



Office of Inspector General

**SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS**

April 1, 2021 - September 30, 2021

## A MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



I am pleased to submit our *Semiannual Report to the Congress* (SAR), summarizing the work and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) from April 1 to September 30, 2021. During this period, we worked hard to improve our core operations despite challenges related to the ongoing pandemic.

We finalized a comprehensive strategic plan covering Fiscal Years 2022–2026. The plan includes four key goals:

1. Deliver Results that Promote the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Integrity of DHS Programs and Operations
2. Cultivate a Diverse, Highly Skilled, Flexible, and Engaged Workforce
3. Strengthen Relationships and Build Trust with External Stakeholders
4. Build and Sustain Enterprise-wide Governance and Management to Support the Workforce

As we implement these goals, we are leveraging expertise from our newly created Offices of Integrity and Innovation. The Office of Integrity places internal quality check and review functions for investigations and audits in one independent office.

The Office of Innovation elevates our data analytics team from its former location in the Office of Audits to better support all of DHS OIG while also aligning strategic planning with innovation. In addition, we created a fiscal year 2022 Annual Performance Plan that includes specific strategies and performance indicators to help us drive performance and measure success.

During this reporting period, I was pleased to learn that our overall Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS) employment engagement scores increased in all categories. In addition, according to the Partnership for Public Service's Best Places to Work rankings, we climbed 18 positions over the previous year. I believe these positive FEVS scores relate directly to our concerted outreach and continued conversations with our dedicated employees. Notwithstanding the challenges of operating during the pandemic, we have held dozens of in-person and remote roundtable discussions and communicated weekly, via email, with all OIG staff. Those conversations have led to numerous improvements in the way we do business, and I am grateful for the diligent service and constant perseverance of our more than 700 professional career employees. Through their audits, inspections, evaluations, investigations, and mission support activities, they make our homeland safer, stronger, and more resilient.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Joseph V. Cuffari". The signature is fluid and cursive.

Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.  
Inspector General

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## OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROFILES

The *Homeland Security Act of 2002* officially established the Department of Homeland Security, as well as an OIG in the Department by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, ensures OIG's independence. This independence enhances our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, as well as to provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress about the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations.

### OIG Offices

- Executive Office
- Office of Audits
- Office of Counsel
- Office of External Affairs
- Office of Innovation
- Office of Integrity
- Office of Inspections and Evaluations
- Office of Investigations
- Office of Management

### DHS Components and Offices

- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)
- Management Directorate (MGMT)
- Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISOMB)
- Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
- Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
- Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
- Office of Inspector General (OIG)
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
- Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
- Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
- Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE)
- Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
- Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
- Privacy Office (PRIV)
- Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
- United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

## SUMMARY OF OIG ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

During this reporting period, DHS OIG completed audits, inspections, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations.

### *Reports Issued to DHS*

In fiscal year 2021, we issued 73 audit and inspection reports containing 278 recommendations, and 566 investigative reports. In this reporting period, we issued 43 audit and inspection reports (see [Appendix 5](#)) containing 141 recommendations, and 290 investigative reports.

Our audit and inspection reports provide the Secretary of Homeland Security and Congress with an objective assessment of issues the Department faces. The reports also offer specific recommendations to correct deficiencies and improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS' programs. Our investigative reports provide factual findings from our investigations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct.

### *Financial Impact*

Our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$63,213, none of which was related to a lack of supporting documentation, and the Department recovered or deobligated \$341,348. (See [Appendix 6](#).) We did not issue any audit reports this SAR period identifying funds that should be put to better use. We also reported \$21,136,482 in recoveries, asset forfeitures, fines, and restitution from investigations.

TYPE OF IMPACT	AMOUNT
Questioned Costs	\$63,213
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$0
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated	\$341,348
Funds Recovered/Deobligated	\$341,348
Recoveries and Asset Forfeitures (Not from Fines and Restitution)	\$0
Fines	\$0
Restitution	\$21,136,482

### *Investigations*

We initiated 222 investigations and closed 325. Our investigations resulted in 65 arrests, 53 indictments, 42 convictions, and 6 personnel actions. In accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, we have included information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION*	NUMBER
Open Investigations as of 04/01/2021	1,019
Investigations Initiated	222
Investigations Closed	325
Open Investigations as of 09/30/2021	916
Investigative Reports Issued	290
Investigations Referred for Federal Prosecution	16
Investigations Accepted for Federal Prosecution	12
Investigations Declined for Federal Prosecution	73
Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	9
Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	53

\* All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is the Office of Investigations' case management system. Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

INVESTIGATIONS RESULTED IN:



Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, fraud, or abuse affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

COMPLAINTS	NUMBER
Total Hotline Complaints Received	16,487
Complaints Referred (outside of DHS OIG)	10,786
Complaints Closed	20,589

Note: Complaints referred and closed include complaints received in a prior period.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19; Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, and the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

## Activity During Current SAR Period

### Complaint Intake

During this SAR period, WPU set multiple records for complaint intake, including complaints received, reviewed, and completed. WPU received 279 complaints, which it reviewed for allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had 11 pending complaints to resolve, resulting in 290 complaints reviewed during the SAR period. This is a record high number of intake complaints for the unit in its 5-year history. Of the 290 complaints, during intake, WPU declined to open an investigation for 277. Investigations were opened for 11 complaints, leaving two complaints currently pending. The two complaints pending at the end of the period represents a record low for the WPU.

WPU INTAKE COMPLAINTS	NUMBER
Pending Complaints Entering this Period	11
Complaints Received by WPU During Period	279
<b>Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period</b>	<b>290</b>
Complaints Declined During Intake Process <sup>1</sup>	277
Complaints Converted to Investigation	11
<b>Total Complaints Pending at End of Period</b>	<b>2</b>

### Investigations

WPU closed a record high eight whistleblower retaliation investigations during the SAR period, including seven investigations closed with a report of investigation.

WPU RETALIATION INVESTIGATIONS	NUMBER
Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	51
Investigations Opened During Period	11
Investigations Closed During Period	8
<b>Investigations Pending at End of Period</b>	<b>54</b>

### Update Related to A Prior Substantiated Report of Whistleblower Retaliation

#### W18-USCG-WPU-02539

As reflected in the previous SAR, WPU substantiated allegations that an enlisted member in the Coast Guard was retaliated against for reporting alleged harassment in violation of the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 U.S.C. § 1034, in W18-USCG-WPU-02539. As stated in the previous SAR, Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas directed the Coast Guard to implement appropriate corrective actions by October 2021.

The Coast Guard reports that it is correcting the numerical scores on the complainant's Enlisted Employee Review and removing any negative comments that reflect retaliatory removal of title or certification. The Coast Guard anticipates completing these actions by October 2021. WPU will update Congress on corrective actions taken by the Coast Guard in the next SAR.


The Coast Guard reports that it also took administrative action against the responsible management officials who remain in the Service and who were found to have retaliated against the complainant.

<sup>1</sup> Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

## HIGHLIGHTS OF SIGNIFICANT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

During this reporting period, we issued 43 new reports and 141 recommendations to the Department; we closed 167 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods.

### OIG ACTIVITY APRIL 1, 2021 - SEPTEMBER 30, 2021



In this report, we highlight our pandemic response oversight activities and a number of audits, inspections, and evaluations we conducted. Our work is risk-based and aligns with the Department's strategic mission areas outlined in the [DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024](#):

- Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats
- Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches
- Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure
- Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security
- Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience
- Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We have also highlighted several investigations we conducted during the reporting period.

### *Pandemic Response*

During this reporting period, OIG completed three reports primarily related to COVID-19, including *ICE's Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses*; in addition, at least four other reports were indirectly related to COVID-19. OIG also has 18 projects in progress. As of September 30, 2021, OIG's Office of Investigations received 6,345 COVID-19-related complaints and opened 167 investigations, of which 44 have been closed. OIG is investigating, among others, hoarding and price gouging of personal protective equipment (PPE), counterfeit PPE, and fraud related to FEMA contracts and grants.

In the *Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act* (CARES Act), Congress appropriated \$3 million in supplemental oversight funding to DHS OIG. OIG is using this funding for audits of FEMA's administration of the CARES Act and investigations of fraud related to FEMA contracts and grants.

DHS OIG is one of nine mandated IGs participating in the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established as a committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency by the CARES Act. At present, the PRAC is composed of 22 Inspectors General. The PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and ensure coordinated, comprehensive oversight of the Government's spending and COVID-19 pandemic response to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.



The PRAC is tracking more than \$5 trillion in payments to individual citizens, loans for businesses, and support for hospitals and other medical providers, as well as economic relief for impacted businesses, industries, and state, local, and tribal governments. The PRAC hosts a comprehensive website — [www.pandemicoversight.gov](http://www.pandemicoversight.gov) — with valuable interactive data visualizations and maps to track pandemic funds. In FY 2021, DHS OIG has contributed to PRAC reports such as *Key Insights: COVID-19 in Correctional and Detention Facilities*. We have also presented highlights of our investigative work involving other Federal law enforcement partners.

In our last two Major Management and Performance Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security reports, we identified performing fully and effectively during the COVID-19 pandemic as a major management and performance challenge facing the Department. The challenge to continue mission critical operations and programs relates to all of [DHS' strategic goals](#). The Department is also charged with leading a whole-of-government response to confront the pandemic, keep Americans safe, help detect and slow the spread of the virus and its variants, and make vaccine available to as many people as possible.

See [video summaries](#) of select OIG pandemic-related reports.

### *Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches*

We continually evaluate the Department's operations to secure our borders, safeguard and facilitate trade and travel, enforce immigration laws, and properly administer immigration benefits.

We completed 14 audits and reviews this SAR period, including 3 unannounced inspections of detention facilities, using the protocols we developed in FY 2020 for conducting virtual reviews, including using available technologies to perform remote walkthroughs and conduct interviews.

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*DHS helps maintain national security by managing the flow of people and goods into the United States. DHS' border security approach focuses on four goals: (1) securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; (2) preventing and intercepting foreign threats so they do not reach U.S. soil; (3) enforcing immigration laws; and (4) properly administering immigration benefits.*

*[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)*

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### [DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response and Testing at the Southwest Border \(OIG-21-60\)](#)

OIG determined the extent to which DHS has implemented COVID-19 measures for migrants at the southwest border. We reported that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does not conduct COVID-19 testing for migrants who enter CBP custody and is not required to do so. Instead, CBP relies on local public health systems to test symptomatic individuals. We recommended DHS reassess its COVID-19 response framework to identify areas for improvement to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 while balancing its primary mission of securing the border. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

[Violations of Detention Standards at Pulaski County Jail \(OIG-21-32\)](#)

OIG conducted an unannounced inspection of Pulaski County Jail (Ullin, IL) to monitor compliance with select U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention standards. We also conducted a limited review of the facility's COVID-19 pandemic preparedness measures. During our inspection, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. We made five recommendations to ensure the ICE Chicago Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Field Office overseeing Pulaski addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with all five recommendations.

[ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children Upon Removal \(OIG-21-36\)](#)

OIG reviewed whether ICE consistently ascertained and honored migrant parents' decisions regarding their minor children before removing them, and the extent to which ICE policies required it to do so. We determined that, before July 12, 2018, migrant parents did not consistently have the opportunity to reunify with their children before removal. We made two recommendations to ensure ICE documents separated migrant parents' decisions regarding their minor children upon removal from the United States and develops a process to share information with Government officials to contact parents for whom ICE lacks documentation on reunification preferences. ICE concurred with our recommendations.

[ICE's Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses \(OIG-21-58\)](#)

OIG sought to determine whether ICE effectively controlled COVID-19 within its detention facilities and adequately safeguarded the health and safety of detainees and its staff. ICE took various actions to prevent COVID-19 spread among detainees and staff at its detention facilities during 2020 and into 2021. At the nine facilities we inspected remotely, these measures included maintaining adequate supplies of PPE such as face masks, enhanced cleaning, and proper screening for new detainees and staff. However, we found other areas in which detention facilities struggled to properly manage the health and safety of detainees. We also found that testing of detainees and staff was insufficient, and that ICE headquarters did not generally provide effective oversight of its detention facilities during the pandemic. We made six recommendations to improve ICE's management of COVID-19 in its detention facilities. ICE concurred with our recommendations.

[\*CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Caravan \(OIG-21-62\)\*](#)

OIG sought to determine whether CBP improperly targeted journalists, attorneys, and advocates (caravan associates) because of their affiliation with and perceived support of the 2018–2019 migrant caravan. We determined that CBP officials had legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on American journalists, attorneys, and others suspected of organizing or being associated with the migrant caravan. However, many CBP officials were unaware of CBP’s policy related to placing lookouts. Therefore, they may have inadvertently placed lookouts on these Americans, which did not fully comport with the policy. Additionally, CBP officials did not remove lookouts promptly once they were no longer necessary and, as a result, subjected some of these U.S. citizens to repeated and unnecessary secondary inspections. During the same time period, a CBP official requested that Mexico deny entry to caravan associates, including 14 Americans. Unlike CBP’s legitimate reasons for placing lookouts on these U.S. citizens, CBP had no genuine basis for requesting that Mexico deny entry to these individuals. On several other occasions throughout Operation Secure Line, other CBP officials also improperly shared the names and sensitive information of U.S. citizens with Mexico. We made six recommendations to improve CBP’s controls on placing and removing lookouts and sharing Americans’ sensitive information with foreign countries. CBP concurred with our recommendations.

[\*ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims \(OIG-21-40\)\*](#)

OIG found that ICE did not adequately identify and track human trafficking crimes. Specifically, ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) did not accurately track dissemination and receipt of human trafficking tips, did not consistently take follow-up actions on tips, and

did not maintain accurate data about human trafficking. Additionally, HSI special agents did not properly maintain all human trafficking case files from initiation to closure. We recommended that ICE HSI improve its coordination and human trafficking efforts to assist victims. ICE concurred with our recommendations.

[\*Violations of Detention Standards at Otay Mesa Detention Center \(OIG-21-61\)\*](#)

OIG conducted an unannounced inspection of Otay Mesa (San Diego, CA) Detention Center to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards. We also conducted a limited review of the facility’s COVID-19 pandemic preparedness measures. During our inspection, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that compromised the health, safety, and rights of detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Otay Mesa did not consistently enforce precautions including use of facial coverings and social distancing. We also determined the declining detainee population at Otay Mesa caused ICE to pay more than \$22 million for unused bed space under a guaranteed minimum contract. We made seven recommendations to ensure the San Diego ERO Field Office overseeing Otay Mesa addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with six of our seven recommendations.

[\*Violations of Detention Standards at Adams County Correctional Center \(OIG-21-46\)\*](#)

OIG conducted an unannounced inspection of Adams County (Natchez, MS) Correctional Center to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards. We also conducted a limited review of the

facility's COVID-19 pandemic preparedness measures. During our inspection, we identified violations of ICE detention standards that threatened the health, safety, and rights of detainees. In addressing COVID-19, Adams took some measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, but detainees did not consistently follow some guidelines, including use of facial coverings and social distancing. We also determined the declining detainee population at Adams resulted in ICE paying more than \$17 million for unused bed space under a guaranteed minimum contract. We made seven recommendations to ensure the New Orleans ERO Field Office overseeing Adams addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with our recommendations.

*Other issued reports include:*

[\*Review of the February 16, 2020 Childbirth at the Chula Vista Border Patrol Station \(OIG-21-49\)\*](#)

[\*USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Process \(OIG-21-56\)\*](#)

[\*CPB Continued to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry \(OIG-21-63\)\*](#)

[\*CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks \(OIG-21-70\)\*](#)

[\*CBP Generally Provided Accurate Notices to Appear to Migrant Protection Protocols Enrollees, but Could Improve Procedures to Reduce Future Errors \(OIG-21-45\)\*](#)

[\*CBP Needs to Strengthen Policies and Procedures to Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention \(OIG-21-48\)\*](#)

## *Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats*

We continue to provide oversight of the Department's counterterrorism programs and operations and make recommendations to improve capabilities and mitigate threats.

We completed one review and one audit this SAR period.

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*DHS protects Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats by preventing nation-states and their proxies, transnational criminal organizations, and groups or individuals from engaging in terrorist or criminal acts that threaten the Homeland. The Department's counterterrorism responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) collect, analyze, and share actionable intelligence; (2) detect and disrupt threats; (3) protect designated leadership, events, and soft targets; and (4) counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats.*

*[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)*

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### [DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities \(OIG-21-31\)<sup>2</sup>](#)

OIG assessed the authority, preparation, and activities of DHS law enforcement officers deployed to protect Federal property in Portland, OR. Under 40 U.S.C. § 1315, DHS had the legal authority to designate and deploy DHS law enforcement officers from CBP, ICE, and United

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<sup>2</sup> See [Management Alert – FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315\(b\)\(1\), OIG-21-05, Nov 2020](#).

States Secret Service to help the Federal Protective Service (FPS) protect Federal facilities in Portland. However, DHS was unprepared to effectively execute cross-component activities to protect Federal facilities when component law enforcement officers first deployed on June 4, 2020. We made two recommendations to improve DHS' preparedness for protecting Federal property.

As of July 9, 2021, in response to our recommendations, FPS indicated that the FPS Director had signed a policy document addressing cross-designation for DHS component personnel under 40 U.S.C. § 1315 and verification of required legal training completion. Additionally, FPS reported that it is leading development of a playbook for responding to civil unrest at high-risk Federal facilities, which will include a generic contingency plan that can be adapted to any incident meeting the specified criteria.

### [DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees \(OIG-21-35\)](#)

OIG determined DHS law enforcement components did not consistently collect DNA from arrestees, as required. Of the five DHS law enforcement components we reviewed that are subject to these DNA collection requirements, only Secret Service consistently collected DNA from arrestees. ICE and FPS inconsistently collected DNA, and CBP and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) collected no DNA. Without all DHS arrestees' DNA samples in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) criminal database, law enforcement likely missed opportunities to receive investigative leads based on DNA matches. Additionally, DHS did not benefit from a unity of effort, such as sharing and leveraging processes, data collection, and best practices across components. We recommended DHS oversee and guide its law enforcement components to ensure they comply with collection requirements. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

## *Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure*

We conduct mandated and discretionary audits to evaluate DHS' compliance with cybersecurity-related Federal laws and Executive Orders to safeguard the Department's information systems and the Nation's critical infrastructure

We completed six audits this SAR period.

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*Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure are one of the most dynamic threats and significant strategic risks to the United States. The Department's cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) secure Federal civilian networks; (2) strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure; (3) assess and counter evolving cybersecurity risks; and (4) combat cybercrime.*

[\*DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan\*](#)

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### [\*DHS Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program \(OIG-21-38\)\*](#)

In 2013, DHS established the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) program to carry out Office of Management and Budget's requirement that Federal agencies establish a program to identify and respond to emerging cyber threats. We determined DHS had not yet strengthened its cybersecurity posture by implementing a CDM Program. DHS spent more than \$180 million between 2013 and 2020 to design and deploy a department-wide continuous monitoring solution but faced setbacks. DHS initially planned to deploy its internal CDM solution by 2017 using a "One DHS" approach that restricted

components to a standard set of common tools. As of March 2020, DHS had developed a key element of the program, its internal CDM dashboard. However, the dashboard contained less than half of the required asset management data. As a result, the Department cannot leverage intended benefits of the dashboard to manage, prioritize, and respond to cyber risks in real time. Finally, we identified vulnerabilities on CDM servers and databases. Consequently, databases and servers could be vulnerable to cybersecurity attack, and the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of the data could be at risk. We recommended DHS update its program plan, address vulnerabilities, and define patch management responsibilities. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

### [\*CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation \(OIG-21-47\)\*](#)

OIG determined CBP did not always protect its Mobile Passport Control (MPC) applications (apps) from cybersecurity threats. This occurred because app version updates were not always scanned for vulnerabilities and CBP did not always identify vulnerabilities detected in scans. CBP also did not complete seven required security and privacy compliance reviews of MPC apps because it did not establish a schedule for the reviews or track and centrally store review documentation. In addition, CBP did not obtain the information needed for the reviews, had competing priorities, and did not ensure app developers created a process for a required internal audit. Finally, CBP did not implement Department server configuration requirements for its MPC servers. We made eight recommendations to improve the security of CBP's MPC program. CBP concurred with our recommendations.

*Other issued reports include:*

### [\*CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience \(OIG-21-59\)\*](#)

[Evaluation of DHS Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2020 \(OIG-21-55\)](#)

[Summary Report: Persistent Data Issues Hinder DHS Mission, Programs, and Operations \(OIG-21-37\)](#)

[Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020 \(OIG-21-72\)](#)

### ***Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security***

We continue to provide oversight of DHS' programs and operations affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems.

We completed five audits and reviews this SAR period.

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*The United States' prosperity and economic security are integral to DHS' homeland security operations, affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems. The Department's prosperity and economic security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) enforce trade laws and facilitate lawful international trade and travel; (2) safeguard the transportation system; (3) maintain waterways and maritime resources; and (4) safeguard financial systems.*

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

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[TSA Did Not Assess Its Explosives Detection Canine Team Program for Surface Transportation Security \(OIG-21-52\)](#)

OIG determined the extent to which TSA evaluated its Explosives Detection Canine Team (EDCT) program and met the intent of the requirements in the *FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Act)*, as part of developing and implementing its *Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy*. We determined that TSA partially complied with the Act by establishing operational processes for routine activities within its EDCT program for surface transportation. Specifically, TSA has a national training program for canines and handlers, uses canine assets to meet urgent security needs, and monitors and tracks canine assets. However, TSA did not comply with the Act's requirements to evaluate the entire EDCT program for alignment with its risk-based security strategy or develop a unified deployment strategy for its EDCTs for surface transportation. We recommended that TSA coordinate with its law enforcement agency partners to evaluate the EDCT program and develop a component-wide deployment strategy for surface transportation consistent with TSA's *Surface Transportation Risk-Based Security Strategy*. TSA concurred with our recommendations.

[TSA Has Not Implemented All Requirements of the 9/11 Act and the TSA Modernization Act \(OIG-21-68\)](#)

OIG determined the extent to which TSA has implemented requirements of the *Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007* and *TSA Modernization Act* to develop strategies, programs, regulations, reports, and other initiatives to strengthen transportation security. Although TSA implemented 67 percent of the requirements in both Acts, 33 percent were not completed by the Acts' established deadlines, and TSA did not complete the remaining requirements. TSA was unable to complete requirements because the actions relied on external stakeholders acting first or depended on conditions outside

of TSA's control. Further, TSA had difficulty completing some mandates that required lengthy regulatory processes or coordination with and reliance on external Government and industry stakeholders. Because TSA has not implemented all requirements, it may be missing opportunities to address vulnerabilities and strengthen the security of the Nation's transportation systems. TSA did not concur with our recommendation but developed a corrective action plan.

[DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems \(OIG-21-69\)](#)

OIG determined that TSA acquired computed tomography (CT) systems that did not address all needed capabilities. DHS is responsible for overseeing all major acquisitions to ensure they are properly planned and executed and meet documented key performance thresholds. However, DHS allowed TSA to use an acquisition approach not recognized by DHS' acquisition guidance. In addition, DHS allowed TSA to deploy the CT system even though it did not meet all TSA key performance parameters. DHS also did not validate TSA's detection upgrade before TSA incorporated it into the CT system. As a result, TSA risks spending more than \$700 million in future appropriated funding to purchase CT systems that may never fully meet operational mission needs. We made three recommendations to improve DHS' oversight of TSA's CT systems acquisition. DHS concurred with our recommendations.

Other issued reports include:

[TSA Needs to Improve Its Oversight for Human Capital Contracts \(OIG-21-39\)](#)

[DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment \(OIG-21-66\)](#)

### *Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience*

We conduct mandated, requested, and discretionary audits and evaluations to assess the Department's disaster response and recovery programs and operations to identify deficiencies and make recommendations for improvement.

We completed nine audits and reviews in this mission area this SAR period.

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*The Federal Government must remain capable of responding to natural disasters, physical and cyber-attacks, weapons of mass destruction attacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, and search and rescue distress signals. Following disasters, the Federal Government must be prepared to support local communities with long-term recovery assistance. The United States can effectively manage emergencies and mitigate harm by thoroughly preparing local communities, rapidly responding during crises, and supporting recovery. The Department's preparedness and resilience responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) build a national culture of preparedness; (2) respond during incidents; (3) support outcome-driven community recovery; and (4) train and exercise first responders.*

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

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[FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges \(OIG-21-43\)](#)

The *Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000* (DMA 2000) repealed and replaced prior mitigation planning provisions with a new set of requirements primarily to authorize a program for pre-disaster mitigation, streamline



the administration of disaster relief, and control the Federal costs of disaster assistance. FEMA obligated an estimated \$1.9 billion for repetitive damages to roads and bridges from 2009 to 2018. We determined that FEMA has not prioritized compliance with the DMA 2000 by implementing regulations and policies to identify and reduce repetitive damages to our Nation's roads and bridges. According to FEMA officials, FEMA has instead focused on immediate needs of disaster operations and other high-profile initiatives necessary to carry out its mission. We made four recommendations, including that FEMA prioritize the DMA 2000 by addressing unresolved implementation issues and publishing a regulation, as required. FEMA concurred with our recommendations.

[Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages \(OIG-21-65\)](#)

OIG evaluated whether the Coast Guard is adequately addressing Rescue 21 outages and providing appropriate notifications to the public when outages occur. We determined that Rescue 21 Alaska, the Coast Guard's maritime search and rescue communication system, has experienced outages resulting from antiquated equipment in Coast Guard's District 17. Challenges and funding shortages during system acquisition caused the Coast Guard to limit the purchase of new equipment for Rescue 21 Alaska, requiring District 17 to maintain existing equipment for longer than initially planned. Adequately upgrading the communications equipment and ensuring robust attempts are made to notify the public when outages occur is essential for the Coast Guard to achieve its search and rescue mission in Alaska. We made two recommendations to ensure the Coast Guard prioritizes Rescue 21 Alaska upgrades and appropriately notifies the public of outages. Coast Guard concurred with our recommendations.

*Other issued reports include:*

[Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19 \(OIG-21-64\)](#)

[FEMA's Efforts to Provide Funds to Reconstruct the Vieques' Community Health Center \(OIG-21-41\)](#)

[FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls \(OIG-21-42\)](#)

[FEMA Must Strengthen Its Responsibility Determination Process \(OIG-21-44\)](#)

[Inadequate FEMA Oversight Delayed Completion and Closeout of Louisiana's Public Assistance Projects \(OIG-21-50\)](#)

[FEMA Prematurely Obligated \\$478 Million in Public Assistance Funds during FYs 2017 through 2019 \(OIG-21-54\)](#)

[FLETC's Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at its Glynco Training Center \(OIG-21-73\)](#)

### *Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department*

We provide oversight of DHS' acquisitions, financial and performance management, information systems, mission support, and workforce areas to ensure the Department's activities and investments effectively support its mission.

We completed eight audits and reviews this SAR period.

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*Strengthening and integrating relationships between and among headquarters offices and operational components is critical to optimizing the Department's efficiency and effectiveness. The Department seeks to increase integration, clarify roles and responsibilities, champion its workforce, advance risk-based decision-making, and promote transparency and accountability. The Department's organizational responsibilities focus on three goals: (1) strengthen departmental governance and management; (2) develop and maintain a high performing workforce; and (3) optimize support to mission operations.*

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

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### *U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs (OIG-21-53)*

OIG determined that CBP did not effectively manage its aviation fleet acquisitions to meet operational mission needs. Specifically, Air and Marine Operations (AMO) acquired and deployed 16 multi-role enforcement aircraft (MEA) that did not contain the necessary air and land interdiction capabilities to perform their mission. In addition, AMO initiated the MEA and medium lift helicopter programs without well-defined operational requirements and key performance parameters — critical items in the acquisition planning process.

This occurred because CBP did not provide oversight and guidance to ensure AMO acquisition personnel followed key steps. As a result, AMO expended approximately \$330 million procuring MEA that, at the time of acceptance, did not effectively respond to emergent air threats along the northern or southern borders and experienced schedule delays deploying the medium lift helicopter. We made four recommendations to improve CBP's acquisition management of its aviation fleet to meet operational needs. CBP concurred with three of our four recommendations.

### *CBP Senior Leaders' Handling of Social Media Misconduct (OIG-21-34)*

OIG determined whether complaints were made to CBP leadership regarding the *I'm 10-15* or similar private Facebook groups prior to media reporting in July 2019; which senior-level officials knew about them prior to the July 2019 media reporting; when they became aware; what they knew about the content; and what actions, if any, they took to evaluate and address potential employee misconduct in the group. We found CBP and U.S. Border Patrol headquarters officials were aware of only a few of the 83 CBP employees' cases of social media misconduct. CBP and Border Patrol headquarters officials only responded to one of those cases, upon direction from DHS. In contrast, the senior CBP Office of Field Operations headquarters leader issued guidance to remind employees of acceptable use of social media. With regard to the posts that media outlets published in July 2019, we found no evidence that senior CBP headquarters or field leaders were aware of them until they were made public. We also found some senior leaders questioned the legality or the application of CBP policies, which may undermine CBP's ability to enforce the policies. We made two recommendations to help reduce the incidence of social media misconduct. CBP concurred with our recommendations.

Other issued reports include:

[FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct \(OIG-21-71\)](#)

[Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments \(OIG-21-33\)](#)

[Management Alert – The United States Coast Guard Discontinued the Use of Functional Firearms in DVD Simulation Training \(OIG-21-67\)](#)

[TSA Needs to Improve Its Oversight for Human Capital Contracts \(OIG-21-39\)](#)

[FY 2018 Audit of Science & Technology Bankcard Program Indicates Risks \(OIG-21-51\)](#)

[ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs Improvement \(OIG-21-57\)](#)

### *Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information: Review of January 6 Events at the Capitol*

Section 5(a)(21)(B) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* (IG Act) requires OIG to report “incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action.”

During this reporting period, the Department significantly delayed OIG’s access to Department records, thereby impeding the progress of OIG’s review of the January 6 events at the Capitol. The Department repeatedly suggested that OIG might not have a right of access to the records sought, but during the months-long period in which access was delayed the Department did not cite any legal authority consistent with section 6(a)(1)(B) of the IG Act that would have justified withholding the information.

On September 30, 2021, Secretary Mayorkas issued a [reminder](#) to all Department personnel about OIG access. Shortly thereafter, OIG began receiving responsive records.

### *Investigations*

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions.

The narratives below are a select sample of our completed investigations.

### ***Pandemic-Related Fraud***

Jointly with the FBI and U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, we investigated the Chief Executive Officer of a contract company for making false statements to multiple Federal agencies to fraudulently obtain multi-million dollar government contracts related to PPE, COVID-19 emergency relief loans, and undeserved military benefits.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia found the former Chief Executive Officer guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (False Statements), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud), and 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Theft of Government Funds) and sentenced him to 21 months of incarceration and 3 years of supervised release. He paid \$348,765 in restitution.

### ***Importation of a Controlled Substance***

Jointly with the Coast Guard Investigative Service and ICE HSI, we investigated a Commander (O-5) in the Coast Guard for illegal importation of a controlled substance.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California found the Commander guilty of Title 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (Importation of a Controlled Substance) and sentenced him to 3 years of probation and a \$5,000 fine.

### ***Human Smuggling***

Jointly with the FBI, we investigated a Border Patrol Agent (now former) for smuggling a non-citizen through a Border Patrol checkpoint.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found the former Border Patrol Agent guilty of Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Transportation

of an Undocumented Alien within the U.S.) and sentenced him to 3 years of probation and 40 hours of community service.

Jointly with the U.S. Border Patrol and ICE HSI, we investigated two civilians for smuggling non-citizens through a Border Patrol checkpoint. One civilian admitted to smuggling over 30 people. The second civilian, a non-citizen present in the United States illegally, harbored nine non-citizens at his residence.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found both civilians guilty of Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (Transportation of an Undocumented Alien within the U.S.). The judge sentenced one civilian to 60 months of incarceration, 2 years of supervised release, and 50 hours of attendance in a Residential Drug Abuse Program. The judge sentenced the second civilian to 267 days of incarceration and 1 year of supervised release.

### ***Wire Fraud***

Jointly with the FBI, we investigated an ICE HSI Special Agent (now former) for using deceased Federal employees' information to apply for and receive \$120,000 in loans.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas found the former employee guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud) and sentenced him to 15 months of confinement, followed by 36 months of probation, and \$51,813.54 in restitution.

### ***Procurement Fraud***

We investigated a FEMA contractor for not providing self-help tarps according to specifications and falsifying the true country of origin of the tarps.

The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee found the two owners of the contract company guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Money Laundering) and sentenced both to 50 months of imprisonment, 5 years of probation, and \$7.006 million in restitution. Of this amount, \$3.775 million was to be paid to FEMA.

A State of Tennessee court found both owners guilty of Theft of Property over \$60,000 and sentenced both to 8 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, to be served concurrently with the Federal sentence.

### ***Healthcare Fraud***

Jointly with the U.S. Postal Service OIG, Department of Labor OIG, and Veterans Affairs OIG, we investigated a Federal contractor for overbilling and for services not rendered.

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas found both the President and the Chief Operating Officer of the contract company guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Conspiracy to Commit Health Care Fraud). The judge sentenced each to 87 months of incarceration, 36 months of supervised release, and \$6,068,275.86 in restitution.

### ***Grant Fraud***

Jointly with the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation, we investigated the Fire Chief (and Grant Administrator) and the Assistant Grant Administrator of a local volunteer fire department for theft of Government funds and false Federal tax returns.

The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania found both civilians guilty of Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Theft of Government Funds) and Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (Fraud and False Statements on Federal Tax Returns).

The judge sentenced the Assistant Grant Administrator to 1 day of incarceration and 2 years of supervised release, 6 months of which is home detention with a monitor. The Fire Chief admitted to embezzling \$1,590,257 in federally funded grant money from FEMA and is scheduled to be sentenced in October 2021.

## INVESTIGATIONS OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Per requirements of the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*<sup>3</sup>, OIG conducted the following investigations involving senior government employees where allegations of misconduct were substantiated.



**A manager (GS-15)** for attempting to influence agency officials into hiring their spouse. We found the manager improperly advocated for the appointment and advancement of their spouse, in violation of Federal law. In addition, we found the manager was placed on leave and later resigned after being indicted in an unrelated Federal investigation. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on December 17, 2018, and declined on December 18, 2018.



**A senior official (SES)** for prohibited personnel practices in the hiring of employees. We found the official engaged in preferential treatment and used his position to improve the prospects of at least one applicant. We also found some of the official's answers during the interview with DHS OIG were factually inaccurate. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on February 15, 2021, and declined on March 3, 2021.



**A former manager (GS-15)** for post-employment restriction and conflict of interest relating to a contract. We found the manager violated post-employment restrictions and Federal conflict of interest laws. This investigation was presented for prosecution on October 17, 2019, and accepted. The former manager entered into a civil settlement with the United States.



**A manager (GS-15)** for misuse of official position and official email to facilitate contact on a personal matter, and bribery of public officials and witnesses. We found the manager misused their position by using their official email and title to conduct personal business. We found the allegation the manager committed bribery to be unsubstantiated. We referred this case to the United States Attorney's Office on March 3, 2020, and it was declined on December 9, 2020. The employee is no longer employed by DHS.

<sup>3</sup>Public Law 114-317 § 4(c)(1)(D)(19).

## CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS

We briefed congressional Members and their staffs more than 118 times throughout the reporting period. The Inspector General personally met with numerous Members who sit on committees with jurisdiction over DHS, and briefed committee staff on DHS OIG's full portfolio of work, including our oversight work of DHS' role in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.

### *Notable hearings and testimony.*<sup>4</sup>

["Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General" before the Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, April 21, 2021.](#)

["FEMA's Disaster Assistance Following Hurricanes Maria and Harvey" before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, June 25, 2021.](#)

["Assessing the Federal Government's COVID-19 Relief and Response Efforts and its Impact" before the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, July 29, 2021.](#)

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<sup>4</sup> Since 2003, OIG has been asked to testify before Congress 168 times.

## OTHER OIG ACTIVITIES

### *Oversight of Single Audits*

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with *Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards* (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a fiscal year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “Single Audit” (per the *Single Audits Act*, as amended by Public Law 1041-156). Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS, and to determine that the audit results are properly reported.

During this reporting period, we completed 125 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by the non-Federal auditing firms (independent public accountant organizations). These 125 desk reviews encompass \$853,901,674 Federal grant spending, of which \$311,274,568 was for direct DHS grants. We did not complete any quality control reviews.

Sixty-two percent of our reviews did not disclose any quality issues, or only minor issues that did not require corrective actions. The remaining 38 percent contained errors needing correction in future filings, as identified below.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup>Some of the Single Audit submissions had several errors, so arithmetically there are more errors noted than 38 percent of 125 letters would indicate.

PROBLEMS WITH:	NUMBER
Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards	20
Corrective Action Plan	13
Findings	11
Audit Report	6
Single Audit Report submitted late	4
Standard Form accompanying Report	4
Prior Report	3
Incorrect risk assessment	2
Inadequate grant testing	1
Other	1

The Single Audit report with inadequate grant testing did not pass our review, and we are waiting for the non-Federal auditors to test additional Federal grant costs in the year we reviewed. Once the additional work is completed, we will review the revised Single Audit submission.




APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Reports with Monetary Findings

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

	# REPORTS	# RECOMMENDATIONS	QUESTIONED COSTS	UNSUPPORTED COSTS
Carryover	31	69	\$8,058,667,834	\$7,179,288,745
Issued	1	1	\$63,213	\$0

CURRENT





*Reports and Recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use*

	# REPORTS	# RECOMMENDATIONS	FUNDS PUT TO BETTER USE
Carryover	13	29	\$2,971,409,106
Issued	0	0	-

CURRENT




*Appendix 2: Compliance – Resolution of Reports and Recommendations*



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

## Active Recommendations



Note: This appendix excludes investigative reports.

*Appendix 3: Reports with Unresolved Recommendations More than 6 Months Old*

	DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	REC NO.	DHS COMPONENT	NO. OVER 6 MONTHS
	5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	<i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
	1/12/2017	OIG-17-22	<i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i>	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	1
	9/27/2017	OIG-17-112	<i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	6	TSA	1
	10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	<i>(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i>	2, 3, 4	TSA	3
	1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	<i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	ICE	1
	9/19/2018	OIG-19-17	<i>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security is Questionable</i>	1, 2	TSA	2
	2/28/2019	OIG-19-23	<i>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i>	1	CBP	1
	7/25/2019	OIG-19-54	<i>Louisiana Did Not Properly Oversee a \$706.6 Million Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Award for Work on Louisiana Homes</i>	1	FEMA	1
	7/31/2019	OIG-19-57	<i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i>	5	ICE	1
	9/30/2019	OIG-19-66	<i>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds</i>	1, 3	FEMA	2
	3/24/2020	OIG-20-19	<i>PALMS Funding and Payments Did Not Comply with Federal Appropriations Law</i>	2, 8, 9	MGMT	3
	4/6/2020	OIG-20-23	<i>FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003</i>	1, 2	FEMA	2
	7/14/2020	OIG-20-52	<i>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border</i>	1, 3	CBP, MGMT,PLCY	2
14	7/27/2020	OIG-20-57	<i>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Com-ply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines</i>	4	FEMA	1
	8/13/2020	OIG-20-59	<i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	4, 5	ICE, MGMT,PLCY, TSA	2
16	8/12/2020	OIG-20-60	<i>FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003</i>	1, 2, 3	FEMA	3

DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	REC NO.	DHS COMPONENT	NO. OVER 6 MONTHS
9/15/2020	OIG-0-63	<i>FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina</i>	1, 7	FEMA	2
8/27/2020	OIG-20-66	<i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i>	1	CBP,	
9/30/2020	OIG-20-77	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i>	2, 4	DHS, MGMT	2
9/28/2020	OIG-20-79	<i>CBP's Entry Reconciliation Program Puts Revenue at Risk</i>	1	CBP	1
9/30/2020	OIG-20-80	<i>DHS Cannot Determine the Total Cost, Effectiveness, and Value of Its Joint Task Forces</i>	2, 5, 6, 7	SEC, DSEC, COS, OPS, PLCY	4
10/27/2020	OIG-21-02	<i>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry</i>	1	CBP	1
2/1/2021	OIG-21-17	<i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019</i>	1	MGMT	1
3/15/2021	OIG-21-27	<i>CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only</i>	2, 3	CBP	2
3/30/2021	OIG-21-30	<i>Violations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ</i>	1	ICE	1
				<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>42</b>

*Appendix 4: Reports with Open Recommendations More than 6 Months Old*

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP	
1	OIG-12-18	<i>FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
2	OIG-14-142	<i>(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations</i>	1	-	-	TSA
3	OIG-15-10	<i>Independent Audi-tors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	20	-	-	DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
4	OIG-15-80	<i>DHS Should Do More to Reduce Travel Reservation Costs</i>	1	-	-	CFO
5	OIG-15-140	<i>DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts</i>	1	-	-	PLCY
6	OIG-16-06	<i>Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit</i>	15	-	-	CFO, DHS, FEMA, MGMT, NPPD, USCG
7	OIG-16-54	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i>	1	-	-	CBP
8	OIG-16-75	<i>CBP Needs Better Data to Justify Its Criminal Investigator Staffing</i>	2	-	-	CBP
9	OIG-16-87	<i>IT Management Challenges Continue in TSA's Security Technology Integrated Program</i>	2	-	-	TSA
10	OIG-16-91	<i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i>	2	-	-	OGC, TSA
11	OIG-16-98	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants</i>	1	\$18,443,447	-	FEMA
12	OIG-16-100	<i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program – AFG Grants</i>	1	\$7,124,893	-	FEMA
13	OIG-17-09	<i>DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Im-provement</i>	1	-	-	MGMT
14	OIG-17-10	<i>The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel</i>	2	-	-	USSS
15	OIG-17-12	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	-	-	CBP, CFO, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
18	OIG-17-38-D <i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power</i>	2	-	-	FEMA
19	OIG-17-49 <i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counter-terrorism Information</i>	4	-	-	CRCL, I&A, OGC, PRIV
20	OIG-17-51 <i>ICE Deportation Operations</i>	1	-	-	ICE
21	OIG-17-74-IQO <i>Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service</i>	3	-	-	USCG
22	OIG-17-112 <i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i>	4	-	-	TSA
23	OIG-18-16 <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	42	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, USCG, USSS
24	OIG-18-36 <i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i>	2	-	-	ICE
25	OIG-18-51 <i>Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement</i>	1	-	-	DHS
26	OIG-18-67 <i>ICE's Inspections and Monitoring of Detention Facilities Do Not Lead to Sustained Compliance or Systemic Im-provements</i>	2	-	-	ICE
27	OIG-18-70 <i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	-	-	TSA
28	OIG-18-71 <i>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
29	OIG-18-73 <i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i>	2	-	-	COS, DSEC, SEC
30	OIG-18-78 <i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i>	4	-	-	USCIS
31	OIG-18-81 <i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i>	1	-	-	MGMT
32	OIG-18-83 <i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i>	4	-	-	CBP



REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP	
33	OIG-18-88	<i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i>	2	-	-	USCG
34	OIG-19-04	<i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	28	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, USCG, USSS
35	OIG-19-10	<i>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry</i>	4	-	-	CBP
36	OIG-19-15	<i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i>	1	\$1,768,768	-	NPPD
37	OIG-19-18	<i>ICE Does Not Fully Use Contracting Tools to Hold Detention Facility Contractors Accountable for Failing to Meet Performance Standards</i>	2	-	-	ICE
38	OIG-19-19	<i>DHS Needs to Improve the Process for Identifying Acquisition Planning Capability Needs</i>	1	-	-	COS, DSEC, SEC
39	OIG-19-21	<i>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i>	1	-	-	TSA
40	OIG-19-28	<i>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens</i>	4	-	-	ICE
41	OIG-19-35	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers</i>	1	-	-	TSA
42	OIG-19-42	<i>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program</i>	3	-	-	DHS
43	OIG-19-48	<i>DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline</i>	6	-	-	MGMT
44	OIG-19-49	<i>CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation</i>	2	-	-	CBP
45	OIG-19-52	<i>FEMA's Cost Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
46	OIG-19-55	<i>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Demonstrate the Importance of Fraud Prevention and Awareness in FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs</i>	2	-	-	FEMA
47	OIG-19-56	<i>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement</i>	1	-	-	TSA

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
48	OIG-19-57 <i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i>	3	-	-	ICE
49	OIG-19-67 <i>Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics</i>	1	-	-	CBP
50	OIG-20-03 <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	5	-	-	DHS
51	OIG-20-06 <i>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families</i>	4	-	-	CBP, MGMT
52	OIG-20-13 <i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges</i>	3	-	-	ICE
53	OIG-20-15 <i>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
54	OIG-20-22 <i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Housing</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
55	OIG-20-25 <i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
56	OIG-20-26 <i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Education</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
57	OIG-20-28 <i>TSA's Challenges With Passenger Screening Canine Teams - Sensitive Security Information</i>	1	-	\$77,000,000	TSA
58	OIG-20-29 <i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the U.S. Virgin Islands Housing and Finance Authority</i>	2	\$296,000,000	-	FEMA
59	OIG-20-32 <i>FEMA Needs to Effectively Designate Volunteers and Manage the Surge Capacity Force</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
60	OIG-20-33 <i>TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System</i>	1	-	-	TSA
61	OIG-20-34 <i>CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States</i>	2	-	-	CBP, TSA
62	OIG-20-37 <i>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats</i>	3	-	-	CISA

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PILOT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
63	OIG-20-40 <i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management</i>	2	-	-	DHS
64	OIG-20-43 <i>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Un-manned Aircraft Systems</i>	3	-	-	PLCY
65	OIG-20-46 <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Collier County, Florida</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
66	OIG-20-48 <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida</i>	7	\$1,076,913	-	FEMA
67	OIG-20-50 <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida</i>	7	\$62,763	-	FEMA
68	OIG-20-51 <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants in Monroe County, Florida</i>	17	\$384,329	\$5,000,000	FEMA
69	OIG-20-52 <i>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border</i>	1	-	-	CBP
70	OIG-20-53 <i>DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department's Efforts to Defend the Nation's Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism</i>	1	-	-	CWMD
71	OIG-20-55 <i>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE</i>	7	-	-	CBP
72	OIG-20-57 <i>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines</i>	1	-	-	FEMA
73	OIG-20-59 <i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	3	-	-	ICE, PLCY, TSA
74	OIG-20-61 <i>Progress and Challenges in Modernizing DHS' IT Systems and Infrastructure</i>	1	-	-	MGMT
75	OIG-20-62 <i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain</i>	3	-	-	CFO
76	OIG-20-63 <i>FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina</i>	5	\$59,575,020	-	FEMA

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PILT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
77	OIG-20-64 <i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection Compliance with Use of Force Policy for Incidents on November 25, 2018 and January 1, 2019 - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	1	-	-	CBP
78	OIG-20-66 <i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i>	1	-	-	CBP, DHS, ICE, USCG, USSS
79	OIG-20-68 <i>FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties</i>	3	-	-	FEMA
80	OIG-20-71 <i>Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot</i>	3	-	-	CBP
81	OIG-20-72 <i>Oversight Review of the Office of the Chief Security Officer, Internal Security Division</i>	1	-	-	DHS
82	OIG-20-73 <i>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018</i>	3	-	-	DHS, MGMT
83	OIG-20-74 <i>DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018</i>	4	-	-	CISA
84	OIG-20-76 <i>FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria</i>	4	\$50,000,000	-	FEMA
85	OIG-20-77 <i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i>	3	-	-	CISA, DHS, MGMT
86	OIG-21-01 <i>DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure</i>	3	-	-	CISA
87	OIG-21-02 <i>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry</i>	1	-	-	CBP
88	OIG-21-05 <i>Management Alert - FPS Did Not Properly Designate DHS Employees Deployed to Protect Federal Properties under 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1)</i>	2	-	-	SEC/ DSEC/ COS, MGMT
89	OIG-21-06 <i>DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives</i>	3	-	-	PRIV
90	OIG-21-08 <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i>	13	-	-	CFO, DHS

REPORT	REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PILOT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
OIG-21-09	<i>DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment</i>	2	-	-	ICE, PLCY
92	OIG-21-10 <i>FEMA Should Disallow \$12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy</i>	5	\$12,178,970	-	FEMA
OIG-21-11	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program - Sensitive Security Information</i>	2	-	-	TSA
94	OIG-21-13 <i>CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage</i>	2	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-14	<i>Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning</i>	3	-	-	MGMT
96	OIG-21-15 <i>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment</i>	4	-	-	ICE
OIG-21-16	<i>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs</i>	1	-	-	CBP, DHS, USCIS
98	OIG-21-17 <i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019</i>	1	-	-	CFO
OIG-21-18	<i>CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs</i>	1	-	-	CBP
100	OIG-21-19 <i>CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i>	4	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-20	<i>Better Oversight and Planning are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program</i>	1	\$55,800,000	-	FEMA
102	OIG-21-21 <i>CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain</i>	2	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-22	<i>Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for Bio-Watch - For Official Use Only</i>	2	-	-	CWMD
104	OIG-21-23 <i>FEMA Needs to Reduce the \$579 Million Backlog of Projects in its New York Public Assistance Grant Program</i>	4	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-24	<i>FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant</i>	2	\$6,936,357	-	FEMA
106	OIG-21-26 <i>FEMA's Procurement and Cost Re-imbursement Review Process Needs Improvement</i>	3	\$23,282,276	-	FEMA

REPORT		REPORT TITLE	# OF RECS	QUESTIONED COSTS	FUNDS TO BE PILT TO BETTER USE	DHS COMP
107	OIG-21-27	<i>CBP Faced Challenges in its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only</i>	5	-	-	FEMA
108	OIG-21-28	<i>FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds</i>	5	-	-	CBP
109	OIG-21-29	<i>DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge</i>	6	-	-	CBP, SEC/ DSEC/ COS, ICE
110	OIG-21-30	<i>Violations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ</i>	2	-	-	ICE
<b>Total</b>			<b>413</b>	<b>\$532,633,736</b>	<b>\$82,000,000</b>	

**Report Number Abbreviations:**

A report number ending with "D" is a grant audit.

A report number ending with "MA" is a Management Alert. These reports identify conditions that pose an immediate and serious threat.

A report number ending with "IQO" is a report issued by the Office of Integrity (formerly known as the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight).

## Appendix 5: Audit Reports Issued

	DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	TOTAL QUESTIONED COSTS <sup>[a]</sup>	UNSUPPORTED COSTS <sup>[b]</sup>	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE <sup>[c]</sup>
1	4/16/21	OIG-21-31	<i>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities</i>	-	-	-
2	4/29/21	OIG-21-32	<i>Violations of Detention Standards at Pulaski County Jail</i>	-	-	-
3	5/7/21	OIG-21-33	<i>Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments</i>	-	-	-
4	5/12/21	OIG-21-34	<i>CBP Senior Leaders' Handling of Social Media Misconduct</i>	-	-	-
5	5/17/21	OIG-21-35	<i>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees</i>	-	-	-
6	5/19/21	OIG-21-36	<i>ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal</i>	-	-	-
7	5/24/21	OIG-21-37	<i>Summary Report: Persistent Data Issues Hinder DHS Mission, Programs, and Operations</i>	-	-	-
8	6/1/21	OIG-21-38	<i>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program</i>	-	-	-
9	6/1/21	OIG-21-39	<i>TSA Needs to Improve Its Oversight for Human Capital Contracts</i>	-	-	-
10	6/4/21	OIG-21-40	<i>ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims</i>	-	-	-
11	6/9/21	OIG-21-41	<i>FEMA's Efforts to Provide Funds to Reconstruct the Vieques Community Health Center</i>	-	-	-
12	7/6/21	OIG-21-42	<i>FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls</i>	-	-	-
13	7/6/21	OIG-21-43	<i>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges</i>	-	-	-

	DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	TOTAL QUESTIONED COSTS <sup>[a]</sup>	UNSUPPORTED COSTS <sup>[b]</sup>	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE <sup>[c]</sup>
14	7/6/21	OIG-21-44	<i>FEMA Must Strengthen Its Responsibility Determination Process</i>	-	-	-
15	7/14/21	OIG-21-45	<i>CBP Generally Provided Accurate Notices to Appear to Migrant Protection Protocols Enrollees, but Could Improve Procedures to Reduce Future Errors</i>	-	-	-
16	7/14/21	OIG-21-46	<i>Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Adams County Correctional Center</i>	-	-	-
17	7/15/21	OIG-21-47	<i>CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation</i>	-	-	-
18	7/20/21	OIG-21-48	<i>CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention</i>	-	-	-
19	7/20/21	OIG-21-49	<i>Review of the February 16, 2020 Childbirth at the Chula Vista Border Patrol Station</i>	-	-	-
20	7/27/21	OIG-21-50	<i>Inadequate FEMA Oversight Delayed Completion and Closeout of Louisiana's Public Assistance Projects</i>	-	-	-
21	7/27/21	OIG-21-51	<i>FY 2018 Audit of Science and Technology Bankcard Program Indicates Risks</i>	\$63,213	-	-
22	8/4/21	OIG-21-52	<i>TSA Did Not Assess Its Explosives Detection Canine Team Program for Surface Transportation Security</i>	-	-	-
23	8/9/21	OIG-21-53	<i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs</i>	-	-	-
24	8/17/21	OIG-21-54	<i>FEMA Prematurely Obligated \$478 Million in Public Assistance Funds from FY 2017 through FY 2019</i>	-	-	-
25	8/25/21	OIG-21-55	<i>Evaluation of DHS Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2020 - Secret</i>	-	-	-
26	8/25/21	OIG-21-56	<i>USCIS Needs to Improve its Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Process</i>	-	-	-
27	8/26/21	OIG-21-57	<i>ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs</i>	-	-	-



	DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	TOTAL QUESTIONED COSTS <sup>[a]</sup>	UNSUPPORTED COSTS <sup>[b]</sup>	FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE <sup>[c]</sup>
	9/7/21	OIG-21-58	<i>ICE's Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses</i>	-	-	-
29	9/9/21	OIG-21-59	<i>CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience</i>	-	-	-
	9/10/21	OIG-21-60	<i>DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response and Testing at the Southwest Border</i>	-	-	-
31	9/14/21	OIG-21-61	<i>Violations of Detention Standards at Otay Mesa Detention Center</i>	-	-	-
	9/20/21	OIG-21-62	<i>CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Cara-van</i>	-	-	-
33	9/23/21	OIG-21-63	<i>CPB Continued to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry - Redacted</i>	-	-	-
	9/21/21	OIG-21-64	<i>Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19</i>	-	-	-
35	9/21/21	OIG-21-65	<i>Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages</i>	-	-	-
	9/22/21	OIG-21-66	<i>DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment</i>	-	-	-
37	9/23/21	OIG-21-67	<i>Management Alert – The United States Coast Guard Discontinued the Use of Functional Firearms in DVD Simulation Training</i>	-	-	-
	9/22/21	OIG-21-68	<i>TSA Has Not Implemented All Requirements of the 9/11 Act and the TSA Modernization Act</i>	-	-	-
39	9/23/21	OIG-21-69	<i>DHS Did Not Effectively Oversee TSA's Acquisition of Computed Tomography Systems</i>	-	-	-
	9/28/21	OIG-21-70	<i>CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks – LES</i>	-	-	-
41	9/30/21	OIG-21-71	<i>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct</i>	-	-	-
	9/30/21	OIG-21-72	<i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2020</i>	-	-	-
43	9/30/21	OIG-21-73	<i>FLETC's Actions to Respond to and Manage COVID-19 at its Glynco Training Center</i>	-	-	-

***Notes and Explanations:***

<sup>(a)</sup> DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

<sup>(b)</sup> The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the Inspector General Act.

<sup>(c)</sup> The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

*Appendix 6: Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated*

	DATE ISSUED	REPORT NUMBER	REPORT TITLE	OIG RECOMMENDED RECOVERY (FEDERAL SHARE)	AMOUNT DHS AGREED TO RECOVER (DISALLOW)	AMOUNT DHS WILL NOT RECOVER (ALLOWED)	AMOUNT DHS RECOVERED/ DEOBLIGATED
1	5/30/2016	OIG-16-78-D	Colorado Should Provide the City of Evans More Assistance in Managing FEMA Grant Funds	\$2,218,535	\$341,348	\$2,616,698	\$341,348
			<b>Totals</b>	<b>\$2,218,535</b>	<b>\$341,348</b>	<b>\$2,616,698</b>	<b>\$341,348</b>

### *Appendix 7: Contract Audit Results*

The *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

During this SAR period, we issued no contract audit reports containing unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs.

### *Appendix 8: Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG Audit Operations*

Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

OIG was not the subject of, nor did it conduct, any peer reviews during this reporting period. There are no outstanding recommendations from previous peer reviews.

If no peer review was conducted within the reporting period, OIGs must include a statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another OIG. The date of the last peer review, which was conducted by Department of Education OIG, was March 2021.

*Appendix 9: Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public*

ALLEGATION	
1	We investigated a manager (GS-15) for retaliating against an employee. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.
2	We investigated one DHS official (Senior Executive Service) for sexual harassment and a second DHS official (SES) for misuse of position and conflict of interest, which the second official was alleged to have tried to conceal. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
3	We investigated a DHS official (SES) and a DHS manager (GS-15) for prohibited personnel practices in the hiring of the DHS manager, who was alleged to lack the security clearance requirements for the position. It was also alleged the short posting window of the vacancy announcement did not give candidates adequate time to apply. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
4	We investigated a former manager (GS-15) for bribery. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.
5	We investigated an official (SES) for participating in the January 6, 2021 riot on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC, which he was alleged to have acknowledged attending during a public symposium. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
6	We investigated a manager (GS-15) for wire fraud in relation to suspicious activity identified in the manager's bank account. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.
7	We investigated a manager (GS-15) for allegations of time and attendance fraud, sexual harassment, and other allegations. We found that the allegations were unsubstantiated.
8	We investigated a manager (GS-15) for nepotism related to the hiring of a close family member after the family member exhibited disqualifying behavior during a pre-employment polygraph examination. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.

*Appendix 10: Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public*

During this reporting period, DHS OIG closed one audit, “DHS’ efforts to ensure the physical security of COVID-19 vaccine intended for DHS staff,” without a report. The objective of our audit, initiated in January 2021, was to determine the extent to which DHS ensured the physical security, storage, and transportation of COVID-19 vaccine in accordance with applicable laws and guidance.

Based on our preliminary research, DHS obtained fewer than 100,000 doses of vaccine directly, and instead, opted to partner with the Department of Veterans Affairs to vaccinate DHS staff. We also determined that the respective vaccine manufacturers arranged and delivered vaccine inventory to final destinations and DHS had no role in providing security, storage, or transportation. Therefore, the audit was not warranted.

*Appendix 11: U.S. Office of Special Counsel Referrals Accepted by OIG*

The U.S. Office of Special Counsel (OSC) handles disclosures of wrongdoing and occasionally refers matters to DHS. OIG has the right of first refusal to investigate the referrals. If accepted by OIG, the resulting report is sent back to the Department which, in turn, reports the findings to OSC. Two investigations were conducted on referral from OSC during this reporting period:

- We initiated a review of medical care provided to pregnant detainees by ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC). Our objectives were to: 1) evaluate compliance with existing requirements for pregnant detainees at IHSC-run facilities; 2) document internal IHSC reviews for medical incidents for pregnant detainees; and 3) determine medical staffing levels at IHSC headquarters and IHSC-run detention facilities.
- We provided additional information related to questions regarding TSA’s passenger screening checkpoint activities. Despite OIG’s previous related work and follow-up activities, concerns remained regarding procedures and operations at passenger screening checkpoints. We evaluated passenger volume and screening detection capabilities; use of canines for TSA PreV®; screening; recent changes to TSA PreV® restrictions; challenges with the new CT technology; and alternate screening procedures used at passenger checkpoints.

*Appendix 12: Abbreviations*

AFG	Assistance to Firefighters Grant
AMO	Air and Marine Operations
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
CIGIE	Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CISA	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
Coast Guard	United States Coast Guard
COS	Chief of Staff
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office
DHSES	Division of Homeland Security Services
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FIMA	Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FPS	Federal Protective Service
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office

HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSPD-12	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IT	information technology
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
LSCMS	Logistics Supply Chain Management System
MGMT	Directorate for Management
MMPC	Major Management and Performance Challenges
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OPA	Office of Public Affairs
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPS	Office of Operations Coordination
OSC	U.S. Office of Special Counsel
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
POE	Port of Entry

PRAC	Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
PREPA	Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PRIV	Privacy Office
QC	Questioned Costs
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate
SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	semiannual report
SAVE	DHS Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess Act
SBA	Small Business Administration
SEC	Secretary
Secret Service	United States Secret Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
SSI	Security Sensitive Information
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TSO	Transportation Security Officer
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(U)	Unclassified
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCG	United States Coast Guard
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USPS	United States Postal Service
USSS	United States Secret Service

USVI	United States Virgin Islands
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit



*Appendix 13: Index to Reporting Requirements*

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010*, are listed below.

REQUIREMENT	
Matters Referred to Federal Prosecutorial Authorities	5
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Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
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Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information	19
Review of Legislation and Regulations	Nothing to Report
Reports with Questioned Costs	25
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	25
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	Nothing to Report
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	29
List of Audit Reports Issued	39
Peer Review Results	Nothing to Report
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public	45
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Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	Nothing to Report
No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance	Nothing to Report



## Office of Inspector General

### OIG Hotline

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Department of Homeland Security  
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Attention: Hotline  
245 Murray Drive, SW  
Washington, D.C. 20525-0305

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