-15-29	<i>Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck™ Initiative</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
46	OIG-15-38	<i>Science and Technology Directorate Needs to Improve Its Contract Management Procedures</i>	2	\$0	\$0	S&T

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
47	OIG-15-45	<i>Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI-14-3679) (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
48	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
49	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
50	OIG-15-88	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
51	OIG-15-94	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
52	OIG-15-95	<i>Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
53	OIG-15-98	<i>TSA Can Improve Aviation Worker Vetting (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
54	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	9	\$67,360,082	\$0	FEMA
55	OIG-15-108-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Internal Affairs Division</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
56	OIG-15-112	<i>Follow-up to Management Alert - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
57	OIG-15-117	<i>Fiscal Year 2014 Assessment of DHS Charge Card Programs Indicates Moderate Risk Remains</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
58	OIG-15-128-D	<i>FEMA's Process for Selecting Joint Field Offices Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$1,553,000	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
59	OIG-15-131-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$21.7 Million of \$376 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Biloxi, Mississippi, for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	1	\$8,093,971	\$0	FEMA
60	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	3	\$0	\$0	PLCY
61	OIG-16-01-D	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Verifying Applicants' Insurance Policies for the Individuals and Households Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
62	OIG-16-02	<i>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively</i>	3	\$0	\$2,519,077	MGMT
63	OIG-16-06	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	23	\$0	\$0	USCG
64	OIG-16-08	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2015</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
65	OIG-16-10	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
66	OIG-16-14	<i>Lower Mississippi River Port-wide Strategic Security Council Did Not Always Properly Manage, Distribute or Spend Port Security Grant Funds</i>	1	\$9,282,920	\$0	FEMA
67	OIG-16-15	<i>(U) Fiscal Year 2015 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG
68	OIG-16-17	<i>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE, USCIS
69	OIG-16-18	<i>DHS' Ebola Response Needs Better Coordination, Training, and Execution</i>	4	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
70	OIG-16-20	<i>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USSS
71	OIG-16-37	<i>Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
72	OIG-16-39	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Implementation of OCFO Policy Over Reimbursable Work Agreements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
73	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	5	\$0	\$0	FEMA
74	OIG-16-48	<i>USCIS Automation of Immigration Benefits Processing Remains Ineffective</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
75	OIG-16-51	<i>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
76	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
77	OIG-16-64	<i>2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident (Redacted)</i>	6	\$0	\$0	USSS
78	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
79	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	\$0	FEMA
80	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program (Redacted)</i>	11	\$0	\$0	TSA
81	OIG-16-88	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
82	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
83	OIG-16-93	<i>Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A
84	OIG-16-95	<i>DHS Does Not Have Comprehensive Policies or Training for Off-duty Conduct of Employees Traveling and Working Abroad</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
85	OIG-16-96-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Citizenship and Immigration Services, Investigations Division</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USCIS
86	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	2	\$18,443,447	\$0	FEMA
87	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG Grants</i>	2	\$7,124,893	\$0	FEMA
88	OIG-16-102-D	<i>FEMA Continues to Experience Challenges in Protecting Personally Identifiable Information at Disaster Recovery Centers</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
89	OIG-16-105	<i>DHS' Use of Reimbursable Work Agreements with GSA</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
90	OIG-16-115-D	<i>FEMA Should Suspend All Grant Payments on the \$29.9 Million Coastal Retrofit Program Until Mississippi Can Properly Account for Federal Funds</i>	4	\$0	\$26,899,836	FEMA
91	OIG-16-119-D	<i>FEMA Improperly Awarded \$47.3 Million to the City of Louisville, Mississippi</i>	1	\$35,474,345	\$0	FEMA
92	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
93	OIG-16-126-D	<i>FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees' and Subgrantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
94	OIG-16-127-D	<i>FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
95	OIG-16-128	<i>TWIC Background Checks are Not as Reliable as They Could Be</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
96	OIG-16-129	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Risk Assessment of the DHS Bank Card Program Indicates Moderate Risk</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
97	OIG-16-130	<i>Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
98	OIG-16-134	<i>Transportation Security Administration Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
99	OIG-16-138	<i>DHS' Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (Revised)</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
100	OIG-16-139-D	<i>FEMA Should Implement Consistent Joint Field Office Guidance</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
101	OIG-16-141	<i>DHS Has Not Trained Classified Network Users on the Classification Management Tool</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
102	OIG-16-143-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$25.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Louisville, Mississippi for an April 2014 Disaster</i>	1	\$1,470,285	\$0	FEMA
103	OIG-17-01	<i>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USSS
104	OIG-17-02	<i>DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and Execution</i>	4	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
105	OIG-17-03	<i>AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT, USCG, CBP, ICE

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
106	OIG-17-04	<i>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
107	OIG-17-05	<i>DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel</i>	5	\$0	\$0	ICE, USSS
108	OIG-17-06-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$1.8 Million of \$5.5 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Columbia County, Florida, for Tropical Storm Debby Damages</i>	3	\$1,172,835		FEMA
109	OIG-17-07-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$2.4 Million in Investment Gains Pennsylvania Improperly Earned on Federal Disaster Funds</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
110	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
111	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USSS
112	OIG-17-11	<i>Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance</i>	7	\$0	\$0	USCIS
113	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CFO
114	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
115	OIG-17-15	<i>Texas' Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2012-14</i>	2	\$218,045	\$0	FEMA
116	OIG-17-18-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$2.0 Million of \$3.59 Million Awarded to Stratford, Connecticut</i>	3	\$1,466,458	\$0	FEMA

Appendix 4

Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
117	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
118	OIG-17-24	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
119	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	3	\$23,785,177	\$0	FEMA
120	OIG-17-26-MA	<i>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Use of the Electronic Immigration System for Naturalization Benefits Processing</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
121	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
122	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
123	OIG-17-40	<i>DHS' Pilots for Social Media Screening Need Increased Rigor to Ensure Scalability and Long-term Success</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS, ICE, I&A
124	OIG-17-42	<i>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCIS
125	OIG-17-43-MA	<i>Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
126	OIG-17-44	<i>Management Advisory - CalRecycle, a California State Agency, Needs Assistance to Ensure that \$230 Million in Disaster Costs Are Valid</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
127	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	10	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
Total			401	\$407,288,624	\$844,738,948	

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
1	7/6/2017	OIG-17-45-MA	<i>Management Alert: Regarding Inspector General Access to Information</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
2	6/9/2017	OIG-17-50-VR	<i>Verification Review: FEMA's Lack of Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements Places Billions of Tax Dollars at Risk</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
3	4/13/2017	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
4	4/27/2017	OIG-17-52	<i>Management Letter for the Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
5	5/8/2017	OIG-17-53	<i>National Flood Insurance Program's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
6	4/28/2017	OIG-17-54	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
7	5/15/2017	OIG-17-55	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the FY 2016 U.S. Customs and Border Protection Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
8	5/1/2017	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	5/4/2017	OIG-17-57-D	<i>Colorado County, Texas, Has Adequate Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant</i>	\$0	\$0	\$343,613

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
10	5/9/2017	OIG-17-58-UNSUM	<i>(U) Annual Evaluation of DHS' INFOSEC Program (Intel Systems - DHS Intelligence and Analysis) for FY 2016</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
11	5/12/2017	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
12	5/31/2017	OIG-17-60	<i>CBP Continues to Improve its Ethics and Integrity Training, but Further Improvements are Needed</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
13	5/25/2017	OIG-17-61	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Coast Guard Component of the FY 2016 DHS Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
14	5/24/2017	OIG-17-62-D	<i>Texas Should Continue to Provide Deweyville Independent School District Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$9,641,029
15	6/8/2017	OIG-17-63	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
16	6/8/2017	OIG-17-64	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Federal Emergency Management Agency Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
17	6/2/2017	OIG-17-65	<i>Results of Office of Inspector General FY 2016 Spot Inspections of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Family Detention Facilities</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
18	6/6/2017	OIG-17-66-D	<i>Milwaukie, Oregon, Has Adequate Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant Funding</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	6/14/2017	OIG-17-67	<i>Federal Emergency Management Agency's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
20	6/13/2017	OIG-17-68	<i>Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
21	6/13/2017	OIG-17-69	<i>Transportation Security Administration's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
22	6/12/2017	OIG-17-70-SR	<i>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on CBP's SBI and Acquisitions Related to Securing our Border</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
23	6/12/2017	OIG-17-71	<i>United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management Letter for DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
24	6/15/2017	OIG-17-72	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the United States Secret Service Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
25	6/21/2017	OIG-17-73	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Transportation Security Administration Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
26	6/23/2017	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the United States Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
27	6/26/2017	OIG-17-75	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
28	6/26/2017	OIG-17-76	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	6/22/2017	OIG-17-77-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$1.5 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Hays County, Texas</i>	\$1,104,784	\$0	\$0
30	6/22/2017	OIG-17-78	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the National Protection and Programs Directorate of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
31 ^(d)	6/22/2017	OIG-17-79-D	<i>Linn County Road Department, Oregon, Has Sufficient Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
32	6/26/2017	OIG-17-81	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Science and Technology Directorate Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
33	6/26/2017	OIG-17-82	<i>Science and Technology Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs^(a)	Unsupported Costs^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use^(c)
34	6/28/2017	OIG-17-83-D	<i>Fort Bend County, Texas, Needs Additional Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Proper Management of Its FEMA Grant</i>	\$0	\$0	\$476,250
35	6/27/2017	OIG-17-84	<i>United States Citizenship and Immigration Services' Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$
36	6/28/2017	OIG-17-85	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Office of Financial Management and Office of the Chief Information Officer Components of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
37	6/29/2017	OIG-17-86	<i>Office of Financial Management's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
38	6/29/2017	OIG-17-87	<i>United States Secret Service's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
39	6/30/2017	OIG-17-88	<i>Information Technology Management Letter for the Management Directorate Component of the FY 2016 Department of Homeland Security Financial Statement Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
40	6/30/2017	OIG-17-89	<i>United States Coast Guard's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
41	6/30/2017	OIG-17-90	<i>Management Letter for U.S Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
42	6/30/2017	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
43	7/3/2017	OIG-17-92	<i>National Protection and Programs Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
44	7/5/2017	OIG-17-93-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3.9 Million of \$13.2 in Grant Funds Awarded to the Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey</i>	\$2,861,889	\$112,552	\$612,784
45	7/10/2017	OIG-17-94	<i>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Years 2014 and 2015 Conference Spending</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
46	7/6/2017	OIG-17-95-D	<i>Williamsburg Regional Hospital, South Carolina, Generally Accounted for and Expended FEMA Grant Funds Awarded for Emergency Work Properly</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
47	7/7/2017	OIG-17-96	<i>Management Directorate's Management Letter for DHS' Fiscal Year 2016 Financial Statements Audit</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
48	7/24/2017	OIG-17-97-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$2.04 Billion Approved for New Orleans Infrastructure Repairs</i>	\$2,034,900,000	\$0	\$0
49	7/27/2017	OIG-17-98-SR	<i>Special Report: Challenges Facing DHS in Its Attempt to Hire 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
50	8/4/2017	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
51	8/10/2017	OIG-17-100	<i>DHS' Joint Task Forces</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
52	8/14/2017	OIG-17-101	<i>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
53	8/16/2017	OIG-17-102-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Pensacola, Florida</i>	\$0	\$0	\$440,654
54	9/14/2017	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raises Concerns</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
55	9/13/2017	OIG-17-104	<i>The Federal Air Marshal Service Has Sufficient Policies and Procedures for Addressing Misconduct</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
56	9/19/2017	OIG-17-105-D	<i>St. Johns County, Florida, Could Benefit from Additional Technical Assistance and Monitoring to Ensure Compliance with FEMA Grant Requirements</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
57	9/19/2017	OIG-17-106-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Downe Township, New Jersey</i>	\$748,836	\$0	\$2,082,763

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
58	9/20/2017	OIG-17-107	<i>TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis Has Improved Its Field Operations</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
59	9/20/2017	OIG-17-108-D	<i>FEMA Should Strengthen Its Policies and Guidelines for Determining Public Assistance Eligibility for Private Non-Profit Schools</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
60	9/25/2017	OIG-17-109	<i>Review of DHS' Information Security Program for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2017</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
61	9/27/2017	OIG-17-110	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Management of its Flood Mapping Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
62	9/25/2017	OIG-17-111	<i>Individuals With Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
63	9/27/2017	OIG-17-112	<i>(U) Covert Testing of TSA's Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness (SECRET)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
64	9/29/2017	OIG-17-113-D	<i>The Covington County Commission Needs Additional Assistance in Managing a \$5.4 Million FEMA Grant from Winter 2015 Storms and to Save Millions in the Future</i>	\$0	\$0	\$40,555,883
65	9/28/2017	OIG-17-114	<i>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
66	9/29/2017	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert – Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector (REDACTED)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
67	9/29/2017	OIG-17-116-VR	<i>DHS Review of Responses to Significant Freedom of Information Act Requests</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
68	9/29/2017	OIG-17-117-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York</i>	\$808,159	\$0	\$0
69	9/29/2017	OIG-17-118-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$246,294 of \$3.0 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Lincoln County, Missouri</i>	\$17,098	\$4,539	\$167,622
70	9/29/2017	OIG-17-119	<i>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
71	9/29/2017	OIG-17-120-D	<i>Audit Tips for Managing Disaster Related Project Costs</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
72	9/29/2017	OIG-17-121-MA	<i>Management Alert – Observations and Concerns with FEMA’s Housing Assistance Program Efforts for Hurricane Harvey in Texas</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
Total				\$2,040,440,766	\$117,091	\$54,320,598

Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “D” is a Disaster Relief Fund report.

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight.

A report number ending with “SR” is a Special Report.

A report number ending with “VR” is a Verification Review of an issued report or recommendation to verify DHS management has taken agreed upon corrective action.

A report number ending with “UNSUM” is an unclassified summary.

Appendix 5

Reports Issued

Notes and Explanations:

- (a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.
- (b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.
- (c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.
- (d) The report number OIG-17-80-D was rescinded during this reporting period.

Appendix 6

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
1	4/14/2015	OIG-15-65-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$82.4 Million of Improper Contracting Costs Awarded to Holy Cross School, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	\$82,360,247	\$7,998,081	\$74,362,166	\$7,998,081
2	8/28/2015	OIG-15-138	<i>Accurate Reporting and Oversight Needed to Help Manage DHS' Warehouse Portfolio</i>	\$74,000	\$74,000	\$0	\$74,000
3	9/15/2015	OIG-15-148-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$4.2 Million of \$142.1 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Gulfport, Mississippi, for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	\$4,202,857	\$2,851,983	\$1,350,874	\$2,851,983
4	10/21/2015	OIG-16-02	<i>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively</i>	\$35,031	\$35,031	\$0	\$35,031
5	9/19/2016	OIG-16-135-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3.4 Million of the \$3.5 Million Awarded to Hope Academy for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	\$491,673	\$491,673	\$0	\$491,673
6	11/2/2016	OIG-17-06-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$1.8 Million of \$5.5 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Columbia County, Florida, for Tropical Storm Debby Damages</i>	\$156,086	\$156,086	\$0	\$156,086
7	11/8/2016	OIG-17-07-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$2.4 Million in Investment Gains Pennsylvania Improperly Earned on Federal Disaster Funds</i>	\$2,430,541	\$2,430,541	\$0	\$2,430,541
8	1/4/2017	OIG-17-17-D	<i>Omaha Public Power District in Nebraska Generally Accounted for and Expended FEMA Grant Funds Properly</i>	\$50,678	\$50,678	\$0	\$50,678

Appendix 6

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
9	3/16/2017	OIG-17-46-D	<i>Minneapolis Park and Recreation Board Did Not Follow All Federal Procurement Standards for \$5.1 Million in Contracts</i>	\$3,985,802	\$1,325,426	\$2,660,376	\$1,325,426
10	8/16/2017	OIG-17-102-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Pensacola, Florida</i>	\$440,654	\$440,654	\$0	\$440,654
11	9/29/2017	OIG-17-118-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$246,294 of \$3.0 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Lincoln County, Missouri</i>	\$7,974	\$7,974	\$0	\$7,974
		Audit Report Total		\$94,235,543	\$15,862,127	\$78,373,416	\$15,862,127
		Investigative Recoveries ^(e)					\$1,456,473
Totals				\$94,235,543	\$15,862,127	\$78,373,416	\$17,318,600

Report Number Abbreviations:

OIG-XX-XX-D Disaster Relief Fund Report

Notes and Explanations:

(e) Recoveries, other than administrative cost savings, which resulted from investigative efforts.

Appendix 7

Contract Audit Reports



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

We did not process contract audit reports meeting the criteria of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* during this reporting period.

Questioned Costs

N/A

Unsupported Costs

N/A

Disallowed Costs

N/A

Appendix 8 Peer Review Results



Section 5(a) (14)-(16) of the ***Inspector General Act of 1978***, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by or of an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

Although our Office of Investigations was not the subject of another OIG’s peer review during this reporting period, we completed a peer review of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Investigations in July of 2017 and gave them a peer review rating of “compliant.” We noted 2 “best practices,” made 10 observations and no recommendations.

Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews

Peer Review Conducted of DHS OIG Audit Operations

Our audit offices received a peer review rating of “pass” as a result of our latest peer review completed by Department of Justice (DOJ) OIG in June 2015, for the FY ending September 30, 2014. We implemented all recommendations made by DOJ OIG.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
1	Headquarters	We investigated a DHS OIG manager (SES) for allegedly being involved in a romantic relationship with a subordinate employee (GS-15), both of whom were being blackmailed by a third employee (GS-15), who was allegedly committing time and attendance abuse. We found no evidence to support any of these allegations.
2	Headquarters	We investigated an official (SES) for allegedly engaging in prohibited personnel practices with regard to promotions. We found no evidence to support the allegation.
3	CBP	We investigated a senior CBP official potentially violating the <i>Hatch Act</i> by posting comments, apparently outside of normal duty hours, regarding a presidential candidate on a personal public Twitter account with a profile picture identifying the official as a CBP employee. We found that while no definitive determination of a <i>Hatch Act</i> violation occurred, the official may have exercised questionable judgment by potentially creating the appearance that he engaged in activity directed to the success or failure of a particular candidate or political party, whether or not the individual intended to.
4	CBP	We investigated a matter involving a group of CBP employees, including a senior CBP manager (SES), who were named in a civil suit alleging that CBP officers violated an individual's civil rights during a body cavity search, which led to an intrusive medical examination, in violation of the individual's Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. We investigated the matter; however, the allegations, the civil rights lawsuit, and all allegations and charges against CBP personnel were withdrawn as part of the individual's settlement agreement. Based upon the circumstances, no criminal referrals were warranted.
5	CBP	We investigated allegations that a senior CBP official (SES) had a possible conflict of interest because their spouse's employer partnered with another private entity and were awarded a services contract to support CBP's training curriculum. It was further alleged that a subordinate, but senior CBP official (SES) directed CBP personnel to acquire the contract on a sole-source basis, despite concerns of a potential conflict of interest; created a hostile work environment; and reassigned personnel who disagreed with them. We found that the more senior official had no conflict of interest because the official had recused himself from any matter involving his spouse's employer. We also found that the allegations regarding the subordinate, senior official were unsubstantiated.
6	CBP	We investigated a CBP employee (GS-15) for allegedly misusing another employee's signature stamp to pre-authorize and then approve their own overtime/credit hours, without authorization. We did not substantiate the allegations.
7	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA executive (SES) for misusing industry user fees to fund a substandard information technology platform and working with two other FEMA executives (an SES and a GS-15) to mislead the U.S. Office of Management and Budget in reporting how the user fees were expended. We did not substantiate the allegations.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
8	FEMA	We investigated a senior FEMA official (SES) for allegedly failing to curtail the abusive behavior of a subordinate manager (SES) who was reportedly abusive towards other employees and required subordinate employees to administer injections of medications to the subordinate manager. We found that the senior FEMA official acted appropriately when the official learned of the subordinate manager's behavior. We did not substantiate the medication administration allegations. The subordinate manager resigned while we were investigating this matter.
9	FEMA	We investigated a FEMA manager (GS-15) for allegedly engaging in nepotism by recommending that a family member serve on a FEMA advisory committee over which the manager has oversight. We found that the manager made the personal recommendation after consulting with a Department attorney who opined that there were no ethical prohibitions from doing so. The manager was not involved in the selection process, and the family member was ultimately not selected for a position.
10	ICE	We investigated a senior ICE manager (SES) for allegedly violating personnel practices by promoting his/her spouse. We found that the manager was not involved in the promotion, but did approve an unrelated, routine, and appropriate temporary accommodation request for the spouse, which may have created the appearance of preferential treatment.
11	ICE	We investigated an ICE official (SES) and a subordinate (GS-15) for unnecessarily routing the SES's official travel through a city that enabled the SES to visit family and friends and resulted in additional costs to the Government and unwarranted compensatory travel time claims. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
12	ICE	We investigated an ICE Supervisory Immigration Enforcement Agent (GS-13) for allegedly failing to conduct required quarterly firearms qualifications for the GS-13's office for approximately the past 2 years, and falsifying official firearms qualifications scores. We found that the GS-13 failed to ensure that employees completed the required qualifications and failed to realize the firearm instructor's certification had lapsed. We found that the firearms instructor, a GS-12, failed to ensure that agents completed their quarterly firearms qualifications and entered fabricated qualification information into an ICE database. We did not substantiate that the GS-13 knew that the GS-12 was fabricating firearms qualification scores. We found that the GS-13's supervisor, a GS-15, was unaware that quarterly qualifications were not being conducted; that qualification scores were being fabricated; or that the firearms instructor's certification had lapsed, despite the fact that the firearms instructor had repeatedly requested to attend a re-certification course. This matter was referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office on April 20, 2015, and declined for criminal prosecution on June 21, 2017, in lieu of administrative remedies available to ICE.
13	Secret Service	We investigated two Secret Service officials (SESs) for allegedly engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We found no evidence to support the allegations.

Appendix 9

Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
14	Secret Service	We investigated a Secret Service manager (GS-15) for allegedly sexually intimidating and professionally harassing a subordinate employee and a second manager (SES) for allegedly retaliating against the employee when the employee reported the GS-15's alleged misconduct. We did not substantiate the allegations.
15	TSA	We investigated two senior TSA managers (SES's) for allegedly creating a hostile work environment. We found no evidence to support the allegations.
16	TSA	We investigated allegations that a TSA manager (GS-15) had improperly shared information that created an adversarial relationship between two other TSA employees. We found no evidence to support the allegation.
17	TSA	We investigated allegations that three TSA managers (including two SW-02's) caused an employee to receive a directed reassignment after the employee reported misconduct to four other senior TSA managers (SES, SW-01, and two SW-02's). We found no evidence to support the allegation that the employee's report of misconduct led to the directed reassignment, which was rescinded.
18	TSA	We investigated two TSA information technology officials (SESs) for allegedly improperly procuring deficient computer equipment and then concealing this fact from TSA. It was further alleged that three other TSA officials (SV-12, SW-02, ES-00) threatened employees, hid information, destroyed evidence, and used government funds and resources for personnel gain. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
19	TSA	We investigated a TSA official (ES-00) for allegedly engaging in prohibited personnel practices by allegedly advising an applicant who failed to make the list of qualified applicants that the official could "help make it happen." We found that the official asked the applicant if they were interested in the position, but did not promise the applicant the position. The applicant failed to make the certificate of eligibility and was not selected for the position.
20	USCIS	We investigated an acting senior official (SES) and a related senior official (SES) for allegedly engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We found no evidence to support the allegations.
21	USCIS	We investigated a USCIS manager (GS-15) for allegedly working on immigration cases as a private attorney while employed by USCIS. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.
	Total	21

Appendix 10

Acronyms and Abbreviations

AMO	Air and Marine Operations
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
Coast Guard	U.S. Coast Guard
DNDO	Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
DOJ	Department of Justice
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
EMO	Office of Emergency Management Oversight
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
I&E	Office of Inspections and Evaluations
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
INV	Office of Investigations
IQO	Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight
IT	information technology
ITA	Office of Information Technology Audits
IS&S	Information Sharing & Safeguarding
MGMT	Directorate for Management
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OA	Office of Audits
OCC	Office of Chief Counsel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIT	Office of Information Technology
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
QC	Questioned Costs
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
S&W	Sewer and Water Board
SAR	semiannual report
SBI	Secure Border Initiative
Secret Service	United States Secret Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UC	Unsupported Costs
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
WPO	Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit

Appendix 11

OIG Contacts and Locations



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Appendix 12

Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

Requirement:	Pages
Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities	4
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	5
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	10-15
Recommendations with Significant Problems	10-15
Summary of Significant Audits	10-15
Review of Legislation and Regulations	19
Reports with Questioned Costs	20
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	21
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	22
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	23-34
List of Audit Reports	35-45
Peer Review Results	49
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	50-52
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	21
Summary of Instances Where Information Was Refused	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report



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