



**Department of Homeland Security**  
**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO**  
**THE CONGRESS**

October 1, 2017 – March 31, 2018

# Inspector General's Message

The Honorable Kirstjen M. Nielsen  
Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Madam Secretary:


I am pleased to present our semiannual report, which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the first half of fiscal year 2018.

The audits, inspections, and investigations we conducted during this reporting period will improve treatment and care of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at detention facilities; make progress toward implementing controls to regulate access to the Department of Homeland Security facilities and systems; and improve oversight and controls for identifying and processing aliens who are known or suspected terrorists. In addition, our work will increase the effectiveness of acquisition oversight over United States Coast Guard information technology investments, and ensure Federal Emergency Management Agency funds are put to better use to improve management and oversight of disaster related programs.

The Department and its components have worked with us to correct hundreds of issues and improve the economy and efficiency of programs and operations. Based on the Department's actions this period, we closed 130 recommendations issued in this and prior periods. Our work in this reporting period has resulted in improved overall effectiveness and a more secure homeland as well as improved management and oversight of programs and operations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

Moving forward, we will continue to concentrate on the areas of greatest risk to the Department and periodically review actions taken to address our prior findings. We look forward to reporting in the future on the Department's actions to address its many challenges.

Sincerely,



John V. Kelly  
Acting Inspector General

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# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments


October 1, 2017 through March 31, 2018

During this reporting period, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department’s programs and operations.

## Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 59 reports, including management alerts, and reports on Disaster Relief Fund spending (appendix 5), as well as 393 investigative reports, while continuing to strengthen our transparency and internal oversight.

Our reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of the issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS’ programs.



## Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$129,898,737 of which \$12,723,707 did not have supporting documentation. The Department recovered or deobligated from audits \$439,807 (appendix 6). We issued 3 reports identifying \$72,692,524 in funds put to better use. Additionally, we reported \$3,459,877 in recoveries, fines, and restitution from investigations.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$129,898,737
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$72,692,524
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$439,807
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$439,807
Recoveries from Investigations ( <i>Not from Fines and Restitution</i> )	\$2,705,898
Fines from Investigations	\$49,005
Restitution from Investigations	\$704,974

## Funds Recovered

*\$3,145,705*

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

## Investigations


We initiated 577 and closed 423 investigations. Our investigations resulted in 62 arrests, 68 indictments, 30 convictions, and 13 personnel actions. We have included, in accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, information regarding number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations as of 10/1/2017	1,112
Investigations Initiated	577
Investigations Closed	423
Open Investigations as of 3/31/2018	1,266
Investigative Reports Issued	393
Investigations Referred for Prosecution	100
Investigations Accepted for Prosecution	43
Investigations Declined for Prosecution	66
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	21
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	40

\*All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigation's case management system. The open investigations balance, 10/1/2017, was adjusted by 2 investigations from the balance on 9/30/2017.

Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

## Investigations resulted in



# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

## Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, abuse, or fraud affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	24,772
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	25,363*
Complaints Closed	14,775*

\*Complaints referred and closed included complaints received in prior period.

## Whistleblower Protection Unit

DHS OIG investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees and applicants for employment; uniformed United States Coast Guard members; and DHS contractors, subcontractors, and grantees. DHS OIG primarily conducts investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information*, Presidential Policy Directive 19; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Investigation by DHS OIG is mandatory under these statutes when a *prima facie* case of retaliation is determined. Additionally, in certain instances, DHS OIG conducts investigations pursuant to the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302.

Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints	Number
<b>Total Whistleblower Retaliation Complaints Received</b>	<b>100</b>
Complaints Closed Because Legal Standard for Retaliation not Met	7
Complaints Closed for no Response from Claimant	7
Complaints Closed in Deferral to Other Agency Investigations	21
Complaints Withdrawn	5
Complaints Referred for Discretionary Investigations and Declined	19
Complaints Pending Further WPU Review	37
Investigations Opened from Complaints During SAR Period	4

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Program consists of two components. The first is the Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU), which is staffed by a Director, three investigative counsel, two whistleblower investigators, and one program

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

analyst. The WPU is responsible for complaint intake and assessment, whistleblower retaliation policy formulation and legal research, and full investigation of whistleblower retaliation complaints.

The second component is the Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman (WPO). The WPO is a department-level resource for educating and advising DHS employees about whistleblower protection rights and remedies. The WPO operates independent of WPU but collaborates frequently with WPU.

## Activity during Current SAR Period

During this semiannual report (SAR) period, WPU received 100 complaints that, on their face, alleged retaliation for protected whistleblower activity. Of those 100, 7 were declined because WPU determined the complaint did not meet the legal threshold for whistleblower retaliation. In 21 instances, the complaint was already the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another agency (such as the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board, or the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), or falling within the EEO process). Per DHS OIG policy, we deferred to the prior actions and did not open an additional investigation. In 19 instances, the retaliation alleged did not fall within one of the three types of investigations DHS OIG is mandated by statute to conduct. Full investigation of these complaints is discretionary, and in these 19 instances, the WPU declined to open an investigation. We closed 7 complaints due to a lack of response from the complainant, and closed 5 other complaints where the complainant withdrew from the process. There are 37 complaints currently pending WPU review. We also opened 4 new investigations from complaints received during this SAR period.

Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	Number
Total Investigations Opened During SAR Period	7
Current Total Active Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations	37
Investigations Closed	1
Reports Issued	1

## Comparison with Previous SAR Period

The number of complaints subject to an in-depth analysis decreased from 104 last period to 100 this SAR period. Additionally, we opened 4 new investigations from complaints from this SAR period, versus 6 investigations opened during the last SAR period.

At the end of the last SAR period, we had 31 open whistleblower retaliation investigations. During this period, we closed 1 investigation, which was closed with a Report of Investigation, and the report did not substantiate the allegations

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

of whistleblower retaliation. In total, the WPU opened 7 new investigations (including 3 from complaints received in previous periods), giving the WPU 37 total open whistleblower retaliation investigations.

## **Updates on Previous Recommendations Made by the WPU in Substantiated Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations**

During this reporting period, WPU did not close any new Reports of Investigation that substantiated whistleblower retaliation allegations. However, during the prior reporting period, WPU closed two reports that substantiated whistleblower retaliation allegations. The prior SAR included a detailed description of those two cases. We now provide information about the official(s) found to have been engaged in retaliation, and any consequences the agency imposed to hold the official(s) accountable.

### Case 1 – WRR1-I15-USSS-SID-01777-092217

As reflected in the prior SAR, OIG substantiated allegations that the United States Secret Service (USSS) suspended and revoked the complainant's security clearance in retaliation for, among other things, reporting a former Special Agent in Charge and other officials for abuse of authority. USSS has informed OIG that, at the time OIG's report was issued, the management officials named in the report were no longer employed by USSS. USSS further informed OIG that it objects to certain findings and conclusions in OIG's report, and does not anticipate taking further action in this matter.

### Case 2 – WRR1-I16-CBP-DET-17715-092917

As reflected in the prior SAR, OIG substantiated an allegation that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) denied a CBP Officer (complainant) a training opportunity in retaliation for complainant reporting that CBP was conducting racial profiling and illegal searches of vehicles. CBP notified OIG that the responsible management official in this matter has completed professionalism training. We have also been informed that CBP and its Office of Chief Counsel are currently reviewing this case and assessing what, if any, additional actions should be taken. OIG will monitor CBP's actions and will report any additional actions taken.

## **Training and Outreach**

During this reporting period, the WPO provided whistleblower training at 13 DHS Headquarters New Employee Orientation classes with approximately 350 attendees and 12 DHS Headquarters New Contractor classes with over 1,100



## Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

attendees. As part of his education outreach during this reporting period, the WPO made information regarding whistleblower protections available to the DHS Chief

Security Office in connection with the Department's mandatory Unauthorized Disclosure training for all DHS employees. The WPO also provided information on whistleblower protections for contractor and grantee employees to the DHS Office of the Chief Procurement Officer for use in training DHS contracting officers. Additionally, the WPO attended and participated in three Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman working group meetings during this reporting period.

### Special Reviews Group

The Special Reviews Group (SRG) continues to conduct sensitive reviews and special investigations across DHS components. SRG was designed to tackle projects that require a flexible approach to address questions or issues that may be particularly time-sensitive, narrower in scope than a typical inspection or evaluation, or require a unique analytical approach. This multi-disciplinary group of employees blends the skills of attorneys, investigators, and program analysts to quickly obtain and process information to achieve the OIG's oversight mandates and to inform agency heads and Congress of emergent problems in the Department's programs and operations. During its first six months, the SRG has completed five special reviews. Among those reports issued, highlights include:

**OIG-18-55, Swearing-In Ceremony of David J. Glawe, DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis:** SRG initiated this special review in response to a request from Senator Claire McCaskill to review the circumstances surrounding an invitation for a government swearing-in ceremony sent from a non-DHS email account. SRG found that the Under Secretary's use of a personal email account to communicate with invited guests was proper and appropriate since he was treating the ceremonial event as personal in nature. Nonetheless, the review determined that, contrary to DHS policy and Federal regulations, DHS resources were used to support the event. SRG issued recommendations to the Department to develop policies to ensure that it does not use government resources to support personal events.

**OIG-18-52, DHS Executive Travel Review:** In light of the heightened public and congressional interest in the misuse of government-owned, government-leased, and chartered aircraft, SRG conducted a special review of DHS' use of government aircraft and other-than-coach-class commercial air travel. SRG found that each instance of the use of government aircraft during the time period of the review complied with relevant laws, rules,

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (continued)

regulations, and guidance. With respect to senior leadership's use of premium class travel, SRG found that the use generally comported with

Federal law and regulations. The review identified two instances of non-compliance with the Department's processes for premium class travel; however, the related travel was properly justified, and the process deviations were quickly identified and corrected.

SRG also conducted special reviews relating to: CBP's use of its examination and summons authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1509; allegations that the Acting Commissioner of CBP engaged in conduct amounting to an abuse of authority and a gross waste of funds; and allegations that Transportation Security Administration (TSA) senior leadership interfered with TSA's standard disciplinary process to provide unusually favorable treatment to a member of senior management. In addition to its already-published reviews, SRG has launched another four reviews that are nearing completion.



## Improved Analytics Capacity

OIG's efforts to establish in-house the analytic capabilities previously provided by the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency Board continues to progress and produce considerable results. Activities to build a team of skilled data analysts and architects and implement state-of-the-art technology are ongoing. Concurrent with these activities, staff analyzed voluminous data and developed a variety of summary products to support audits and investigations of fraud, waste, and abuse in the administration of increased disaster relief resources in the wake of the 2017 hurricane season. To date, Congress has appropriated more than \$136 billion for such disaster relief, including over \$66 billion for DHS, with the bulk of DHS funding—about \$49.5 billion—going to the Disaster Relief Fund.

OIG's data analytic accomplishments to-date in fiscal year 2018 include:

- use of network and link analysis to identify potentially fraudulent disaster aid-related activity;
- adoption of data visualization techniques to provide the disaster aid-related information in dynamic ways to aid investigators pursuing criminal leads;
- creation of an audit risk visualization pilot tool that, using data from Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Single Audits of state, local, and non-profit entities, can help identify control weaknesses in Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) disaster relief spending; and
- researching Government Accountability Office and Congressional Research Service reports to build an OIG Knowledge Library.

In addition, assigned staff provided data analytic support to various OIG program units on more than a dozen issues, including audits of CBP's biometric exit system pilot, CBP's targeting and examination of incoming international mail, and FEMA's management and distribution of disaster relief shipments.

# Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act* ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS' programs and operations.


OIG Offices	DHS Component and Offices
Executive Office Office of Audits (OA) Office of Counsel Office of Enterprise Risk Identification and Management Office of External Affairs Office of Information Technology Audits (ITA) Office of Inspections and Evaluations (I&E) Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO) Office of Investigations (INV) Office of Management	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Directorate for Management (MGMT) Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Office of Inspector General (OIG) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Office of Legislative Affairs Office of Operations Coordination Office of Partnership and Engagement Office of Public Affairs Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Privacy Office Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Transportation Security Administration (TSA) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) United States Coast Guard (USCG) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) United States Secret Service (USSS)

# Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. We issued more than 10,298 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of March 31, 2018, the Department took action to address all but 578 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 152 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 59 new reports and 202 unique recommendations to the Department; we closed 130 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, because of the Department's actions. Congress also recognized our work by calling on us to testify four times about our efforts to improve the Department.

## *OIG Activity October 1, 2017 – March 31, 2018*



We have highlighted a number of audits and inspections that we conducted during the reporting period in the following eight focus areas:

- Acquisitions
- Disaster Related Activities
- Financial Management
- Immigration
- Information Technology Cybersecurity
- Law Enforcement
- Terrorism
- Investigations

# ACQUISITIONS

Our reports on acquisitions focused on DHS not always following its statutory requirements for entering, modifying, and overseeing its Other Transaction Authority agreements; USCG does not know if all IT investments within its \$1.8 billion in approved procurements are receiving proper acquisition oversight; and DHS needs to improve oversight and accountability of its suspension and debarment program.

## What We Found

### 1 **Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority**

DHS did not always follow statutory requirements when entering, modifying, and overseeing its Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreements. Specifically, DHS did not:

- require a cost-share agreement to its only research OTA;
- ensure statutory requirements were met when it modified a prototype OTA to include separate research-related activities; and
- timely and accurately report OTA activities to Congress.

### 2 **USCG IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight**

Although USCG approved approximately \$1.8 billion of information technology (IT) procurements between fiscal years 2014 and 2016, it does not know if almost 400 information systems are receiving proper acquisition oversight. Specifically:

- acquisition and IT review processes operate independently of each other;
- there are insufficient controls to ensure IT investments are reviewed to identify the appropriate level of acquisition oversight; and
- lack of reliable or non-existent information hinders efforts to determine what systems may require additional acquisition oversight.

### 3 **DHS Needs to Strengthen Its Suspension and Debarment Program**

DHS needs to improve several aspects of its Suspension and Debarment Program. Guidance on suspensions and debarments is outdated and missing needed detail. DHS did not adequately document five of seven administrative agreements completed from FY 2012 to FY 2017. DHS does not have a centralized system to track suspension and debarment activities, and staffing issues may hinder efficient and effective handling of suspensions and debarments.

## DHS Response

DHS reported the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer (OCPO) will issue an Acquisition Alert to remind components that authorized components must justify and document deviations to cost sharing arrangements, including those involving basic, applied, and advanced research and development. The OCPO will also remind authorized components that they must adhere to all statutory requirements when modifications are made to OTAs.

DHS reported USCG staffs are reviewing acquisition and IT processes to identify gaps, overlaps, and recommend improvements. DHS reported the USCG is revising its acquisition processes, methodology, and guidance to account for requisite programs below \$300 million in life cycle cost. USCG is also refining its Capital Planning and Investment Control process, management, and oversight to further align portfolio management of systems.

DHS reported the Suspension and Debarment Official (SDO) has drafted a revision of the *Suspension and Debarment Directive and Instruction*. DHS anticipates this will be completed by March 31, 2018. DHS reported to enhance information sharing, the DHS SDO implemented a SharePoint site for DHS Suspension and Debarment personnel to refer to for templates, policies, procedures, and guidance.

## Moving Forward

Modifying policies and correctly reporting to Congress could help ensure statutory requirements are met, reduce OTA costs, and increase accountability. USCG must strengthen its controls for identifying and designating non-major IT acquisition programs. By improving in reported areas, DHS can ensure suspensions, debarments, and administrative agreements are in the Federal Government's best interest.

# DISASTER RELATED ACTIVITIES

FEMA faces significant challenges ensuring its grant recipients properly manage Federal disaster funds. To avoid obligating duplicate or ineligible repair costs to an affected facility, FEMA will need to determine which incident caused facility damages and whether repairs necessitated by a previous incident were complete. FEMA needs to rely on legislatively mandated internal controls designed to ensure appropriate payments for flood victims.

## What We Found

### **1 Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process (SCRP)**

Facing continued negative publicity and pressure from members of Congress, FEMA created the SCRCP. In doing so, FEMA did not rely on certain legislatively mandated internal controls designed to ensure appropriate payments for flood victims. During the operation of the SCRCP, FEMA failed to establish contractor expectations or provide consistent guidance and oversight related to Hurricane Sandy claims. These omissions resulted in policyholders receiving unsupported additional payments, excessive costs to operate the SCRCP, and time delays processing claims.

### **2 Management Alert – Concerns with Potential Duplicate or Ineligible FEMA Public Assistance Funding for Facilities Damaged by Back-to-Back Disasters**

Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, some of the most catastrophic disasters in recent U.S. history, occurred within a 23-day period and resulted in multiple disaster declarations and billions of dollars in damages to areas within several Gulf Coast and Southeast states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. We noted the hurricanes affected some of the same designated disaster areas of earlier 2017 and 2016 declared disaster incidents. Facilities damaged by those incidents may not have been fully repaired before the new incident occurred.

### **3 Management Alert – FEMA Faces Significant Challenges Ensuring Recipients Properly Manage Disaster Funds**

FEMA does not effectively hold grant recipients accountable for proper grant management. This occurs because FEMA does not have effective policies, procedures, and controls in place. Findings repeatedly identified in our disaster grant reports show grant recipients and subrecipients continue to mispend disaster funds and fail to adhere to Federal regulations and FEMA policies.

## Moving Forward

FEMA's inability to provide consistent guidance and oversight has resulted in SCRCP costs to the Federal Government in excess of \$196 million. The additional \$49.5 billion that Congress appropriated for Hurricanes Harvey, Irma and Maria heightens the need for FEMA to take quick and effective actions to improve its controls over expensive and vulnerable programs. FEMA's oversight problems will continue to risk Federal funds intended to meet the needs of survivors.

## DHS Response

FEMA reported that the Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) developed and is implementing the *Flood Response Playbook*, which included outreach efforts to proactively address concerns and issues arising from large scale flood events. FIMA reported it is in the process of updating manuals such as the *Flood Insurance Manual* and the *Adjuster Claims Manual* to provide clarity and uniformity so partners and stakeholders are able to better understand and implement the Program's intent.

Management alerts are used by OIG to inform senior DHS managers of conditions that pose an immediate threat of waste, fraud, and abuse in agency programs. We discussed this alert with FEMA senior management at Headquarters. We made no recommendations in this report and did not seek written comments from DHS.

We discussed this alert with FEMA senior management at Headquarters. We made no recommendations in this report and did not seek written comments from DHS.

# FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Our reports on financial management focused on the *Independent Auditors Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting*; the FY 2016 audit of the DHS Bankcard Program indicates that moderate risk remains; and FEMA and CBP's oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program needs improvement.

## What We Found

### **1 Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting**

KPMG LLP (KPMG) has issued an unmodified (clean) opinion on DHS' consolidated financial statements. KPMG noted that the financial statements present fairly, in all material respects, DHS' financial position as of September 30, 2017. KPMG issued an adverse opinion on DHS' internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2017. The report identifies six significant deficiencies in internal control, two of which are considered material weaknesses, and four instances where DHS did not comply with four laws and regulations.

### **2 FY 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains**

During FY 2016, DHS reported spending approximately \$1.2 billion in purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions. Although the DHS has established internal controls for its charge card programs, the components we reviewed did not always follow DHS' procedures. Our testing results of purchase, travel, and fleet card transactions revealed internal control weaknesses. We found major internal control weaknesses that persisted at USCG and some control weaknesses within CBP's Fleet Card Program.

### **3 FEMA and CBP Oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program Needs Improvement**

FEMA and CBP did not meet their oversight responsibilities to monitor Stonegarden grantees, issue guidance and approve costs, and demonstrate program performance. FEMA does not have accurate financial data to identify grantees that require additional monitoring. As a result, FEMA and CBP approved more than \$14.6 million (or 72 percent of the amount audited) in overtime costs and more than \$390,500 in equipment costs without addressing the risk of supplantation.

## Moving Forward

DHS must continue remediation efforts in order to sustain a clean opinion on its financial statements and obtain a clean opinion on its internal control over financial reporting. There is moderate risk that DHS' internal controls over its charge card programs may not prevent illegal, improper, or erroneous purchases and payments. FEMA and CBP need to improve oversight to ensure Stonegarden funds are used according to Federal and program requirements.

## DHS Response

The Department concurred with the independent auditors' conclusions and indicated management will continue efforts to remediate control weaknesses in FY 2018, moving forward on the path to an unmodified opinion on internal control over financial reporting.

DHS reported the Office of Chief Financial Officer's (OCFO) Bankcard and Review Branch will develop a tiered system of violations for approving officials that will apply Department-wide. DHS directed USCG to develop more enhanced training for its Purchase Card Program. DHS reported the OCFO Bankcard and Review Branch will issue a revised fleet card policy to update the review and approval process.

FEMA reported it partnered with CBP to implement MAX.gov, a singular platform to provide transparency, visibility, and increased accountability for Stonegarden funds. According to FEMA, the implementation of MAX.com will provide Stonegarden financial information needed to monitor spending commitments, obligations, outlays, financial plans, and funding transfers. FEMA also reported MAX.gov will allow for better oversight and tracking of Stonegarden spend plans.

# IMMIGRATION

During this SAR period, we raised concerns about the care and treatment of detainees at four of five ICE detention facilities we inspected. We also found the need for improvement in USCIS's automation of the N-400 *Application for Naturalization*; and the lack of clarity in USCIS' website information on the time it takes to adjudicate green card applications, as well as USCIS' unrealistic processing time goal for these applications.

## What We Found

- 1 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities**

Inspections of five detention facilities raised concerns about the treatment and care of ICE detainees at four facilities. The problems we identified erode the protection of detainees' rights, their humane treatment, and provision of a safe, healthy environment. We recommended that ICE develop a process for field offices to conduct specific reviews for areas of concern identified in the report.
- 2 USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery**

USCIS automation of the N-400 *Application for Naturalization* has not been successful. The Electronic Immigration System (ELIS) capabilities deployed did not include critical functionality necessary for end-to-end Form N-400 processing. Also, USCIS did not ensure field personnel were adequately trained to use the new system capabilities prior to deployment.
- 3 USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications**

USCIS' website information about the time it takes field offices to adjudicate green card applications is unclear and not helpful to customers. It does not reflect the actual amount of time it takes, on average, to complete green card applications. In addition, USCIS' goal of adjudicating green card applications in 120 days is not realistic, given the factors that can slow the process and the importance of continuing to thoroughly vet applicants.

## Moving Forward

ICE acknowledged the importance of and challenges with detainee treatment and care in detention facilities. ICE reported it discontinued the contract with the Santa Ana City Jail in early 2017 and will no longer house detainees in this facility. Only time will tell whether efforts undertaken by USCIS to address challenges are effective in delivering needed ELIS capability and realizing transformational benefits. USCIS should present website information more clearly and reassess its 120-day green card application adjudication goal.

## DHS Response

DHS officials reported they will advise compliance personnel to fully integrate special assessments into their existing auditing and compliance efforts in the following areas: (1) detainee classification; (2) use of language services; (3) use of segregation and disciplinary actions; (4) compliance with grievance procedures; and (5) detainee care, including facility conditions.

USCIS provided in-person and virtual training for pre processing and adjudicative functionalities. DHS reported USCIS conducted a risk-based assessment on all ELIS N-400 product line technical issues and categorized corrective actions for the highest risk items into five areas. DHS also reported the USCIS' Executive Coordination Council established a new set of eight business objectives for measuring the operational impacts of ELIS.

USCIS officials reported they have begun testing a new method of determining processing times from existing systems. USCIS has also begun redesigning the processing times webpages to give applicants a clearer idea of where their case is in the adjudication process. USCIS will monitor processing times under the new methodology for a year to determine data driven, final processing times for each application type.



# INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CYBERSECURITY

As part of our review of the CBP IT system outage, we identified deficiencies with CBP software capacity testing and maintenance, system monitoring, and business continuity and disaster recovery processes. Although DHS has addressed requirements of the *Cybersecurity Act of 2015*, DHS faces challenges to effectively share cyber threat information across Federal and private sector entities. DHS has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD program.

## What We Found

### **1 Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017**

CBP took sufficient steps to resolve the January 2, 2017 outage on the same day it occurred; however, CBP's initial actions to resolve this outage were unsuccessful for several hours. CBP's transition from the TECS Modernization server environment to the TECS Legacy mainframe environment worked to resolve the outage. However, we identified the following deficiencies:

- inadequate CBP software capacity;
- deficient software maintenance;
- ineffective system status monitoring; and
- inadequate business continuity and disaster recovery processes.

### **2 Biennial Report on DHS Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015**

DHS has addressed information sharing requirements of Title I, Section 107 of the *Cybersecurity Act of 2015*. Despite meeting these requirements, DHS faces challenges to effectively share cyber threat information across Federal and private sector entities. The system DHS uses does not provide the high quality, contextual data needed to effectively defend against ever-evolving threats.

### **3 Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement**

DHS has not made much progress in implementing and managing requirements of the HSPD-12 program. DHS has made limited progress implementing controls necessary to regulate access to DHS facilities and systems. A significant challenge includes ensuring termination of cards for separated employees. Further, no DHS component had fully addressed key physical access control requirements, such as inventorying, assigning risk levels, and identifying existing mechanisms for securing owned and leased facilities.

## Moving Forward

CBP needs to improve its software testing environment, identify and implement critical operating system patches, and update the criteria used for TECS performance monitoring. Without enhanced outreach, DHS cannot increase participation and improve coordination of information sharing across Federal and private organizations. In the HSPD-12 Program, the potential remains for individuals who misrepresent their identities to circumvent controls, enter DHS buildings and controlled areas, and cause harm to people and assets.

## DHS Response

DHS reported protocols have been updated to clearly establish a quick escalation to OIT leadership when the TECS Primary applications have issues. DHS reported the inclusion of a production-like environment will be part of the requirements as CBP moves to a cloud environment and will depend on the necessary funding to establish a production-like test environment. DHS also reported CBP will develop and implement procedures to limit the time spent troubleshooting alternative recovery paths.

DHS reported that in FY 2018, the Network Security Deployment Division plans to evaluate cross-domain solutions for compliance with National Cybersecurity and Communications and Integration Center (NCCIC) standards and requirements. NCCIC is working with other divisions to promote Automated Indicator Sharing by helping organizations that may experience technical, resource, or cultural hurdles that can impede their participation.

DHS reported that Access Lifecycle Management (ALM) is being implemented to manage the lifecycle access for employees and contractors. DHS reported they have established a project to automate provisioning and de-provisioning of system and facility access through the ALM solution. DHS also reported they will coordinate HSPD-12 implementation as it pertains to: (1) risk assessments for information systems, and (2) PIV-enablement of all unclassified information systems.

# LAW ENFORCEMENT

Our audit of controls over firearms and sensitive assets disclosed components do not safeguard and effectively track sensitive assets. We issued Management Alerts in the law enforcement area that addressed a safety issue at the FLETC Artesia warehouse, and ICE's training model that needed further evaluation.

## What We Found

### **1 DHS Controls over Firearms and Sensitive Assets**

Component personnel do not always safeguard sensitive assets that, if lost, would result in critical mission impact or loss of life. Between FYs 2014 and 2016, DHS personnel lost a total of 2,142 highly sensitive assets — 228 firearms; 1,889 badges; and 25 secure immigration stamps. Furthermore, components are not effectively tracking sensitive assets, and practices surrounding non-law enforcement badges may be resulting in unnecessary risk.

### **2 Management Alert—Safety Issue at FLETC Artesia Warehouse**

During an August 2017 site visit to the FLETC Artesia Training Center, we identified a potential safety issue at a warehouse, Building 13. In 2009, a vehicle from an adjacent driving course struck the warehouse. The collision left a hole in the metal siding of the warehouse and damaged one of the supporting columns. Despite the significant damage caused to a load-bearing portion of a building used to train new hires, FLETC officials could not provide documentation to support that an engineering evaluation was conducted to determine whether the accident affected the integrity of the warehouse structure.

### **3 Management Alert—ICE Training Model Needs Further Evaluation**

ICE HSI and ERO leaders are proposing to reorganize and decentralize basic and advanced ICE training programs 6 months after ICE created a separate training office and merged its training programs into a centralized model. HSI and ERO leaders could not provide justification and their views on training conflict with the centralized training model approach. Without a thorough analysis, efforts to decentralize aspects of ICE training may prove counterproductive to benefits ICE previously identified with the centralized training model analysis.

## Moving Forward

Without oversight and policy improvements, highly sensitive assets will continue to be subject to loss or theft and the safety of the general public will be at risk. Continuing to use the warehouse for training and other purposes without an independent engineering safety evaluation may increase the safety risk for trainees and staff. ICE needs to make deliberate and strategic decisions about the most effective and efficient method to train its agents and officers.

## DHS Response

DHS reported that the Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer (OCRSO) will work with components to develop updated policy, require procedures to implement policy, and implement training for components. DHS reported OCRSO will provide direction and guidance to re-train property officials and employees on updates to personal property records.

FLETC reported they relocated the Border Patrol Academy from Building 13 to Building 30. FLETC also procured an engineering firm to conduct an in-depth safety analysis and provide cost estimates to repair Building 13, which FLETC plans to implement. FLETC placed high-speed jersey barriers between Range 4 and Building 13. FLETC agreed to procure an engineering firm to conduct an engineering and safety evaluation of the driving course.

ICE did not concur with our recommendation to conduct an independent assessment of the current training structure. ICE plans to return to program led basic and advanced training, while maintaining the centralization of cross-cutting training functions to better posture ICE in executing training in the most effective and efficient manner. We remain concerned that without implementing our recommendation, ICE may be missing opportunities to build a comprehensive training strategy and structure that best meets the organization's needs.

# TERRORISM

Our reports on the Department's efforts to prevent terrorism and other threats focused on DHS' implementation of Executive Order #13769; challenges ICE faces to screen aliens who may be known or suspected terrorists; and Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) contribution to aviation transportation security.

## What We Found

### **1 DHS Implementation of Executive Order (EO) #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States"**

We found that CBP was caught by surprise when the President issued the EO on January 27, 2017. DHS had little opportunity to prepare for and respond to basic questions about which travelers were affected by the EO. We observed a lack of coordinated communication strategy for dealing with the public and Congress, which significantly hampered CBP and harmed its public image. We did not substantiate any claims of misconduct on the part of CBP Officers at the U.S. ports of entry. However, CBP's aggressive approach to preventing affected travelers from boarding aircraft at international airports and pre-clearance facilities appears to have violated two court orders that enjoined CBP from this activity.

### **2 ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists**

ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) uses the Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol (KSTEP) screening process to identify aliens who may be known or suspected terrorists. Although ERO uses KSTEP to screen all aliens who are in ICE custody, ERO policy does not require continued screening of the approximately 2.37 million aliens when released and under ICE supervision. Also, the majority of ERO offices did not have access to DHS classified networks at their locations to communicate about derogatory information related to known or suspected terrorists.

### **3 FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable (CLASSIFIED)**

We identified limitations with FAMS contributions to aviation security. We also identified a part of FAMS operations where, if discontinued, funds could be put to better use. Details related to FAMS operations and flight coverage presented in the report are classified Sensitive Security Information.

## DHS Response

DHS claimed that the evidence did not support our finding that CBP violated the two court orders with respect to its handling of international travelers. We considered DHS' response, but respectfully disagree with its assertions and continue to believe that our findings are properly supported. Thus, our conclusions remain unchanged.

ICE reported ERO will conduct an assessment to determine additional resources needed to (1) expand screening to cover individuals on the non-detained docket, including aliens enrolled in the Alternatives to Detention Program, and (2) implement infrastructure improvements and fund additional ERO field offices. ICE reported the Combined Intelligence Unit designed a quality control program to ensure the screening of the detained population for nexus to terrorism.

The DHS response is classified. We made five recommendations that when implemented, should improve FAMS operations.

## Moving Forward

We hope the Department and CBP will find reason to reflect on our conclusions and consider ways to avoid the few, but significant, problems we identified in our report on the Executive Order. Due to limited program oversight and weak management controls, ERO may be missing opportunities to make decisions on those aliens who pose the highest risk to national security and public safety. In response to our classified report, TSA concurred with three recommendations and did not concur with two recommendations.

# INVESTIGATIONS

Our Reports of Investigation disclosed an HSI special agent conspiring to commit wire fraud; a TSA Security Officer for assisting a drug trafficking organization; a USCG contractor providing defective parts; a CBPO and two civilians for possession of marijuana; and an FPS officer submitted fraudulent travel vouchers.



## What We Found

- 1 HSI Special Agent Conspired to Commit Honest Services Wire Fraud**  
We investigated an ICE, Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) Special Agent for accepting cash, prostitutes, liquor, a party and expensive meals from an HSI confidential source and another civilian associated with a drug trafficking organization in exchange for falsifying official records and providing confidential information to his co-conspirators.
- 2 TSA Transportation Security Officer Assisted a Drug Trafficking Organization**  
We investigated a TSA Transportation Security Officer for assisting a drug trafficking organization by helping to transport \$138,000.
- 3 USCG Contractor Provided Defective Parts**  
We conducted a qui tam investigation of a USCG contractor based on an allegation that a contractor, through its subcontractor, provided defective Radio Frequency Distribution Systems (RFDS) as part of the National Security Cutter (NSC) Program.
- 4 Customs and Border Protection Officer Possessed Marijuana with Intent to Distribute**  
We investigated a Customs and Border Protection Officer (CBPO) and two civilians for possession of approximately 71 pounds of marijuana.
- 5 Federal Protective Service Officer Submitted Fraudulent Travel Vouchers**  
We investigated a Supervisor, Law Enforcement Specialist, Federal Protective Service (FPS) for submitting fraudulent travel vouchers and time and attendance reports.

## Action Taken

A Federal judge sentenced the former ICE HSI employee to 36 months imprisonment. The Federal judge sentenced the former confidential source to 27 months imprisonment. The Colombian government arrested the second civilian pursuant to an Interpol Red Notice and is pending extradition to the U.S. We are conducting this investigation jointly with the ICE Office of Professional Responsibility.

A Federal judge sentenced the former employee to 12 months of house arrest followed by 48 months of probation. We conducted this investigation jointly with the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation Division. TSA terminated the employee following the indictment.

The U.S. Attorney's Office and the relator reached a settlement agreement with the contractor for \$4.4 million. We conducted this investigation jointly with USCG Investigative Service.

A Federal judge sentenced the former CBPO to 21 months' incarceration, \$20,000 fine, and 2 years' supervised release. The Federal judge sentenced one civilian to 15 months' incarceration, a \$5,000 fine, and 2 years' supervised release, and the other civilian to 3 years' probation and a \$5,000 fine. We conducted this investigation jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

A Federal judge sentenced the former employee to probation for 36 months, to be incarcerated for 12 weekends during the first year of his probation, and to pay \$28,532 in restitution. We conducted this investigation jointly with NPPD, Compliance Investigations Division.

# Investigations of Senior Government Employees

This section reports on each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct of a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This report is being provided in accordance with the requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.

## We Investigated...

**A CBP Supervisory Information Technology Specialist (GS-15)** for improperly facilitating preferential treatment for a CBP Information Technology services contracting company. Working together with several other OIGs, we found that this individual and several co-conspirators were involved in a multi-year bid rigging scheme, which included major government fraud and illegal gratuities. The employee pleaded guilty to conspiracy, was sentenced to 2 months in Federal custody, resigned from Federal employment, and was debarred for 10 years.

**Two USCIS managers (both GS-15s)** for creating a hostile work environment and engaging in retaliation against employees who filed EEOC complaints against them. We found that both managers engaged in prohibited personnel practices and in a pattern of retaliation against employees who participated in EEOC protected activities or had filed EEOC claims against them. During our investigation, both managers were relieved of their duties and reassigned to non-supervisory positions in other areas. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A senior department official (SES)** for continuing to investigate an alleged unauthorized media disclosure of a draft intelligence document, despite the DHS Inspector General's explicit direction to await a determination of whether the disclosure was protected by law. We substantiated that the official violated departmental policy granting DHS OIG the authority to make this determination when he directed law enforcement to proceed with the investigation after receiving guidance personally from the IG not to proceed. Based upon our findings, no criminal referral was warranted.

**A component head (SES)** for travel fraud and excessive travel; an improper relationship with a subordinate; prohibited personnel practices; retaliation; and misuse of authority on the part of an agency subcomponent. We found no evidence of substantive misconduct; however, we identified instances in which the official failed to comply with Federal and DHS travel regulations. We also found that during the official's tenure, component employees who were not in law enforcement positions were improperly assigned weapons and were flying armed on both personal and official travel. The component has clarified which employees are permitted to carry a firearm, and those who are prohibited from flying armed while on personal travel are now in compliance with applicable regulations. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**An ICE official (SES)** for using ICE assets and personnel for personal travel while on leave and for activities outside the scope of the official's employment, and also for engaging in prohibited personnel practices. We substantiated that the official misused government resources while on personal travel. We did not substantiate the prohibited personnel practice allegation. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**An ICE HSI manager (GS-15)** for abuse of authority and improperly permitting an unidentified individual to access secure areas to misuse government facilities and equipment. We found that the manager permitted a private citizen to use government gym facilities and helped the individual complete a Federal employment application, both during and after business hours. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**An ICE HSI manager (SES)** for assaulting a subordinate employee during a meeting in which the manager also used abusive and offensive language. We substantiated these allegations. We referred our findings to the U.S. Attorney's Office, but the case was declined because the subordinate employee was not physically injured. During our investigation, we also found that the manager provided details of the incident that were inconsistent with the statements provided by witnesses to the conduct.

# Congressional Testimony and Briefings



The Office of Inspector General testified before Congress four times during this period. Testimony prepared for these hearings may be accessed on our website at [www.oig.dhs.gov](http://www.oig.dhs.gov).

## U.S. House of Representatives

## U.S. Senate

**November 15, 2017**

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform concerning, **"Recommendations and Reforms from the Inspectors General."**

**January 23, 2018**

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine Infrastructure, Safety and Security concerning, **"Surface Transportation Security: Addressing Current and Emerging Threats."**

**February 7, 2018**

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs concerning, **"Reauthorizing DHS: Positioning DHS to Address New and Emerging Threats to the Homeland."**

**March 15, 2018**

Committee on Homeland Security concerning, **"Assessing FEMA's Preparedness and Response Capabilities."**

We briefed congressional members and their staffs frequently throughout the reporting period. Our office conducted more than 40 briefings for congressional members and staff on the results of our work, including on the following OIG reports: *Covert Testing of TSA's Screening Checkpoint Effectiveness* (OIG-17-112); *FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable* (OIG-18-04); *DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration* (OIG-18-07); and *DHS' Implementation of the DATA Act* (OIG-18-34). We also met with congressional staff to discuss our FY 2019 budget request as well as Member requests for reviews of DHS programs and operations.



## OIG In The News

*NBC News, Washington Post, and NPR* — among other news outlets — took notice of our audit work from October 1, 2017 to March 31, 2018.

***Homeland insecurities: Lost guns, backlogged asylum-seekers among DHS vulnerabilities***

*USA Today*  
November 7, 2017

***“Disturbing” Undercover Probe Found TSA Screeners Missing Many Test Weapons***

*NBC News*  
November 8, 2017

***DHS Inspector General: Travel ban confusion led agents to violate court order***

*Washington Post*  
November 20, 2017

***Federal Investigation Finds “Significant Issues” At Immigrant Detention Centers***

*NPR*  
December 14, 2017

***Audit finds critical vulnerabilities in DHS computer systems***

*Washington Times*  
March 8, 2018

# Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other Office of Inspector General Activities

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## LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REVIEWS




The *Inspector General Act*, as amended, directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations. During this semiannual reporting period, we reviewed and provided comments on the following bill:

- *Department of Homeland Security Authorization Act of 2017* (H.R. 2825)

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## OVERSIGHT OF SINGLE AUDIT ACT, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 104-156

The *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires that inspectors general take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with Government Auditing Standards (GAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in one year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “single audit.” Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their single audit work in compliance with GAS. During this reporting period, we completed 23 desk reviews and 1 quality control review of Single Audit reports issued by an independent public accountant organization. Our ongoing work includes 4 onsite quality control reviews and 12 Single Audit desk reviews.





# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings



## Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs, Unsupported Costs

### Carryover from last period

8 reports with 26 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$69,681,288
- Unsupported Costs \$37,206

### Issued this period


4 reports with 7 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$129,898,737
- Unsupported Costs \$12,723,707




**12 Reports with  
33 Recommendations**

**199,580,025 Questioned Costs  
12,760,913 Unsupported Costs**



### Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs (QC) and Unsupported Costs (UC)



# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings (continued)



## Reports and Recommendations with Funds to be Put to Better Use (FPTBU)

### Carryover from last period

5 reports with 24 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$31,257,569

### Issued this period

3 reports with 3 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$72,692,524




**8 Reports with  
27 Recommendations**




**FPTBU  
103,950,093**

### Current Status on Reports and Recommendations with FPTBU




- The management decision for recommendation 1 for OIG-18-01 was changed from Open to Closed in October 2017, then changed to Open-Resolved in February 2018.

# Appendix 2 Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations



## ACTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

## Appendix 3

### Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec. No.	DHS Comp	Number of Recommendations Over 6 Months
1	12/16/2011	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	3, 4	FEMA	2
2	8/28/2013	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	9	MGMT	1
3	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
4	8/21/2015	OIG-15-131-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$21.7 Million of \$376 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Biloxi, Mississippi for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	1	FEMA	1
5	5/10/2016	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	5	TSA	1
6	9/30/2016	OIG-16-143-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$25.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Louisville, Mississippi for an April 2014 Disaster</i>	2	FEMA	1
7	6/21/2017	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	14, 29	USCG	2
8	6/30/2017	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	1, 5, 7	MGMT	3
9	7/24/2017	OIG-17-97-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$2.04 Billion Approved for New Orleans Infrastructure Repairs</i>	1, 2	FEMA	2
10	8/4/2017	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	CBP	1
11	9/14/2017	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert - Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
12	9/27/2017	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	1	CBP	1
<b>Total</b>						<b>17</b>

# Appendix 4

## Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-10-11	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2009 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCG
2	OIG-11-16	<i>Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
3	OIG-11-86	<i>U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program – Offshore Vessel Inspections</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
4	OIG-11-92	<i>Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection's Bonding Process</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
5	OIG-12-07	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2011 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	\$0	\$0	FEMA, USCG
6	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
7	OIG-12-26	<i>(U) Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secured Airport Areas</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
8	OIG-12-64	<i>Operations of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Secure Communities</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
9	OIG-12-79	<i>Opportunities to Improve FEMA's Public Assistance Preliminary Damage Assessment Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
10	OIG-12-132	<i>CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
11	OIG-13-19	<i>Identification, Reutilization, and Disposal of Excess Personal Property by the United States Coast Guard</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
12	OIG-13-20	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements and Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	16	\$0	\$0	FEMA, ICE, OCIO-OCFO, USCG
13	OIG-13-80	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Enforcement and Removal Operations' Contract Funding and Payment Processes</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
14	OIG-13-92	<i>Marine Accident Reporting, Investigations, and Enforcement in the United States Coast Guard</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCG
15	OIG-13-104	<i>Technical Security Evaluation of DHS Activities at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
16	OIG-13-110	<i>DHS Needs To Strengthen Information Technology Continuity and Contingency Planning Capabilities</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
17	OIG-13-113	<i>DHS Needs to Manage Its Radio Communication Program Better</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
18	OIG-13-114	<i>CBP Use of Force Training and Actions To Address Use of Force Incidents (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
19	OIG-13-115	<i>DHS Uses Social Media To Enhance Information Sharing and Mission Operations, But Additional Oversight and Guidance Are Needed</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PLCY
20	OIG-13-119	<i>CBP's and USCG's Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
21	OIG-14-14	<i>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	2	\$727,742	\$1,528,259	FEMA
22	OIG-14-18	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2013 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	10	\$0	\$0	DHS, ICE, MGMT, USCG, USSS
23	OIG-14-32	<i>Ensuring the Integrity of CBP's Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection Program</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
24	OIG-14-47	<i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Advanced Training Center Acquisition</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
25	OIG-14-105	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Management of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE

## Appendix 4 Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
26	OIG-14-112	<i>U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Information Technology Management Progress and Challenges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
27	OIG-14-118-D	<i>FEMA Should Take Steps to Improve the Efficiency and Effectiveness of the Disaster Assistance Helpline for Disaster Survivors That Do Not Speak English or Spanish</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
28	OIG-14-132	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport</i>	8	\$0	\$0	ICE, TSA
29	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
30	OIG-14-150-D	<i>FEMA and the State of Louisiana Need to Accelerate the Funding of \$812 Million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funds and Develop a Plan to Close Approved Projects</i>	1	\$0	\$812,238,776	FEMA
31	OIG-14-151	<i>FEMA's Logistics Supply Chain Management System May Not Be Effective During a Catastrophic Disaster</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
32	OIG-14-153	<i>Use of Risk Assessment within Secure Flight</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
33	OIG-15-01-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$13 Million of Grant Funds Awarded to The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	1	\$3,839,224	\$0	FEMA
34	OIG-15-02-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3 Million of Ineligible Costs and \$4.3 Million of Unneeded Funds from the Columbus Regional Hospital</i>	2	\$1,720,315	\$0	FEMA
35	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
36	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	1	\$3,559,067	\$0	FEMA
37	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	\$0	\$0	DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
38	OIG-15-18	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE
39	OIG-15-29	<i>Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck™ Initiative</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
40	OIG-15-38	<i>Science and Technology Directorate Needs to Improve Its Contract Management Procedures</i>	2	\$0	\$0	S&T
41	OIG-15-45	<i>Allegation of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI-14-3679) (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
42	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
43	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
44	OIG-15-88	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
45	OIG-15-94	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
46	OIG-15-95	<i>Streamline: Measuring Its Effect on Illegal Border Crossing</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP



## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
47	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	9	\$67,360,082	\$0	FEMA
48	OIG-15-108-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the National Protection and Programs Directorate, Internal Affairs Division</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
49	OIG-15-112	<i>Follow-up to Management Alert - U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
50	OIG-15-128-D	<i>FEMA's Process for Selecting Joint Field Offices Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$1,553,000	FEMA
51	OIG-15-131-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$21.7 Million of \$376 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to the City of Biloxi, Mississippi, for Hurricane Katrina Damages</i>	1	\$8,093,971	\$0	FEMA
52	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE, PLCY
53	OIG-16-01-D	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Verifying Applicants' Insurance Policies for the Individuals and Households Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
54	OIG-16-02	<i>The FPS Vehicle Fleet Is Not Managed Effectively</i>	3	\$0	\$2,519,077	MGMT
55	OIG-16-06	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' 2015 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	23	\$0	\$0	CFO, DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
56	OIG-16-08	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2015</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
57	OIG-16-10	<i>FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
58	OIG-16-15	<i>(U) Fiscal Year 2015 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems</i>	3	\$0	\$0	USCG
59	OIG-16-17	<i>ICE and USCIS Could Improve Data Quality and Exchange to Help Identify Potential Human Trafficking Cases</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
60	OIG-16-18	<i>DHS' Ebola Response Needs Better Coordination, Training, and Execution</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
61	OIG-16-20	<i>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems (Redacted) (Revised)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USSS
62	OIG-16-37	<i>Conditions at CBP's Forward Operating Bases along the Southwest Border (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
63	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
64	OIG-16-51	<i>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
65	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
66	OIG-16-64	<i>2014 White House Fence Jumping Incident (Redacted)</i>	6	\$0	\$0	USSS
67	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
68	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	\$0	FEMA
69	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program (Redacted)</i>	11	\$0	\$0	TSA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
70	OIG-16-88	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
71	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	OGC, TSA
72	OIG-16-93	<i>Office of Intelligence and Analysis Can Improve Transparency and Privacy</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A
73	OIG-16-96-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Citizenship and Immigration Services, Investigations Division</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USCIS
74	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	2	\$18,443,447	\$0	FEMA
75	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG Grants</i>	2	\$7,124,893	\$0	FEMA
76	OIG-16-102-D	<i>FEMA Continues to Experience Challenges in Protecting Personally Identifiable Information at Disaster Recovery Centers</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
77	OIG-16-115-D	<i>FEMA Should Suspend All Grant Payments on the \$29.9 Million Coastal Retrofit Program Until Mississippi Can Properly Account for Federal Funds</i>	4	\$0	\$26,899,836	FEMA
78	OIG-16-119-D	<i>FEMA Improperly Awarded \$47.3 Million to the City of Louisville, Mississippi</i>	1	\$35,474,345	\$0	FEMA
79	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
80	OIG-16-126-D	<i>FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees' and Subgrantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
81	OIG-16-127-D	<i>FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
82	OIG-16-128	<i>TWIC Background Checks are Not as Reliable as They Could Be</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
83	OIG-16-134	<i>Transportation Security Administration Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
84	OIG-16-138	<i>DHS' Progress in Implementing the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (Revised)</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT
85	OIG-16-139-D	<i>FEMA Should Implement Consistent Joint Field Office Guidance</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
86	OIG-16-143-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$25.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Louisville, Mississippi for an April 2014 Disaster</i>	1	\$1,470,285	\$0	FEMA
87	OIG-17-01	<i>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USSS
88	OIG-17-02	<i>DHS Pandemic Planning Needs Better Oversight, Training, and Execution</i>	4	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
89	OIG-17-03	<i>AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE, MGMT, USCG
90	OIG-17-04	<i>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
91	OIG-17-05	<i>DHS Is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP, ICE, MGMT, USSS
92	OIG-17-06-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$1.8 Million of \$5.5 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Columbia County, Florida, for Tropical Storm Debby Damages</i>	3	\$1,172,835		FEMA
93	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
94	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	\$0	\$0	USSS
95	OIG-17-11	<i>Better Safeguards Are Needed in USCIS Green Card Issuance</i>	7	\$0	\$0	USCIS
96	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CBP, CFO, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
97	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
98	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
99	OIG-17-24	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2016</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
100	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	3	\$23,785,177	\$0	FEMA
101	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
102	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
103	OIG-17-42	<i>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS
104	OIG-17-43-MA	<i>Management Alert on Issues Requiring Immediate Action at the Theo Lacy Facility in Orange, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
105	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	7	\$0	\$0	CRCL, DHS, I&A, PRIV
106	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
107	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	5	\$0	\$0	ICE, MGMT
108	OIG-17-58	<i>(U) Annual Evaluation of DHS' INFOSEC Program (Intel Systems - DHS Intelligence and Analysis) for FY 2016</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A
109	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CFO
110	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	26	\$0	\$0	USCG
111	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	7	\$0	\$0	MGMT
112	OIG-17-93-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3.9 Million of \$13.2 in Grant Funds Awarded to the Borough of Lavallette, New Jersey</i>	5	\$2,861,889	\$612,784	FEMA
113	OIG-17-97-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$2.04 Billion Approved for New Orleans Infrastructure Repairs</i>	2	\$2,034,900,000	\$0	FEMA
114	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert - CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
115	OIG-17-101	<i>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals</i>	2	\$0	\$0	I&A, MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
116	OIG-17-103-MA	<i>Management Alert -Unclear Rules Regarding Executive Protection Details Raise Concerns</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC, DSEC, COS
117	OIG-17-107	<i>TSA's Office of Intelligence and Analysis Has Improved Its Field Operations</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
118	OIG-17-108-D	<i>FEMA Should Strengthen Its Policies and Guidelines for Determining Public Assistance Eligibility of PNP Schools</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
119	OIG-17-110	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Management of its Flood Mapping Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	FEMA
120	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	8	\$0	\$0	TSA
121	OIG-17-113-D	<i>The Covington County Commission Needs Additional Assistance in Managing a \$5.4 Million FEMA Grant from Winter 2015 Storms and to Save Millions in the Future</i>	3	\$0	\$40,555,883	FEMA
122	OIG-17-114	<i>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations</i>	7	\$0	\$0	CBP
123	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert - Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
124	OIG-17-116-VR	<i>DHS Review of Responses to Significant Freedom of Information Act Requests</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PRIV
125	OIG-17-117-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York</i>	2	\$808,159	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations Over 6 Months Old (continued)

	Report Number	Report Title	# of Recs	Total Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
126	OIG-17-119	<i>ICE Field Offices Need to Improve Compliance with Oversight Requirements for Segregation of Detainees with Mental Health Conditions</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
	<b>Total</b>		<b>426</b>	<b>\$2,212,832,224</b>	<b>\$884,379,356</b>	

#### Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight.

A report number ending with “VR” is a Verification Review of an issued report or recommendation to verify DHS management has taken agreed upon corrective action.



# Appendix 5

## Reports Issued

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
1	10/10/2017	OIG-18-01	<i>Hazard Mitigation Grant Funds Awarded to MEMA for the Mississippi Coastal Retrofit Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
2	10/10/2017	OIG-18-02	<i>Verification Review of District of Columbia's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
3	10/20/2017	OIG-18-03	<i>USCIS Needs a Better Approach to Verify H-1B Visa Participants</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
4	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security is Questionable (Unclassified Summary)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
5	10/25/2017	OIG-18-05	<i>DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
6	10/27/2017	OIG-18-06	<i>Summary and Key Findings of Fiscal Year 2016 FEMA Disaster Grant and Program Audits</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
7	10/30/2017	OIG-18-07	<i>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
8	10/30/2017	OIG-18-08	<i>FEMA and California Need to Assist CalRecycle, a California State Agency, to Improve Its Accounting of \$230 Million in Disaster Costs</i>	\$107,002,492	\$0	\$65,397,921

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
9	10/30/2017	OIG-18-09	<i>Management Alert - FEMA Should Recover \$6.2 Million in Public Assistance Funds for Disaster Repairs That Are Not the Legal Responsibility of Richland County, North Dakota</i>	\$5,228,005	\$0	\$0
10	11/1/2017	OIG-18-10	<i>Biennial Report on DHS' Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
11	11/3/2017	OIG-18-11	<i>Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
12	11/7/2017	OIG-18-12	<i>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Previous Audit Reports on Insurance under the Public Assistance Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
13	11/9/2017	OIG-18-13	<i>FEMA and CBP Oversight of Operation Stonegarden Program Needs Improvement</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
14	11/14/2017	OIG-18-14	<i>Management Alert - Concerns with Potential Duplicate or Ineligible FEMA Public Assistance Funding for Facilities Damaged by Back-to-Back Disasters</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
15	11/14/2017	OIG-18-15	<i>Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
16	11/15/2017	OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
17	11/16/2017	OIG-18-17	<i>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its \$6.7 Million FEMA Grant</i>	\$5,021,273	\$225,240	\$4,788,492
18	11/16/2017	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert - CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	11/21/2017	OIG-18-19	<i>Review of CBP Information Technology System Outage of January 2, 2017 (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
20	11/30/2017	OIG-18-20	<i>Office of Health Affairs Has Not Implemented An Effective Privacy Management Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
21	11/30/2017	OIG-18-21	<i>Special Report: Lessons Learned from Prior DHS-OIG Reports Related to FEMA's Response to Texas Disasters and Texas' Management of FEMA Grant Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
22	11/30/2017	OIG-18-22	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Award of the Family Case Management Program Contract (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
23	11/30/2017	OIG-18-23	<i>USCIS Has Been Unsuccessful in Automating Naturalization Benefits Delivery</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
24	11/30/2017	OIG-18-24	<i>Department of Homeland Security's Use of Other Transaction Authority</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
25	11/30/2017	OIG-18-25	<i>The Omaha Tribe of Nebraska and Iowa Mismanaged \$14 Million in FEMA Disaster Grants</i>	\$12,646,967	\$12,498,467	\$2,506,111

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
26	12/5/2017	OIG-18-26	<i>Solano County, California, Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant Funding</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
27	12/5/2017	OIG-18-27	<i>TSA's Adjudication Resources are Inadequate to Meet TSA PreCheck Enrollment Goals</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
28	12/5/2017	OIG-18-28	<i>Osceola Electric Cooperative, Iowa, Generally Managed FEMA Grant Funds According to Federal Requirements</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	12/5/2017	OIG-18-29	<i>Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on Disaster-related Procurement and Contracting</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
30	12/11/2017	OIG-18-30	<i>Management Alert - FEMA Must Take Steps to Stop Those Attempting to Profit from Disaster Survivors Seeking Assistance in Puerto Rico</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
31	12/8/2017	OIG-18-31	<i>Management Alert - Potential Safety Issue at the FLETC Artesia Warehouse</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
32	12/11/2017	OIG-18-32	<i>Concerns About ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Detention Facilities</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
33	12/20/2017	OIG-18-33	<i>Management Alert - FEMA Faces Significant Challenges Ensuring Recipients Properly Manage Disaster Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
34	12/29/2017	OIG-18-34	<i>DHS' Implementation of the DATA Act</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
35	1/8/2018	OIG-18-35	<i>Special Review: TSA's Handling of the 2015 Disciplinary Matter Involving TSES Employee (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
36	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
37	1/18/2018	OIG-18-37	<i>DHS Implementation of Executive Order #13769 "Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States" (January 27, 2017)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
38	1/25/2018	OIG-18-38	<i>Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
39	1/25/2018	OIG-18-39	<i>Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Volunteer Energy Cooperative, Tennessee, for February 2015 Severe Winter Storm</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
40	1/25/2018	OIG-18-40	<i>Indiana Needs to Improve the Management of Its FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grants</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
41	1/25/2018	OIG-18-41	<i>DHS Needs to Strengthen Its Suspension and Debarment Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
42	1/25/2018	OIG-18-42	<i>Management Alert - ICE's Training Model Needs Further Evaluation</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
43	1/30/2018	OIG-18-43	<i>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
44	1/30/2018	OIG-18-44	<i>Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
45	1/30/2018	OIG-18-45	<i>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
46	1/30/2018	OIG-18-46	<i>Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
47	1/30/2018	OIG-18-47	<i>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Drug Control Performance Summary Report</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
48	1/30/2018	OIG-18-48	<i>Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2017 Detailed Accounting Submission for Drug Control Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
49	2/7/2018	OIG-18-49	<i>City of Cedar Falls, Iowa Has Policies, Procedures, and Business Practices to Manage Its FEMA Grant</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
50	2/8/2018	OIG-18-50	<i>The TSA SSI Program Office's Identification and Redaction of Sensitive Security Information</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
51	2/14/2018	OIG-18-51	<i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
52	2/16/2018	OIG-18-52	<i>Special Review: DHS Executive Travel Review</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
53	2/21/2018	OIG-18-53	<i>Immigration and Customs Enforcement Did Not Follow Federal Procurement Guidelines When Contracting for Detention Services</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
54	2/26/2018	OIG-18-54	<i>Management Alert - Inadequate FEMA Progress in Addressing Open Recommendations from our 2015 Report, "FEMA Faces Challenges in Managing Information Technology" (OIG-16-10)</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
55	2/28/2018	OIG-18-55	<i>Special Review: Swearing-In Ceremony of David J. Glawe, DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
56	3/1/2018	OIG-18-56	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2017</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
57	3/6/2018	OIG-18-57	<i>Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
58	3/9/2018	OIG-18-58	<i>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
59	3/12/2018	OIG-18-59	<i>FY 2017 Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$129,898,737</b>	<b>\$12,723,707</b>	<b>\$72,692,524</b>

### Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.



# Appendix 6

## Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommend- ed Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/ Deobligated
1	10/8/2014	OIG-15-01-D	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$13.0 Million of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to The Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, New Orleans, Louisiana</i>	\$7,121,750	\$325,072	\$6,796,678	\$325,072
2	9/29/2017	OIG-17-118-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$246,294 of \$3.0 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Lincoln County, Missouri</i>	\$176,746	\$114,735	\$62,011	\$114,735
3	10/30/2017	OIG-18-09	<i>Management Alert - FEMA Should Recover \$6.2 Million in Public Assistance Funds for Disaster Repairs That Are Not the Legal Responsibility of Richland County, North Dakota</i>	\$5,228,005	\$0	\$5,228,005	\$0
		Audit Report Total		\$12,526,501	\$439,807	\$12,086,694	\$439,807
		Investigative Recoveries <sup>(d)</sup>					\$2,705,898
		<b>Totals</b>		<b>\$12,526,501</b>	<b>\$439,807</b>	<b>\$12,086,694</b>	<b>\$3,145,705</b>

**Report Number Abbreviations:** OIG-XX-XX-D Disaster Relief Fund Report

**Notes and Explanations:** (d) Recoveries, other than administrative cost savings, which resulted from investigative efforts.

# Appendix 7

## Contract Audit Reports



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

We did not process contract audit reports meeting the criteria of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* during this reporting period.

Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs	Disallowed Costs
N/A	N/A	N/A

## Appendix 8 Peer Review Results



Section 5(a) (14) -(16) of the ***Inspector General Act of 1978***, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by or of an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

Our Office of Investigations was not subject to a peer review during the reporting period. However, we completed a peer review of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Office of Investigations in July 2017 and gave them a peer review rating of “compliant.” We noted two “best practices,” made 10 observations and no recommendations.

Our Office of Investigations received a peer review rating of “compliant” in September 2016, as a result of a review completed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. The review noted three “best practices” and two observations, but did not result in any recommendations.

### ***Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews***

#### ***Peer Review Conducted of DHS OIG Audit Operations***

Our audit offices were subject to a peer review by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) OIG during the reporting period. The review is expected to be completed by June 2018.

Our audit offices received a peer review rating of “pass” as a result of our latest peer review completed by Department of Justice (DOJ) OIG in June 2015, for the FY ending September 30, 2014. We implemented all recommendations made by DOJ OIG.

# Appendix 9

## Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
1	CBP	We investigated a CBP official (SES) for being involved in the deportation of criminal aliens from a location outside the continental United States without legal proceedings. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
2	Headquarters	We investigated a former DHS procurement official (SES) for soliciting a contractor's assistance in preparing a statement of work for a contract solicitation and later skewing a contract proposal evaluation panel's findings, resulting in a contract award to this contractor. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
3	FLETC	We investigated a training official (SES) who self-reported receiving a <i>de minimis</i> amount of money from a government contractor after the contractor left debris on the official's personal vehicle. We found that the official did not engage in misconduct or violate ethical standards for government employees.
4	Federal Protective Service (FPS)	We investigated an FPS official for having an inappropriate relationship with a FPS contractor and misusing government funds to pay for the contractor's travel and lodging on one occasion. We found that the official and the contractor had a personal relationship, but the allegations that government funds were used for the contractor's travel or lodging were unsubstantiated.
5	I&A	We investigated a DHS official (SES) for failing to follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guidelines in appointing an individual to a subordinate management position that ultimately granted the official direct mission authorities over a family member. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
6	CBP	We investigated a CBP manager (GS-15) for working together with subordinate managers to manipulate operational activity along the northern border to facilitate corrupt activity. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
7	CBP	We investigated a CBP official (SES) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices during the selection process for two senior positions. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated and the selections were consistent with CBP's Merit Promotion Plan.
8	CBP	We investigated four CBP officials (two SESs and two GS-15s) who were involved in issuing a request for information that exceeded a CBP component's authority. We found that the request likely exceeded the CBP component's authority, but identified no misconduct.
9	USCIS	We investigated a USCIS official (SES) for taking actions to increase the favorable adjudication of Iraqi asylum applicants, and directly fielding inquiries from a local immigration attorney and applicants themselves. We found that the USCIS official and USCIS headquarters reviewed this office's denials of Iraqi national asylum claims to ensure the claims were being processed fairly and consistently across the organization. We also found that the official received direct emails from an immigration attorney and Iraqi nationals, but the official's government email address was publicly available. We found that the allegations of an inappropriate relationship with an immigration attorney were unsubstantiated.

## Appendix 9

### Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public (continued)

	Affected Agency	Allegation
10	FAMS	We investigated a TSA official (SES) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices by retaliating against an employee for his previous whistleblower disclosures. Some of these allegations were not investigated by OIG because they were under consideration by the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). We found that the other allegations were unsubstantiated.
11	FLETC	We investigated a law enforcement training official (SES) for allegedly misusing a government owned vehicle for home to work transportation and drinking while armed. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
12	FLETC	We investigated three law enforcement training officials (an SES and two GS-15s) for administrative misconduct. We found that the allegations concerning early departures, prohibited personnel practices, and vehicle accident reporting were unsubstantiated. We did identify failures to follow policy related to the reporting of telework hours in the time and attendance system and each telework-ready employee having a signed telework agreement on file.
13	USCG	We investigated two USCG managers (SES and GS-15) who allegedly were not qualified for their positions. Also, the SES was alleged to have engaged in prohibited personnel practices and misuse of government resources. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
	<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>

# Appendix 10

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ALM	Access Lifecycle Management
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CBPO	Customs and Border Protection Officer
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DOJ	Department of Justice
EEOC	Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
ELIS	Electronic Immigration System
EMO	Office of Emergency Management Oversight
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIMA	Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FPTBU	Funds Put to Better Use
GAS	Government Auditing Standards
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
I&E	Office of Inspections and Evaluations
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ID	Identification
INV	Office of Investigations
IQO	Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight
ITA	Office of Information Technology Audits
IT	information technology
KSTEP	Known or Suspected Terrorist Encounter Protocol
MGMT	Directorate for Management
MSPB	Merit Systems Protection Board
NCCIC	National Cybersecurity and Communications and Integration Center
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
NSC	National Security Cutter Program
OA	Office of Audits
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OCPO	Office of the Chief Procurement Officer
OCRSO	Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OIT	Office of Information Technology
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OPM	Office of Personnel Management
OTA	Other Transaction Authority
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
QC	Questioned Costs
RFDS	Radio Frequency Distribution Systems
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAR	semiannual report
SCRIP	(Hurricane) Sandy Claims Review Process

# Appendix 10

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

SDO	Suspension and Debarment Official
SES	Senior Executive Service
SRG	Special Reviews Group
SSI	Sensitive Security Information
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
UC	Unsupported Costs
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USSS	United States Secret Service
WPO	Whistleblower Protection Ombudsman
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit

# Appendix 11

## OIG Contacts and Locations



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# Appendix 12

## Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

<b>Requirement:</b>	<b>Pages</b>
Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities	4
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	5
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Summary of Significant Audits	12-18
Review of Legislation and Regulations	23
Reports with Questioned Costs	24
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	25
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	26
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	27-39
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Peer Review Results	50
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	51-52
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	25
Summary of Instances Where Information Was Refused	Nothing to Report
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report

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