



**Department of Homeland Security**  
**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**



**SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO**  
**THE CONGRESS**

April 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019

# Inspector General's Message

The Honorable Kevin K. McAleenan  
Acting Secretary  
Department of Homeland Security  
Washington, DC 20528

Dear Mr. Secretary:


I am pleased to present our 34th semiannual report (SAR), which summarizes the work and accomplishments of our office during the second half of fiscal year 2019.

The Department and its components have worked with us to correct hundreds of issues and improve the economy and efficiency of programs and operations. Based on the Department's actions this period, we closed 146 recommendations issued in this and prior periods. Our work this reporting period resulted in improved overall effectiveness and a more secure homeland as well as improved management and oversight of programs and operations to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

The audits, inspections, and investigations we conducted during this reporting period should continue to help improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department and its domestic and international missions to continue to protect the homeland. As examples, we reviewed the treatment and care of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees at detention facilities, as well as ensured U.S. Customs and Border Protection provides guidance, knowledge, and tools to protect personnel when they come in contact with fentanyl and other opioids during search and seizures. Our work should also improve the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) review and obligation of Public Assistance grant funds and better align FEMA's information technology resources with agency and mission priorities.

This year marks the 41st anniversary of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* and the creation of the original 12 Offices of Inspector General. Our office was created in 2003. Every six months we provide the Congress with a report detailing our independent oversight of the Department. In the years to come, we look forward to continuing our efforts to provide independent and effective oversight of the Department and working with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency on important issues that cut across our Government.

Sincerely,

  
Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
Inspector General

# Table of Contents

<b>Inspector General’s Message .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments .....</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Acquisitions .....</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Disaster-related Activities .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>Financial Management .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Immigration .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Information Technology/Cybersecurity .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Law Enforcement .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Terrorism and Other Special Reports .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Investigations .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Investigations of Senior Government Employees .....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Congressional Testimony and Briefings .....</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>OIG In The News .....</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other OIG Activities .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>APPENDIXES</b>	
<b>Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings .....</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>Appendix 2 Compliance—Resolution of Reports and Recommendations .....</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Appendix 3 Reports with Unresolved Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Appendix 4 Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Appendix 5 Reports Issued .....</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Appendix 6 Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated .....</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Appendix 7 Contract Audit Reports .....</b>	<b>51</b>
<b>Appendix 8 Peer Review Results .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Appendix 9 Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public .....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b>Appendix 10 Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information...</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>Appendix 11 Acronyms and Abbreviations .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b>Appendix 12 OIG Contacts and Locations .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Appendix 13 Index to Reporting Requirements .....</b>	<b>59</b>

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments


April 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019

During this reporting period, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department’s programs and operations.

## Reports Issued to DHS

We issued 30 reports, including 3 management alerts (appendix 5), as well as 396 investigative reports, while continuing to strengthen our transparency and internal oversight.

Our reports provide the DHS Secretary and Congress with an objective assessment of issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS’ programs.



## Dollar Impact

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$707,550,017 of which \$706,574,823 did not have supporting documentation. The Department recovered or deobligated \$9,182,403 as a result of audits. (See appendix 6.) We issued one report identifying \$123,011,428 in funds put to better use. Additionally, we reported \$4,527,933 in recoveries, asset forfeitures, fines, and restitution from investigations.

Type of Impact	Amount
Questioned Costs	\$707,550,017
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$123,011,428
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$9,182,403
Funds Recovered/Deobligated from Audits	\$9,182,403
Recoveries and Asset Forfeitures from Investigations ( <i>Not from Fines and Restitution</i> )	\$94,230
Fines from Investigations	\$509,901
Restitution from Investigations	\$3,923,802

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Investigations


We initiated 375 investigations and closed 437 investigations. Our investigations resulted in 52 arrests, 65 indictments, 39 convictions, 7 debarments, and 11 personnel actions. We have included, in accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

Type of Investigation*	Number
Open Investigations as of 3/31/2019	1,263
Investigations Initiated	375
Investigations Closed	437
Open Investigations as of 9/30/19	1,201
Investigative Reports Issued	396
Investigations Referred for Federal Prosecution	26
Investigations Accepted for Federal Prosecution	26
Investigations Declined for Federal Prosecution	2
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	9
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	25

\*All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigations' case management system.

Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

## Investigations resulted in



# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, abuse, or fraud affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

Complaints	Number
Total Hotline Complaints Received	12,442
Complaints Referred (to programs or other agencies)	12,713
Complaints Closed	15,506

Note: Complaints referred and closed include complaints received in prior period.

## Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, as well as by employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. The WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19*; *Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, and the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

### Activity during Current SAR Period

#### Complaint Intake

During this semiannual report (SAR) period, WPU received 207 complaints, which it reviewed for allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had 19 pending complaints to resolve. WPU declined to open an investigation for 208 complaints during the intake process. Investigations were opened on 7 complaints, leaving 11 complaints currently pending WPU review.

## Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

<b>WPU Intake Complaints</b>	<b>Number</b>
Pending Complaints Entering this Period	19
Complaints Received by WPU during Period	207
<b>Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period</b>	<b>226</b>
Complaints Declined during Intake Process <sup>1</sup>	208
Complaints Converted to Investigation	7
<b>Total Complaints Pending at End of Period</b>	<b>11</b>

### Investigations

WPU closed six whistleblower retaliation investigations during the SAR period, including four with reports of investigation. Two investigations substantiated whistleblower retaliation allegations.

During this reporting period, the WPU also completed special projects at the request of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Integrity Committee.

<b>Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations</b>	<b>Number</b>
Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	40
Investigations Opened during Period	7
Investigations Closed during Period	6
<b>Investigations Pending at End of Period</b>	<b>41</b>

<sup>1</sup> Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency, or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Substantiated Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations

### I16-NON-DHS-SID-18500

The Inspector General for the Intelligence Community (ICIG) requested that OIG review a Presidential Policy Directive 19 complaint filed by a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) OIG employee. OIG's investigation substantiated allegations that the employee was retaliated against for cooperating with an ICIG official. OIG determined that the CIA OIG opened a "retaliatory investigation" against the employee, and used other, unrelated derogatory information, along with the employee's protected activity, to suspend the employee's clearance and place the employee on administrative leave. OIG made one recommendation for corrective action and referred the complete Classified Report of Investigation to the CIA to determine appropriate corrective action. A one-page Unclassified Summary of the report of investigation, with appropriate redactions, can be found on the OIG website:

<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019/I16-NON-DHS-SID-18500.pdf>

### W17-USCG-WPU-00828 & W-17-USCG-19305

OIG substantiated allegations that two whistleblowers in the Coast Guard were retaliated against for reporting misconduct in violation of the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034.

OIG determined that the whistleblowers' protected communications were a contributing factor in multiple personnel actions taken against the whistleblowers, including derogatory Officer Evaluation Reports (OER) and the withholding of performance awards. The officials involved in retaliation were the subject of the whistleblower complaints, and were the immediate supervisors responsible for the derogatory OERs and withholding of performance awards. OIG made four recommendations for corrective action: (1) that a performance award be resubmitted on behalf of the whistleblowers for consideration; (2) that one whistleblower's derogatory OER be removed from his file; (3) that the OER for the other whistleblower be corrected; and (4) that a records review board be convened to determine whether to order any retroactive promotions and back pay. The redacted report of investigation can be found on the OIG website:

<https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2019/WRROI-W17-USCG-WPU-08828.pdf>.



# Highlights of OIG Activities and Accomplishments (Continued)

## Updates Related to Prior Substantiated Reports of Whistleblower Retaliation

### W17-USCG-WPU-16018

As reflected in the prior SAR, OIG substantiated allegations that a Lieutenant Commander in the Coast Guard was retaliated against for making discrimination and harassment complaints against her supervisors. OIG made four recommendations for corrective action. In response to our report of investigation, the DHS Secretary ordered the Coast Guard to implement all four recommendations. By the end of this SAR period, the Coast Guard had implemented most of the recommendations, including (1) correcting the Lieutenant Commander's Officer Evaluation Report performance marks, (2) requiring supervisors to document their rationales for findings and outcomes in harassment investigations, (3) updating Coast Guard supervisor training on prohibited discrimination, harassment, and bullying policies, and (4) updating the *Coast Guard Civil Rights Manual* to clarify military members' right to file whistleblower retaliation complaints with OIG. No actions were taken against any of the officials involved in the substantiated retaliation. DHS told OIG that one official retired earlier this year but was not subject to any disciplinary action regarding the matter.

### I16-CBP-DET-17715

During a previous reporting period, OIG closed a case concerning a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officer who was denied a training opportunity in retaliation for a protected disclosure. In response to our report of investigation, CBP provided special training to the responsible management official involved on how to handle similar situations properly in the future. Last period, CBP informed OIG that CBP also proposed a suspension as disciplinary action against the responsible management official in response to his conduct. During this period, CBP informed OIG that CBP has closed the matter without disciplinary action.

# Office of Inspector General and Department of Homeland Security Profiles

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* officially established DHS, with the primary mission of protecting the American homeland. The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* also established an OIG in the Department by amendment to the *Inspector General Act of 1978*. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act* ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress on the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations.


OIG Offices	DHS Components and Offices
Executive Office	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
Office of Audits (OA)	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
Office of Counsel	Management Directorate (MGMT)
Office of External Affairs	Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations (SRE)	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)
Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO)	Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISO)
Office of Investigations (INV)	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
Office of Management (OM)	Office of Inspector General (OIG)
	Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
	Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
	Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
	Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE)
	Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
	Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
	Privacy Office
	Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
	Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
	United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)
	U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
	United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

## Summary of Significant Office of Inspector General Activities

Since 2003, our work has inspired significant Department and congressional action to correct deficiencies identified in our audit, inspection, and investigative reports. Since our creation, we have issued more than 10,698 recommendations to improve the economy, effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of the Department's programs and operations. As of September 30, 2019, the Department took action to address all but 533 of those recommendations. Congress has also taken notice of our work and called on us to testify 164 times since our office was created.

During this reporting period, we issued 30 new reports and 104 unique recommendations to the Department; we closed 146 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods, because of the Department's actions. Congress also recognized our work by calling on us 10 times to testify about our efforts to improve the Department.

### *OIG Activity April 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019*



We have highlighted a number of audits and inspections that we conducted during the reporting period in the following eight focus areas:

- Acquisitions
- Disaster-related Activities
- Financial Management
- Immigration
- Information Technology/Cybersecurity
- Law Enforcement
- Terrorism
- Investigations

# ACQUISITIONS

During this SAR period, we evaluated the contracting practices of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) after the 2017 hurricanes, as well as DHS and component oversight of acquisition programs costing less than \$300 million.



## What We Found

### 1 **FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC (OIG-19-38)**

FEMA did not follow all procurement laws, regulations, and procedures when it awarded more than \$30 million for two contracts to Bronze Star for tarps and plastic sheeting. As a result of these management control weaknesses, FEMA inappropriately awarded two contracts to Bronze Star, which did not meet the requirements of either contract. This deficiency delayed delivery of crucial supplies, and impeded Puerto Rico residents' efforts to protect their homes and prevent further damage. Overall, FEMA wasted personnel resources, time, and taxpayer money by issuing, canceling, and reissuing contracts for tarps.

### 2 **Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts (OIG-19-50)**

DHS components did not always properly solicit, award, and manage contracts according to Federal and departmental regulations. Components lacked a comprehensive contract management process for maintaining contract files, and reviews conducted by procurement personnel did not ensure that contract personnel performed the required procurement processes.

### 3 **FEMA's Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC (OIG-19-52)**

FEMA's eligibility determination of Cobra Acquisitions LLC (Cobra) contract costs for the Public Assistance Grant Program was not sound and lacked supporting documentation. FEMA did not consider compliance with contract terms in its review of Cobra contract costs to transport equipment and people to Puerto Rico. As a result, FEMA approved a Public Assistance grant and reimbursed millions of dollars for Cobra contract costs based on an unsound eligibility determination.

## DHS Response

FEMA non-concurred with both recommendations, asserting that our recommendations should focus solely on specific issues related to the two Bronze Star contracts reviewed rather than broader FEMA procurement practices.

The Chief Procurement Officer did not agree with our recommendations and asserted that our report lacked basis to conclude that our findings are a result of a lack of contract management policy or guidance, either at the Department or contracting activity level.

FEMA concurred with the one recommendation that we made and described corrective actions to address the issues we identified. FEMA will update its *Public Assistance Program and Policy Guide* to include additional guidance specific to time and materials contracts. FEMA is also conducting additional analyses of the incurred costs to determine the reasonability and eligibility of Cobra contract costs for PA funding.



## Moving Forward

FEMA must be meticulous in its approach when developing solicitations and determining the award of contracts to qualified contractors and suppliers. FEMA must remain committed to analyzing the reasonableness of time and quantities claimed against the work completed. Although DHS has made improvements in providing oversight for lower dollar contracts, more work is needed.

# DISASTER-RELATED ACTIVITIES

During this SAR period, we audited \$706.6 million awarded to Louisiana for hazard mitigation work following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. We audited an award of \$306 million in Public Assistance funds to the New Jersey Port Authority for Holland Tunnel repairs. Lastly, we audited the State of Washington's Emergency Management Division to determine the extent to which it complied with policies, procedures and regulations for effective oversight of FEMA Public Assistance grant funding.

## What We Found

- 1 Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a \$706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes (OIG-19-54)**

Louisiana did not provide adequate documentation to support costs, as required by Federal regulations, and FEMA is not requiring the State to provide mandatory documentation to close out the \$706.6 million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program grant. Louisiana also has not provided FEMA with required documentation showing that homeowners paid \$79.7 million in promissory notes for state-funded mitigation work on their homes. As a result of these issues, Federal funds are at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse.
- 2 FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for \$306 Million in Public Assistance Funds (OIG-19-61)**

FEMA lacks assurance the costs obligated are accurate and reasonable. FEMA should deobligate \$123 million of ineligible costs, and implement procedures to ensure its personnel follow Federal regulations and FEMA guidelines when reviewing Public Assistance grant requests. FEMA should also implement training to emphasize the importance of proper and appropriate obligation of Public Assistance funds.
- 3 The State of Washington's Oversight of FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program for Fiscal Years 2015–2017 Was Generally Effective (OIG-19-64)**

The State's Emergency Management Division (EMD) and FEMA complied with applicable policies, procedures, and regulations in two areas. However, we found in a third that EMD lacked position-specific guidance for all personnel with programmatic responsibilities. Because FEMA did not ensure that EMD complied with its own administrative plan to issue written guidance for each internal position, some program staff may not have consistently executed their assigned duties. Lastly, neither EMD nor its subrecipients submitted timely project closeout requests.

## DHS Response

FEMA stated that Louisiana has made significant progress on grants management, documents retention, and accounting. FEMA's responses were sufficient to close all but one of our five recommendations. FEMA is taking action to resolve the final open recommendation.

FEMA concurred with one recommendation, which we consider resolved and open. FEMA did not concur with two recommendations that remain unresolved and open.

FEMA concurred with all five of our recommendations to strengthen EMD's internal controls to improve its oversight of FEMA's PA grant program.

## Moving Forward

FEMA must work closely with Louisiana to develop applicable policies and procedures regarding its accounting controls, records retention, and tracking of state funds. FEMA should also implement training to emphasize the importance of appropriate obligation of Public Assistance funds, and FEMA must continue supporting the State of Washington to help it close all projects by the applicable regulatory deadlines, including hiring a program specialist.

# FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Our reports on financial management evaluated compliance with a variety of Federal guidelines, including the *Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017*; the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*; the *Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act*; *Individuals and Households Program Unified Guidance FP-104-00903/September 2016*; and the *Transportation and Second Vehicles Requests document*.



## What We Found

- 1 Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending (OIG-19-39)**

DHS and its components did not maintain all required supporting documentation of actual conference costs, and certain costs, in some instances, did not meet all reasonable and allocable criteria. Further, DHS did not submit a fully compliant annual report to OIG and to the public as required. DHS did not fully align with statutory requirements in its written policy governing the classification, approval, and reporting of conferences with scheduled training, nor maintain the required documentation to support the use of training exemptions at certain components. Lastly, DHS did not ensure all cases of conferences with costs exceeding \$20,000 are accurately reported to OIG.
- 2 S&T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS (OIG-19-59)**

Science and Technology (S&T) did not fully comply with requirements of the *Homeland Security Act of 2002*. An incomplete profile of capability gaps hinders S&T's ability to identify and understand existing and emerging needs, as well as its ability to make informed investment decisions. S&T may not be able to provide the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an accurate profile of the Department's Research and Development (R&D) activities or funding needs for a wide range of missions, including securing the border, detecting nuclear devices, and screening airline passengers.
- 3 FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds (OIG-19-66)**

FEMA did not take sufficient actions to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of transportation assistance funds for vehicles considered damaged or destroyed by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in fiscal year 2017. Specifically, FEMA did not adequately document applicants' eligibility for transportation assistance because FEMA's policies and procedures do not require documenting comprehensive insurance and second vehicle verifications. Without this documentation, FEMA risks approving ineligible applications.

## DHS Response

The Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO) concurred with all seven recommendations. OCFO provided OIG with a copy of its testing work program, and the results of its completed quarterly tests. OCFO provided, to OIG, the Desk-Side Procedures currently in use as a demonstration of actual quality control activities in place within OCFO's Office of Financial Operations.

S&T concurred with all three of our recommendations. S&T is revising policies and guidance regarding the coordination of DHS R&D and is also developing and implementing a tracking tool that will become the Directorate's authoritative database.

FEMA concurred with one of our recommendations and did not concur with two of our recommendations. FEMA will include guidance in its procedures that will include methodologies that states, tribes, and territories may use to determine proper monetary limits for transportation assistance.



## Moving Forward

DHS must formalize periodic monitoring of the completeness and accuracy of conference reporting, including verification of supporting documentation, as well as, amend its conference reporting policies and procedures. S&T needs to implement efficient tracking tools to ensure a comprehensive department-wide R&D profile. FEMA needs to work more closely with states, tribes, and territories to establish their repair and replacement limits for transportation assistance.

# IMMIGRATION

During this SAR period, we assessed USCIS' process for recording adjudicative decisions and how the component used the data to support its quality assurance, fraud monitoring, and reporting processes. We conducted unannounced inspections of four detention facilities to evaluate their compliance with ICE detention standards. We also reviewed three allegations of immigration law violations at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry.

## What We Found

### **1 Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions (OIG-19-40)**

USCIS has not implemented an effective process to track adjudicative decisions and ensure data integrity in its Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS3). USCIS cannot reliably trace adjudicative decisions recorded in CLAIMS3 back to the Immigration Services Officers (ISO) responsible for those decisions. These weaknesses create data integrity issues and vulnerability to fraud. In addition, the system does not support accurate management and productivity reporting necessary for sound management decision making.

### **2 Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities (OIG-19-47)**

Our inspections revealed violations of ICE's *2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards*. Although the conditions varied among the facilities, our observations revealed issues with expired food, and segregation practices violated standards, which infringed on detainee rights. Bathrooms in detainee housing units were dilapidated and moldy, and at one facility, detainees did not receive appropriate clothing and hygiene items to ensure they could properly care for themselves. Lastly, one facility allowed only non-contact visits, despite being able to accommodate in-person visitation.

### **3 Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel (OIG-19-65)**

We substantiated, in whole or in part, all three factual allegations referred to DHS by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC). We found instances of CBP officials returning some asylum applicants to Mexico after they had already entered the United States. We confirmed that Tecate personnel do not document when they redirect asylum applicants at the limit line, or when they return asylum applicants, who are already present in the United States, back to Mexico.

## Moving Forward

USCIS must conduct ongoing analysis of CLAIMS3 data in order to improve oversight and proactive internal fraud monitoring. ICE should ensure detention facilities comply with ICE's *2011 Performance-Based National Detention Standards*.

## DHS Response

The USCIS Director concurred with all eight recommendations. USCIS provided guidance and procedural policy to adjudicators. USCIS officials agreed that capturing the identity of the ISO is important and stated that the CLAIMS3 system displays the action taken on a case, the date and time of the action, and the user who performed the action.

ICE concurred with the one recommendation we issued. ICE has identified ongoing actions to address the OIG-identified deficiencies. ICE responded it is committed to correcting all issues identified by OIG.

This report does not contain any recommendations.

# INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY/CYBERSECURITY

We conducted an audit to assess the extent to which FEMA has implemented federally mandated IT management practices and identify challenges to ensuring FEMA's IT systems adequately support mission operations. We reviewed DHS' information security program for compliance with *Federal Information Security Modernization Act* requirements. We also performed an audit to assess DHS' progress in fulfilling requirements of the *Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act*.

## What We Found

### **1 FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations (OIG-19-58)**

FEMA has not implemented federally mandated IT management practices essential for effective oversight of its information technology (IT) environment. Specifically, FEMA has not established an IT strategic plan, architecture, or governance framework to facilitate day-to-day management of its aging IT systems and equipment. We attribute these deficiencies to the FEMA Chief Information Officer's (CIO) limited authority to manage IT agency-wide, as well as to a decentralized resource allocation approach that hinders funding for the centralized IT environment.

### **2 Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018 (OIG-19-60)**

DHS' information security program was effective for fiscal year 2018 because the Department earned the targeted maturity rating, "Managed and Measurable" (Level 4) in four of five functions, as compared to last year's lower overall rating, "Consistently Implemented" (Level 3). We rated DHS' information security program according to five functions outlined in this year's reporting instructions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover.

### **3 DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning (OIG-19-62)**

DHS has not fully met requirements in the *Cybersecurity Workforce Assessment Act* to assess its cybersecurity workforce and develop a strategy to address workforce gaps. The Department did not submit annual workforce assessments to Congress by the statutorily defined due dates for the past 4 years. DHS also did not include all required information in the assessments once they were submitted. The Department also did not submit an annual cybersecurity workforce strategy to Congress, as required, between 2015 and 2018.

## Moving Forward

FEMA must modernize its IT systems and infrastructure to make response and recovery operations more efficient, and to deliver assistance in as simple a manner as possible. DHS needs to have a well-documented and tested contingency plan, which can ensure the recovery of critical network operations. DHS needs to complete workforce assessment and strategy in order to carry out its critical cybersecurity functions in the face of ever-expanding cybersecurity threats.

Semiannual Report to the Congress  
April 1, 2019 – September 30, 2019

## DHS Response

FEMA concurred with our four recommendations. FEMA Acting Administrator signed a directive delegating authority to the FEMA CIO to exercise and fulfill IT responsibilities for FEMA.

DHS concurred with all three recommendations and initiated corrective actions to sufficiently close all three recommendations.

The Department concurred with all three recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address them. Office of Chief Human Capital Officer (OCHCO) has made significant progress in the collection and analysis of cybersecurity workforce data. OCHCO established the Lead Cybersecurity Workforce Official role in each component to oversee workforce analysis and reporting requirements.



# LAW ENFORCEMENT

DHS OIG, jointly with the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General, evaluated cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) on Southwest border criminal investigations.

## What We Found

### **1 A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations (OIG-19-57)**

We found that inconsistent deconfliction practices on the part of both FBI and HSI agents compromised the other agency's ability to access relevant investigative information. We found that many FBI and HSI personnel lacked understanding of the partner agency's mission, jurisdiction, and authorities. Trust issues between FBI and HSI agents have likely contributed to the reported cooperation failures and their resulting impacts. We also believe that specific jurisdictional conflicts and unclear policies, in areas where both the FBI and HSI have investigative authority, have contributed to interagency disagreements.

## DHS Response

We made five recommendations to improve cooperation between the FBI and HSI along the Southwest border. ICE concurred with three of five recommendations. ICE intends to provide the FBI with material identifying HSI's agency mission, statutory authority, and priorities in an effort to educate FBI agents. Additionally, ICE will distribute materials provided by the FBI in order to educate HSI agents.

## Moving Forward

Given the ICE and FBI overlapping jurisdictional authorities, which can produce operational conflicts, ICE and the FBI should develop a Memorandum of Understanding or other agreement to govern deconfliction of operations on overlapping criminal investigative areas.

# TERRORISM AND OTHER SPECIAL REPORTS

We initiated a project to determine the Insider Threat Program's (ITP) progress in monitoring, detecting, and responding to malicious insider threats on unclassified DHS systems and networks. We also conducted an audit to determine whether CBP's controls over Global Entry prevent high-risk travelers from obtaining expedited screening. During our audit of CBP's storage of seized drugs, we determined that CBP does not adequately protect its staff from the dangers of powerful synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl.



## What We Found

### 1 **DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program (OIG-19-42)**

DHS needs to address several deficiencies that may hinder program effectiveness and efficiency. Although the expanded program was approved in January 2017, the Office of the Chief Security Officer has yet to revise, obtain approval for, and reissue required documentation. DHS has not completed required standard procedures, acquisition paperwork, and the systems engineering life cycle framework. DHS also did not complete or revise the ITP's privacy threshold analysis, privacy impact assessment, system of records notification, and operating procedures to ensure the program complies with privacy laws.

### 2 **CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation (OIG-19-49)**

CBP's controls over the Global Entry Program do not always prevent ineligible and potentially high-risk Global Entry members from obtaining expedited entry into the United States. During airport arrival process, CBP officers granted some Global Entry members expedited entry without verifying the authenticity of their kiosk receipts. CBP does not effectively monitor Global Entry to ensure members continue to meet program requirements. CBP's lack of adherence to its compliance program's policies and procedures creates vulnerabilities in Global Entry.

### 3 **Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure (OIG-19-53)**

CBP has not always made medications designed to treat narcotic overdose available in case of accidental exposure. CBP lacks an official policy requiring standard workplace practices for handling fentanyl and safeguarding personnel against exposure. CBP does not require mandatory training for its staff to provide an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl and methods to combat accidental exposure. CBP staff are at increased risk of injury or death if exposed.



## Moving Forward

DHS should ensure it employs effective oversight capabilities to meet the requirements of Executive Order 13587 and DHS guidance. To avoid exploitation of Global Entry, CBP needs to address the vulnerabilities we identified and strengthen controls to ensure effective operations. CBP needs to provide guidance on naloxone administration and availability to all employees, involved in seizure, transportation, and storage of fentanyl.

## DHS Response

The Department concurred with all four recommendations to address planning, policy, and acquisition deficiencies prior to further expansion of the ITP.

CBP concurred with all six of our recommendations and initiated corrective actions to address the findings. However, CBP did not concur with our conclusion that Global Entry is vulnerable to exploitation. It did not consider the number of potentially ineligible members participating in the program, the vulnerabilities in the airport arrival process, nor its ineffective compliance programs.

CBP concurred with our one recommendation, which is resolved and open. CBP's Executive Assistant Commissioner for Office of Field Operations (OFO) directed that all OFO permanent vaults be equipped with Naloxone nasal spray kits and lock boxes, and Seized Property Specialists be trained on proper use of the Naloxone spray, an understanding of the hazards of fentanyl, and methods to combat accidental exposure.

# INVESTIGATIONS

Some of our Reports of Investigation revealed a Border Patrol Agent dealing in firearms without a required license; another agent filing a false claim in order to receive a small business loan, and an individual committing disaster fraud against FEMA. Among other investigations, we also investigated false claims of vehicle damage from Hurricane Sandy, and a task force officer engaging in bulk cash smuggling. The table below lists a small sample of our completed investigations.



## What We Found

- 1 Supervisory Border Patrol Agent Operated Illegal Firearms Business**  
We investigated a Supervisory Border Patrol Agent for dealing in firearms without a federally required license.
- 2 Supervisory U.S. Customs and Border Protection Officer Made False Statements to a Federally Insured Bank**  
We investigated a Supervisory Customs and Border Protection Officer for filing a false claim to receive U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) loans.
- 3 Individual Commits FEMA Disaster Fraud**  
We investigated an applicant for fraudulently applying for FEMA disaster benefits.
- 4 New York City Made a False FEMA Disaster Assistance Claim**  
We investigated the New York City, Department of Transportation for falsely claiming that city vehicles were damaged by Hurricane Sandy, when they were actually inoperable before the storm.
- 5 ICE ERO Officers Exceeded Lawful Authority**  
We investigated whether ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) officers illegally entered a residence.
- 6 ICE, HSI Task Force Officer Engaged in Bulk Cash Smuggling**  
We investigated an ICE, HSI Task Force Officer for engaging in bulk cash smuggling with a Supervisory Sheriff's Officer on behalf of the owner of a commercial fishing business.

## Action Taken

A Federal judge sentenced the supervisory agent to five years' probation, after the agent pled guilty to making false statements in firearms records and aiding and abetting, and agreed to the forfeiture of 191 seized firearms. This investigation was conducted jointly with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF).

A Federal judge sentenced the former supervisory agent, who retired while under investigation, and another individual to 3 years of supervised release and ordered them to pay \$336,000 in restitution. This investigation was conducted jointly with SBA OIG.

A Federal judge sentenced the applicant to 12 months and 1 day incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay \$51,218.20 in restitution to FEMA.

New York City voluntarily deobligated FEMA funds and entered into a civil settlement agreement resulting in the recovery of \$8,500,000. This investigation was conducted jointly with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York, and the New York City, Department of Investigation.

Our investigation was unable to conclusively determine whether the officers illegally entered the residence, but found they did not leave the residence when the questioned consent to enter the residence was withdrawn. The U.S. Attorney's Office declined prosecution, and our findings were referred to ICE for appropriate action.

The Task Force Officer was sentenced to 1 year and 1 day incarceration for bulk cash smuggling and structuring the export of monetary instruments. The Sheriff's Officer was sentenced to 1 year probation, including 8 months' home detention, for smuggling and structuring the export of monetary instruments. The businessperson was sentenced to 46 months' incarceration, 3 years' supervised release, fined \$200,000, barred from any association with the commercial fishing industry, ordered to pay \$108,919 in restitution, and forfeited four fishing vessels valued at \$2,000,000. This investigation was conducted jointly with the Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation Division (IRS/CID) and the FBI.

This section summarizes each OIG investigation involving substantiated allegations of misconduct by a senior Government employee that we closed during the reporting period. This information is provided in accordance with requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*. Appendix 9 provides a detailed description of all other OIG investigations involving senior Government employees that we closed during the reporting period and did not disclose to the public.

## We Investigated...

**A CBP manager (GS-15)** for failure to report dating and cohabitating with a foreign national while working abroad, and for utilizing her position to obtain benefits for that individual. We did not substantiate the allegation that the manager misused their position to obtain benefits for the individual, but found that the manager had a close and continuing relationship with the foreign national who was a deported felon, which the manager failed to properly report in accordance with DHS policy. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A USCIS official (SES)** for falsifying data and misleading executive leadership relating to the implementation of an automated database system. We also investigated the official and two USCIS managers (GS-15s) for engaging in prohibited personnel practices, the official and the first manager for obstructing an audit and the second manager for using profanity in the workplace. We did not substantiate the allegations of misconduct but substantiated that the second manager used excessive profanity in front of subordinates. The official and the second manager are no longer employed with USCIS. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A DHS OIG Manager (GS-15)** for transmitting unclassified electronic documents containing various protection markings to non-governmental e mail accounts. We found that the manager sent unclassified information with various protection markings from their Government email account to various personal email accounts controlled by or accessible to the manager and their spouse. We also found that the manager recorded various work-related telephone calls and meetings involving unclassified but protected information without the knowledge or consent of the other participants, thereby violating information security policies. The manager was removed from Government service. Based upon our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

**A DHS manager (GS-15) and a DHS employee** for accessing a law enforcement database after superiors directed they cease usage and the manager for forging the signature of an official. We did not substantiate the allegation that the manager forged the signature of an official, but substantiated that the manager continued to use the database to work on matters related to his former position despite instructions by current supervisors to cease usage. We found that the employee accessed the database but we did not substantiate that the employee disobeyed a specific directive to cease usage. We referred this matter to the U.S. Attorney's office (USAO) on November 28, 2018, and it was declined for prosecution on the same date.

**A FEMA official (SES)** for misusing a Government-owned vehicle, and a FEMA manager (GS 15) for aiding and concealing it. We found that the official misused a Government owned vehicle and resources for themselves and their family. We found that the manager provided unauthorized transportation to the official and his family, submitted travel reimbursement claims for hotel rooms he did not occupy, and intentionally destroyed evidence in an attempt to obstruct our investigation. We also found that the manager directed one FEMA employee to prepare and submit a false statement and another employee to alter evidence relating to a traffic accident. We referred this matter to the USAO on June 12, 2018, who declined prosecution on January 23, 2019.

**An ICE manager (GS-15)** for conduct unbecoming a Federal employee by engaging in a verbal outburst during a one-on-one, closed-door meeting with another employee. We were unable to substantiate misconduct during the questioned meeting, but determined that the manager made potentially offensive remarks and engaged in unprofessional behavior on other occasions. Based on our findings, no criminal referrals were warranted.

# Congressional Testimony and Briefings



The Office of Inspector General testified 10 times during this SAR period.

- ❖ May 9, 2019 – U.S. House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Recovery and Oversight, Management, and Accountability at a hearing entitled, *FEMA Contracting: Reviewing Lessons Learned from Past Disasters to Improve*.
- ❖ May 16, 2019 – U.S. House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability at a hearing entitled, *Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers: Preparing America’s Law Enforcement to Protect the Homeland*.
- ❖ May 21, 2019 – U.S. House Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security at a hearing entitled, *The TSA Workforce Crisis: A Homeland Security Risk*.
- ❖ June 25, 2019 – U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform at a hearing entitled, *Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Vulnerabilities in TSA’s Security Operations*.
- ❖ July 12, 2019 – U.S. House Committee on Oversight and Reform at a hearing entitled, *The Trump Administration’s Child Separation Policy: Substantiated Allegations of Mistreatment*.
- ❖ July 15, 2019 – U.S. House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Immigration and Citizenship at a hearing entitled, *Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention at CBP Facilities*.
- ❖ July 25, 2019 – U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittees on Intelligence and Counterterrorism and Border Security, Facilitation, and Operations at a hearing entitled, *Homeland Security Implications of the Opioid Crisis*.
- ❖ July 25, 2019 – U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary at a hearing entitled, *Oversight of Family Separation and CBP Short-Term Custody under the Trump Administration*.
- ❖ July 30, 2019 – U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs at a hearing entitled, *Unprecedented Migration at the U.S. Southern Border: What is Required to Improve Conditions?*
- ❖ September 26, 2019 – U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Oversight, Management, and Accountability at a hearing entitled, *Oversight of ICE Detention Facilities: Is DHS Doing Enough?*

Testimony for these hearings is available on our website at [www.oig.dhs.gov](http://www.oig.dhs.gov).

# Congressional Testimony and Briefings (Continued)



---

We briefed congressional Members and their staff frequently throughout this SAR period. Our office conducted more than 25 briefings for congressional committee staff on the results of our work including the following OIG reports:

- ❖ *Management Alert – FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED) (OIG-19-32)*
- ❖ *FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC (OIG-19-38)*
- ❖ *Management Alert – DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center (OIG-19-46)*
- ❖ *Management Alert – DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley (OIG-19-51)*
- ❖ *CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation (OIG-19-49)*
- ❖ *Management Alert – CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure (OIG-19-53)*

We also met with congressional staff to discuss Member requests for OIG audits, investigations, and reviews.



## OIG In The News

During this SAR period, our office was mentioned more than 500 times in the local and national news. *Washington Post*, *Homeland Preparedness News*, *Associated Press*, *Federal News Network*, and *Federal Times*— among other news outlets — took notice of our audit and inspection work from April 1, 2019 – September 3, 2019.

***Inside overcrowded Border Patrol facilities for detained migrants in Texas***

*Washington Post*  
July 2, 2019

***DHS finishes assessment of contract oversight procedures***

*Homeland Preparedness News*  
July 12, 2019

***Probe: No bias by TSA supervisor, but profiling concerns***

*Associated Press*  
August 5, 2019

***IG warns customs officers intercepting fentanyl at risk of exposure***

*Federal News Network*  
August 7, 2019

***FEMA has a whirlwind of IT problems***

*Federal Times*  
September 3, 2019

# Legislative and Regulatory Reviews and Other Office of Inspector General Activities

---

## LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY REVIEWS

The *Inspector General Act* directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations. During this SAR period, we reviewed and provided comments on draft legislation:

- *requiring the Federal Emergency Management Agency to safeguard the personally identifiable information of disaster survivors;*
- *prohibiting the expenditure of funds or use of Government property for post-swearing-in ceremonies in the Department of Homeland Security; and*
- *reauthorizing the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards program.*

---

## OVERSIGHT OF SINGLE AUDIT ACT, AS AMENDED BY PUBLIC LAW 104-156



The *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires that Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “Single Audit.” Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS. During this reporting period, we completed 57 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by independent public accountant organizations and we completed one Quality Control Review.

**57**  
Desk  
Reviews  
Completed

**1**  
Quality Control  
Review  
Completed



# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings



## Reports and Recommendations with Questioned Costs, Unsupported Costs

### Carryover from last period

10 reports with 30 recommendations


- Questioned Costs \$99,545,563
- Unsupported Costs \$262,446

### Issued this period


2 reports with 2 recommendations

- Questioned Costs \$707,550,017
- Unsupported Costs \$706,574,823

 12 Reports with  
32 Recommendations

807,095,580 Questioned Costs  
706,837,269 Unsupported Costs  


### Management Decision for Reports & Recommendations with QC



- Reports Pending Management Decision
- Recommendations Pending Management Decision
- Reports that Management Decision was Made
- Recommendations that Management Decision was Made

# Appendix 1 Reports with Monetary Findings (Continued)



## Reports and Recommendations with Funds to be Put to Better Use (FPTBU)

### Carryover from last period

6 reports with 21 recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

- Funds Put to Better Use \$2,416,607,736

### Issued this period


1 report with 1 recommendation with Funds Put to Better Use





- Funds Put to Better Use \$123,011,428

  
7 Reports with  
22 Recommendations

  
2,539,619,164


### Management Decision for Reports & Recommendations with FPTBU




-  Reports Pending Management Decision
-  Recommendations Pending Management Decision
-  Reports that Management Decision was Made
-  Recommendations that Management Decision was Made

# Appendix 2 Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations


**MANAGEMENT DECISION IS PENDING**



**CURRENT REPORT INVENTORY**



**ACTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

## Appendix 3

### Reports with Unresolved Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec. No.	DHS Comp.	No. Over 6 Months
1	12/16/2011	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	3, 4	FEMA	2
2	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	DSEC	1
3	5/10/2016	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	5	TSA	1
4	8/4/2017	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert – CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	CBP	1
5	9/27/2017	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	2, 6	TSA	2
6	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2, 3, 4	TSA	3
7	10/30/2017	OIG-18-07	<i>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration</i>	1	MGMT	1
8	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	ICE	1
9	4/26/2018	OIG-18-62	<i>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project</i>	1, 2	FEMA	2
10	9/19/2018	OIG-18-77	<i>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program</i>	3	ICE	1
11	2/13/2019	OIG-19-21	<i>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i>	2	TSA	1
					<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
1	OIG-10-11	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2009 Financial Statements and Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	2	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard
2	OIG-11-16	<i>Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
3	OIG-11-92	<i>Efficacy of Customs and Border Protection's Bonding Process</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
4	OIG-12-07	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2011 Integrated Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, FEMA
5	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
6	OIG-12-132	<i>CBP's Strategy to Address Illicit Cross-Border Tunnels</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
7	OIG-13-20	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS FY 2012 Consolidated Financial Statements and Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting</i>	16	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, FEMA, ICE, OCIO-OCFO

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
8	OIG-13-80	<i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Enforcement and Removal Operations' Contract Funding and Payment Processes</i>	2	\$0	\$0	ICE
9	OIG-13-119	<i>CBP's and USCG's Controls Over Exports Related to Foreign Military Sales</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
10	OIG-14-18	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2013 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	10	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, DHS, ICE, MGMT, Secret Service
11	OIG-14-132	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
12	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
13	OIG-14-150-D	<i>FEMA and the State of Louisiana Need to Accelerate the Funding of \$812 Million in Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Funds and Develop a Plan to Close Approved Projects</i>	1	\$0	\$812,238,776	FEMA
14	OIG-15-06-D	<i>FEMA Needs To Track Performance Data and Develop Policies, Procedures, and Performance Measures for Long Term Recovery Offices</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
15	OIG-15-08	<i>Ohio's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010 Through 2012</i>	1	\$3,559,067	\$0	FEMA
16	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	31	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD
17	OIG-15-18	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at John F. Kennedy International Airport-Sensitive Security Information</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
18	OIG-15-29	<i>Security Enhancements Needed to the TSA PreCheck™ Initiative</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
19	OIG-15-38	<i>Science and Technology Directorate Needs to Improve Its Contract Management Procedures</i>	1	\$0	\$0	S&T
20	OIG-15-45	<i>Allegations of Granting Expedited Screening through TSA PreCheck Improperly (OSC File No. DI-14-3679)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
21	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
22	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DSEC

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
23	OIG-15-88	<i>Audit of Security Controls for DHS Information Technology Systems at San Francisco International Airport</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
24	OIG-15-94	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2014 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (Revised)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
25	OIG-15-107	<i>New York's Management of Homeland Security Grant Program Awards for Fiscal Years 2010-12</i>	6	\$67,360,082	\$0	FEMA
26	OIG-15-108-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the Department of Homeland Security National Protection and Programs Directorate Internal Affairs Division</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
27	OIG-15-112	<i>Follow-up to Management Alert – U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Facility, San Pedro, California</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
28	OIG-15-128-D	<i>FEMA's Process for Selecting Joint Field Offices Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$1,553,000	FEMA
29	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	1	\$0	\$0	PLCY



## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
30	OIG-16-06	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit</i>	15	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, CFO, DHS, FEMA, MGMT, NPPD
31	OIG-16-20	<i>U.S. Secret Service Needs to Upgrade Its Radio Systems</i>	2	\$0	\$0	Secret Service
32	OIG-16-47	<i>FEMA Does Not Provide Adequate Oversight of Its National Flood Insurance Write Your Own Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
33	OIG-16-51	<i>CBP Needs to Better Plan Its Implementation of the DHS Prison Rape Elimination Act Regulations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
34	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
35	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
36	OIG-16-78-D	<i>Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds</i>	1	\$2,218,535	\$0	FEMA
37	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	9	\$0	\$0	TSA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
38	OIG-16-88	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2015 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
39	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	\$0	\$0	OGC, TSA
40	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	1	\$18,443,447	\$0	FEMA
41	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG</i>	1	\$7,124,893	\$0	FEMA
42	OIG-16-123	<i>CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility's Privacy Policies and Practices</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
43	OIG-16-126-D	<i>FEMA Can Do More to Improve Public Assistance Grantees' and Subgrantees' Compliance with Federal Procurement Rules</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
44	OIG-16-127-D	<i>FEMA Can Enhance Readiness with Management of Its Disaster Incident Workforce</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
45	OIG-16-134	<i>TSA Needs a Crosscutting Risk-Based Security Strategy</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
46	OIG-16-139-D	<i>FEMA Acquisition of a Joint Field Office for DR-4223 in Austin, Texas</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
47	OIG-17-01	<i>USSS Faces Challenges Protecting Sensitive Case Management Systems and Data</i>	1	\$0	\$0	Secret Service
48	OIG-17-03	<i>AMO and Coast Guard Maritime Missions Are Not Duplicative, But Could Improve with Better Coordination</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP, Coast Guard, ICE, MGMT
49	OIG-17-04	<i>TSA Could Improve Its Oversight of Airport Controls over Access Media Badges</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA
50	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
51	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	4	\$0	\$0	Secret Service
52	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CBP, CFO, Coast Guard, FEMA, NPPD, Secret Service
53	OIG-17-14	<i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i>	1	\$0	\$0	TSA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
54	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DSEC
55	OIG-17-25-D	<i>The Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority in Victorville, California, Did Not Properly Manage \$32 Million in FEMA Grant Funds</i>	3	\$23,785,177	\$0	FEMA
56	OIG-17-36	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	CBP
57	OIG-17-38-D	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	\$0	\$0	FEMA
58	OIG-17-42	<i>H-2 Petition Fee Structure is Inequitable and Contributes to Processing Errors</i>	2	\$0	\$0	USCIS
59	OIG-17-49	<i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i>	6	\$0	\$0	COS, CRCL, DSEC, I&A, OGC, PRIV, SEC
60	OIG-17-51	<i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
61	OIG-17-56	<i>DHS Tracking of Visa Overstays Is Hindered by Insufficient Technology</i>	3	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
62	OIG-17-59	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2016 Compliance with the IPERA of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
63	OIG-17-74-IQO	<i>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	12	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard
64	OIG-17-91	<i>PALMS Does Not Address Department Needs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
65	OIG-17-99-MA	<i>Management Alert – CBP Spends Millions Conducting Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
66	OIG-17-101	<i>Improvements Needed to Promote DHS Progress toward Accomplishing Enterprise-wide Data Goals</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A, MGMT
67	OIG-17-110	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Management of Its Flood Mapping Program</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
68	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	6	\$0	\$0	TSA
69	OIG-17-114	<i>CBP's IT Systems and Infrastructure Did Not Fully Support Border Security Operations</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
70	OIG-17-115-MA	<i>Management Alert – Security and Safety Concerns at Border Patrol Stations in the Tucson Sector</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
71	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	3	\$0	\$0	TSA
72	OIG-18-05	<i>DHS' Controls Over Firearms and Other Sensitive Assets</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT
73	OIG-18-07	<i>DHS Needs a More Unified Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Administration</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
74	OIG-18-08	<i>FEMA and California Need to Assist CalRecycle, a California State Agency, to Improve Its Accounting of \$230 Million in Disaster Costs</i>	3	\$107,002,492	\$65,397,921	FEMA
75	OIG-18-10	<i>Biennial Report of DHS' Implementation of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015</i>	1	\$0	\$0	NPPD
76	OIG-18-15	<i>Coast Guard IT Investments Risk Failure Without Required Oversight</i>	2	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard
77	OIG-18-16	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	42	\$0	\$0	CBP, Coast Guard, DHS, FEMA, Secret Service
78	OIG-18-17	<i>Napa State Hospital, California, Should Improve the Management of Its \$6.7 Million FEMA Grant</i>	2	\$4,788,492	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
79	OIG-18-18	<i>Management Alert – CBP's Use of Examination and Summons Authority Under 19 U.S.C. § 1509</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
80	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (Redacted)</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
81	OIG-18-38	<i>Unsupported Payments Made to Policyholders Who Participated in the Hurricane Sandy Claims Review Process</i>	7	\$0	\$0	FEMA
82	OIG-18-51	<i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DHS
83	OIG-18-57	<i>Fiscal Year 2016 Audit of the DHS Bankcard Program Indicates Moderate Risk Remains</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CFO
84	OIG-18-58	<i>USCIS Has Unclear Website Information and Unrealistic Time Goals for Adjudicating Green Card Applications</i>	1	\$0	\$0	USCIS
85	OIG-18-62	<i>Victor Valley Wastewater Reclamation Authority, California, Provided FEMA Incorrect Information for Its \$33 Million Project</i>	3	\$24,843,002	\$4,527,346	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
86	OIG-18-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$20.4 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Diamondhead Water and Sewer District, Mississippi</i>	4	\$20,391,686	\$0	FEMA
87	OIG-18-65	<i>Special Report – Certain Findings Relating to the OIG's Investigation of Allegations Involving FLETC Senior Officials</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT
88	OIG-18-67	<i>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Improvements</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE
89	OIG-18-70	<i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	\$0	\$0	TSA
90	OIG-18-71	<i>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
91	OIG-18-72	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2017 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CFO



## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
92	OIG-18-73	<i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i>	2	\$0	\$0	SEC
93	OIG-18-76	<i>Assaults on CBP and ICE Law Enforcement Officers</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
94	OIG-18-77	<i>Lack of Planning Hinders Effective Oversight and Management of ICE's Expanding 287(g) Program</i>	3	\$0	\$0	ICE
95	OIG-18-78	<i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	7	\$0	\$0	USCIS
96	OIG-18-79	<i>CBP Has Not Ensured Safeguards for Data Collected Using Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i>	3	\$0	\$0	CBP
97	OIG-18-80	<i>Progress Made, but CBP Faces Challenges Implementing a Biometric Capability to Track Air Passengers Departures Nationwide</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
98	OIG-18-81	<i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i>	2	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
99	OIG-18-83	<i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i>	6	\$0	\$0	CBP
100	OIG-18-85	<i>Management Alert – Observations of FEMA's Debris Monitoring Efforts for Hurricane Irma</i>	3	\$0	\$0	FEMA
101	OIG-18-88	<i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	4	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard, S&T
102	OIG-18-89	<i>(U) S&amp;T Has Taken Steps to Address Insider Threats, But Management Challenges Remain</i>	3	\$0	\$0	DHS
103	OIG-19-03	<i>Management Alert - Coast Guard Investigative Service Search and Seizure of DHS OIG and Congressional Communications</i>	1	\$0	\$0	COS, DSEC, SEC
104	OIG-19-04	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	\$0	\$0	CBP, Coast Guard, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, Secret Service
105	OIG-19-06	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$22.3 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation, Montana</i>	1	\$22,318,110	\$0	FEMA
106	OIG-19-07	<i>DHS Training Needs for Hiring 15,000 Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Officers</i>	1	\$0	\$0	MGMT

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
107	OIG-19-08	<i>FEMA's Oversight of the Integrated Public Alert &amp; Warning System (IPAWS)</i>	1	\$0	\$0	FEMA
108	OIG-19-09	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$413,074 of Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Nashville-Davidson County, Tennessee, for a May 2010 Flood</i>	3	\$371,766	\$0	FEMA
109	OIG-19-10	<i>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry</i>	5	\$0	\$0	CBP
110	OIG-19-11	<i>CBP Did Not Maximize its Revenue Collection Efforts for Delinquent Debt Owed from Importers</i>	1	\$0	\$0	CBP
111	OIG-19-12	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$3,061,819 in Grant Funds Awarded to Jackson County, Florida</i>	2	\$2,296,365	\$0	FEMA
112	OIG-19-15	<i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i>	1	\$1,768,768	\$0	NPPD
113	OIG-19-17	<i>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable</i>	2	\$0	\$394,000,000	TSA
114	OIG-19-18	<i>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards</i>	4	\$0	\$0	ICE

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
115	OIG-19-19	<i>DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs</i>	1	\$0	\$0	DSEC
116	OIG-19-20	<i>Issues Requiring Action at the Essex County Correctional Facility in Newark, New Jersey</i>	1	\$0	\$0	ICE
117	OIG-19-21	<i>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i>	5	\$0	\$0	TSA
118	OIG-19-22	<i>United States Coast Guard's Reporting of Uniform Code of Military Justice Violations to the Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>	6	\$0	\$0	Coast Guard
119	OIG-19-23	<i>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i>	2	\$0	\$0	CBP
120	OIG-19-24	<i>Progress Made, But Additional Efforts are Needed to Secure the Election Infrastructure</i>	4	\$0	\$0	NPPD
121	OIG-19-28	<i>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens</i>	5	\$0	\$0	ICE
122	OIG-19-31	<i>Oregon's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2013 through 2015</i>	10	\$1,227,325	\$0	FEMA

## Appendix 4

### Reports with Open Recommendations More Than 6 Months Old (Continued)

No.	Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
123	OIG-19-32	<i>Management Alert - FEMA Did Not Safeguard Disaster Survivors' Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (REDACTED)</i>	2	\$0	\$0	PRIV
124	OIG-19-34	<i>(U) Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2018</i>	1	\$0	\$0	I&A
125	OIG-19-35	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers</i>	4	\$0	\$0	TSA
126	OIG-19-36	<i>Missouri's Management of State Homeland Security Program and Urban Areas Security Initiative Grants Awarded During Fiscal Years 2012 through 2015</i>	7	\$0	\$0	FEMA
<b>Total</b>			<b>463</b>	<b>\$307,499,207</b>	<b>\$1,277,717,043</b>	

#### Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with “D” is a grant audit.

A report number ending with “MA” is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with “IQO” is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight.

# Appendix 5

## Reports Issued

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
1	5/7/2019	OIG-19-38	<i>FEMA Should Not Have Awarded Two Contracts to Bronze Star LLC</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
2	5/22/2019	OIG-19-39	<i>Audit of Department of Homeland Security's Fiscal Year 2017 Conference Spending</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
3	5/14/2019	OIG-19-40	<i>Data Quality Improvements Needed to Track Adjudicative Decisions</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
4	5/22/2019	OIG-19-41	<i>Special Report: Review Regarding DHS OIG's Retraction of Thirteen Reports Evaluating FEMA's Initial Response to Disasters</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
5	5/24/2019	OIG-19-42	<i>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
6	5/24/2019	OIG-19-43	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2018 Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
7	5/30/2019	OIG-19-44	<i>Audit of DHS' Issuance and Management of Other Transaction Agreements Involving Consortium Activities</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
8	5/29/2019	OIG-19-45	<i>Lessons Learned from Prior Reports on FEMA's 50 Percent Repair-or-Replace Rule Decisions</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
9	5/30/2019	OIG-19-46	<i>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding Among Single Adults at El Paso Del Norte Processing Center</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
10	6/3/2019	OIG-19-47	<i>Concerns about ICE Detainee Treatment and Care at Four Detention Facilities</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
11	6/17/2019	OIG-19-48	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
12	6/24/2019	OIG-19-49	<i>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
13	7/2/2019	OIG-19-50	<i>Inadequate Oversight of Low Value DHS Contracts</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
14	7/2/2019	OIG-19-51	<i>Management Alert - DHS Needs to Address Dangerous Overcrowding and Prolonged Detention of Children and Adults in the Rio Grande Valley</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	<b>Date Issued</b>	<b>Report Number</b>	<b>Report Title</b>	<b>Total Questioned Costs<sup>(a)</sup></b>	<b>Unsupported Costs<sup>(b)</sup></b>	<b>Funds to be Put to Better Use<sup>(c)</sup></b>
15	7/3/2019	OIG-19-52	<i>FEMA's Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
16	7/16/2019	OIG-19-53	<i>Management Alert - CBP Did Not Adequately Protect Employees from Possible Fentanyl Exposure</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
17	7/25/2019	OIG-19-54	<i>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a \$706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes</i>	\$706,574,823	\$706,574,823	\$0
18	7/24/2019	OIG-19-55	<i>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
19	7/26/2019	OIG-19-56	<i>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
20	7/31/2019	OIG-19-57	<i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0



## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
21	8/30/2019	OIG-19-58	<i>FEMA's Longstanding IT Deficiencies Hindered 2017 Response and Recovery Operations</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
22	9/18/2019	OIG-19-59	<i>S&amp;T Is Not Effectively Coordinating Research and Development Efforts across DHS</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
23	9/19/2019	OIG-19-60	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2018</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
24	9/23/2019	OIG-19-61	<i>FEMA Did Not Properly Review the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey's Request for \$306 Million in Public Assistance Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$123,011,428
25	9/23/2019	OIG-19-62	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Cybersecurity Workforce Planning</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
26	9/25/2019	OIG-19-63	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$1.1 Million in Grant Funds Awarded to Richland County, North Dakota</i>	\$975,194	\$0	\$0
27	9/25/2019	OIG-19-64	<i>The State of Washington's Oversight of FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program for Fiscal Years 2015-2017 Was Generally Effective</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0

## Appendix 5 Reports Issued (Continued)

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs <sup>(a)</sup>	Unsupported Costs <sup>(b)</sup>	Funds to be Put to Better Use <sup>(c)</sup>
28	9/26/2019	OIG-19-65	<i>Investigation of Alleged Violations of Immigration Laws at the Tecate, California, Port of Entry by U.S. Customs and Border Protection Personnel</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
29	9/30/2019	OIG-19-66	<i>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
30	9/30/2019	OIG-19-67	<i>Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics</i>	\$0	\$0	\$0
			<b>Total</b>	<b>\$707,550,017</b>	<b>\$706,574,823</b>	<b>\$123,011,428</b>

### Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act*.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

## Appendix 6

### Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

	Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/Deobligated
1	8/10/16	OIG-16-115-D	<i>FEMA Should Disallow \$9.1 Million in Public Assistance Grant Funds Awarded to Ascension Parish School Board, Louisiana</i>	\$26,899,836	\$9,182,403	\$20,706,304	\$9,182,403
2	9/29/17	OIG-17-117-D	<i>Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, New York</i>	\$808,159	\$0	\$808,159	\$0
	AUDIT REPORT TOTAL			\$27,707,995	\$9,182,403	\$21,604,259	\$9,182,403
	INV Recoveries (d)	4/2019–9/2019					\$94,230
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>\$27,707,995</b>	<b>\$9,182,403</b>	<b>\$21,514,463</b>	<b>\$9,276,633</b>

**Notes and Explanations:** (d) Recoveries and asset forfeitures, other than administrative cost savings, which resulted from investigative efforts.

# Appendix 7

## Contract Audit Reports



The ***National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008*** requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

We did not process contract audit reports meeting the criteria of the *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* during this reporting period.

**Questioned Costs**

**N/A**

**Unsupported Costs**

**N/A**

**Disallowed Costs**

**N/A**

# Appendix 8

## Peer Review Results



Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by or of an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

### **Peer Review Conducted of DHS OIG Audit Operations**

On August 27, 2018, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency OIG completed a peer review of DHS OIG audit operations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017. Of the four recommendations included in their System Review Report, two have been closed. The Office of Audits (OA) continues to implement corrective actions to address the remaining two open recommendations. Once implemented, OA and the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight (IQO) will test the control environment to assess the effectiveness of the corrective actions. The following table shows details on the status of the corrective actions.

#	Recommendation	Status
1	Identify the root cause for the departures identified from GAGAS in audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing and reporting disclosures for the sampled EMO assignment, as well as the other seven terminated assignments.	<p>This recommendation is resolved and closed.</p> <p>The Assistant Inspector General for Special Reviews and Evaluations spearheaded and completed this review in May 2019 to, in part, address this recommendation and develop additional recommendations aimed at improving OA’s control environment. Congress and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) were briefed on the results of this report, as well as planned corrective actions. OA has also implemented various corrective actions, including revising its policies and procedures and establishing a Quality Management and Training Branch.</p>
2	Update its policies and procedures as necessary to address the deficiencies.	<p>This recommendation is resolved and open.</p> <p>OA will issue an updated audit manual, which will address policy and procedure limitations identified through the most recent peer review and internal quality assurance reviews. After issuance of the audit manual, estimated to be by October 31, 2019, both OA (Quality Management and Training Branch) and IQO will perform quality assurance reviews to help assess the effectiveness of OA’s updated policies and procedures and overall control environment.</p> <p>Estimated completion: Ongoing</p>

# Appendix 8

## Peer Review Results (Continued)



#	Recommendation	Status
3	Verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control, and the integration of the EMO into the Office of Audit, resolves the deficiencies in the areas of audit planning, assessment of evidence, supervision, indexing and reporting disclosures.	<p>This recommendation is resolved and open.</p> <p>IQO reviewed all 47 issued FY 2018 legacy OA and Office of Emergency Management Oversight audit reports. Through the review, IQO identified opportunities for OA to augment its policies and procedures, which OA expects to address in its updated audit manual. OA has also established a Quality Management and Training Branch to provide additional quality oversight of audit work. Lastly, IQO, which provides quality assurance for OA products, has changed its staffing structure to ensure greater stability. OA's Quality Management and Training Branch and IQO will continue to perform quality assurance reviews related to OA's control environment.</p> <p>Estimated completion: Ongoing</p>
4	Schedule an off-cycle peer review with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to verify that changes to the DHS OIG system of quality control provides reasonable assurance of conformance with GAGAS.	<p>This recommendation is resolved and closed.</p> <p>The abovementioned ongoing corrective actions were delayed by the integration of various OIG offices into one OA, as well as the most recent Government furlough. According to CIGIE's audit peer review schedule for 2020-2022, the next peer review of DHS OIG is scheduled for September 2020. Because corrective actions are ongoing, OA will wait for the upcoming on-cycle review rather than schedule an off-cycle review. The OIG will coordinate with CIGIE, as necessary.</p>

### ***Outstanding Recommendations from Previous Peer Reviews of Audit Operations***

DHS OIG does not have any outstanding recommendations from any previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG other than those listed.

### ***Investigative Operations***

The Office of Investigations was not subject to a peer review during the reporting period. Our investigative operations received a peer review rating of "compliant" in September 2016, following a review completed by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration. The review noted three "best practices" and two observations, but did not result in any recommendations.

During this SAR period, we initiated a peer review of the Social Security Administration Inspector General's investigative operations. We will summarize the results of that review in a future SAR.

# Appendix 9

## Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

	Affected Agency	Allegation
1	CBP	<b>We investigated a CBP official (SES)</b> for approving the security clearance of an employee despite documented derogatory information discovered during the employee's background clearance investigation, and that the official improperly intervened in the adjudication process. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
2	USCIS	<b>We investigated a USCIS official (SES)</b> for changing labor category codes for positions associated with a Government contract, which affected position descriptions resulting in higher costs to the Government and for intimidating a USCIS manager and an employee to dissuade them from requesting General Service 14 pay while acting in that grade for over 90 days. We found that the official made changes to the position description but the changes did not affect the labor costs associated with the contract. We found no evidence that the official intentionally intimidated the manager and employee from requesting acting pay.
3	DHS	<b>We investigated a DHS official (SES)</b> for failing to report personal reimbursement for travel from a foreign association on his Public Financial Disclosure Report. We found insufficient information to warrant conducting a full investigation.
4	DHS	<b>We investigated a DHS manager (GS-15)</b> for conflict of interest based on improper relationships with executives at two DHS contractor companies and that the manager reprimanded DHS employees when they criticized the companies. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
5	FEMA	<b>We investigated a FEMA manager (GS-15)</b> for intentionally deleting documents containing budget information from their computer and network before their resignation. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated. The manager resigned from FEMA after a FEMA administrative investigation found the manager falsified a resume used to gain employment with FEMA.
6	FEMA	<b>We investigated a FEMA official (SES)</b> for authorizing payment of attorneys' fees with Federal funds to plaintiffs who sued insurance companies following a federally declared disaster. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
7	FEMA	<b>We investigated a FEMA official (SES)</b> for sexually harassing a FEMA employee. We found that this allegation was unsubstantiated.
8	FEMA	<b>We investigated a FEMA Official (SES)</b> for travel fraud. We found that this allegation was unsubstantiated.
9	TSA	<b>We investigated a TSA manager (GS-15 equivalent)</b> for creating a hostile work environment, making discriminating, disparaging, and defamatory remarks about minority employees, violating travel policy, and committing time and attendance fraud. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
<b>Total: 9</b>		

# Appendix 10

## Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information

Under Section 5(a)(21) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978*, as amended, we are required to include in our semiannual report a description of any attempt by the Department to interfere with OIG’s independence. This includes instances where the Department has resisted or objected to oversight activities or restricted or significantly delayed access to information.

During this SAR period, in one instance the U.S. Secret Service did not provide access to information we requested on an announced audit. The Inspector General will meet with Secret Service senior leadership in early FY 2020 to resolve this matter.

The table below contains additional information regarding this audit.

Project Number	Title	Access Issue
19-059-AUD-USSS	Secret Service Protective Operations Mission Efforts	The Secret Service declined to provide us with requested and needed information, citing national security concerns.



# Appendix 11

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
AFG	Assistance to Firefighters Grant
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CISA	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
CISO	Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
CLAIMS3	Computer Linked Information Management System
Coast Guard	United States Coast Guard
COS	Chief of Staff
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
EMD	Emergency Management Division
EMO	Office of Emergency Management Oversight
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FAMS	Federal Air Marshal Service
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPTBU	Funds to be Put to Better Use
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
HMGP	Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSPD-12	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
ICIG	Inspector General for the Intelligence Community
INV	Office of Investigations
IPAWS	Integrated Public Alert & Warning System
IPERA	<i>Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010</i>
IQO	Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight
IRS/CID	Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations Division
ISO	Immigration Services Officer
IT	information technology
ITP	Insider Threat Program
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
MGMT	Directorate for Management
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OA	Office of Audits
OCFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
OCHCO	Office of Human Capital Officer
OCIO	Office of the Chief Information Officer
OER	Officer Evaluation Report
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OM	Office of Management

# Appendix 11

## Acronyms and Abbreviations (Continued)

OPA	Office of Public Affairs
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OPS	Office of Operations Coordination
OSC	U.S. Office of Special Counsel
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PRIV	Privacy Office
QC	Questioned Costs
R&D	research and development
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	semiannual report
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEC	Secretary
Secret Service	United States Secret Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
SPII	Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information
SRE	Office of Special Reviews and Evaluations
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(U)	Unclassified
UC	Unsupported Costs
USAO	U.S. Attorney's Office
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USSS	United States Secret Service
WPA	Whistleblower Protection Act
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit

# Appendix 12

## OIG Contacts and Locations



**Headquarters Mailing Address:**

Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 0305  
 Department of Homeland Security  
 245 Murray Lane, SW  
 Washington, DC 20528-0305



**Email:**

[dhs-oig.officepublicaffairs@oig.dhs.gov](mailto:dhs-oig.officepublicaffairs@oig.dhs.gov)



**Telephone:**

(202) 981-6000 / Fax: (202) 254-4285

Click here to: [Subscribe to OIG Email Alerts](#)

**OIG Senior Management Team**

Joseph V. Cuffari	.....	Inspector General
Jennifer Costello	.....	Deputy Inspector General
Vondena Nevarez	.....	Special Assistant to the Inspector General ( <i>Acting</i> )
Sondra McCauley	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Audits
Karen Ouzts	.....	Counsel to the Inspector General ( <i>Acting</i> )
Erica Paulson	.....	Assistant Inspector General/External Affairs
Thomas Salmon	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Integrity and Quality Oversight
Gary Thorne	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Investigations ( <i>Acting</i> )
Louise McGlathery	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Management
Diana Shaw	.....	Assistant Inspector General/Special Reviews and Evaluations

# Appendix 13

## Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below with a reference to the pages on which they appear.

<b>Requirement:</b>	<b>Pages</b>
Matters Referred to Federal Prosecutorial Authorities	4
Report of Whistleblower Retaliation	5
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Summary of Significant OIG Activities	10 – 18
Review of Legislation and Regulations	23
Reports with Questioned Costs	24
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	25
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	26
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	27 – 44
List of Audit Reports	45 – 49
Peer Review Results	52
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees Not Disclosed to the Public	54
Management Decision Disagreements	Nothing to Report
Revised Management Decisions	Nothing to Report
Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information	55
Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report
Inspection, Evaluation, or Audit Closed and Not Publicly Disclosed	Nothing to Report

